Our main focus in this paper is to try to show Rorty＇s point of departure from mainstream pragmatist treatment of epistemology. In his pragmatic approach to epistemology, Rorty urges that a good pragmatist should aba...Our main focus in this paper is to try to show Rorty＇s point of departure from mainstream pragmatist treatment of epistemology. In his pragmatic approach to epistemology, Rorty urges that a good pragmatist should abandon epistemology as a foundational and rational discipline and instead opt for conversation, the view that knowledge is an expression of judgment of a historically conditioned social group） According to Rorty, the view that we should disentangle ourselves from rigid canons of epistemology is the quest of classical pragmatism traceable to the writings of William James and John Dewey. On this showing, Rorty argues that conversationalism is consistent with mainstream or original pragmatism. Contrary to Rorty＇s claim we try to show, in the following pages, that his pragmatic approach to epistemology is a deviation from mainstream pragmatism. We establish that mainstream or classical pragmatists do not repudiate epistemology.展开更多
Richard Rorty thinks he has the same agenda as Donald Davidson. He is wrong. Though Rorty contends truth as only metaphor liberates us, he actually undercuts a rich interpretative ability. Davidson＇s agenda provides ...Richard Rorty thinks he has the same agenda as Donald Davidson. He is wrong. Though Rorty contends truth as only metaphor liberates us, he actually undercuts a rich interpretative ability. Davidson＇s agenda provides ways to explore this ability by elucidating the conditions that reside in the make up of successful communication and in which truth claims are made about the world. Thus, Davidson and Rorty have different agenda, and Davidson＇s offers more promise for philosophy to help explain what we seem to know-we can communicate truthfully about the world.展开更多
Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis is crucial for consequences for the pursuit of epistemology. A interpreting his views on the development of science and their commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the publication ...Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis is crucial for consequences for the pursuit of epistemology. A interpreting his views on the development of science and their commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of the original version of Kuhn＇s epoch-making book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （henceforth： SSR） should thus provide a thorough reflection on this thesis. However, this thesis is not easy to interpret. It is not only complex in itself but has also undergone a historical development--in Kuhn＇s own hands and in those of his interpreters. In this article, I sort out the different interpretations of it, in particular, in Part A. In Part B, I demonstrate their epistemological consequences. Under closer scrutiny, Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis contains several sub-theses Different senses of ＂incommensurability＂ thus need to be distinguished. However, the way in which those distinctions are drawn in Kuhn-scholarship differs. In paragraph I of Part A, I provide an overview of the reception of the incommensurability-thesis in Kuhn-scholarship. In Paragraph II, I trace its development in Kuhn＇s later writings： given its importance and contested nature, Kuhn later clarifies his original thesis. Those later clarifications＇ main function consists in domesticating the most radically relativistic aspects his original incommensurability-thesis had, at least, in the eyes of his interpreters. The upshot of Part A （Paragraphs I and II） is to provide a coherent interpretation of Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis. To that end, I distinguish in line with much of Kuhn-scholarship a semantic from a methodological sense of incommensurability. In part B, the question is raised： What sort of epistemological consequences follow from both senses of incommensurability？ In particular, what consequences follow for the issues of reference, subjectivity （objectivity）, pluralism, and realism？ The underlying question is to what extent Kuhnian incommensurability caters to a relativistic understanding of those issues. This question is answered in Paragraph Ill with the help of the analyses of a currently leading Kuhn-scholar, C. H. Sankey. His answers are taken as a vantage point for my concluding evaluation of the consequences of Kuhnian incommensurability in Paragraph IV.展开更多
In this writing, I reconstruct the Principle of Complementarity in Quantum Mechanics, elaborated by Niels Bohr, and the conception of objectivity implied in it （and in Bohr＇s writings）. Then, I connect it with the ...In this writing, I reconstruct the Principle of Complementarity in Quantum Mechanics, elaborated by Niels Bohr, and the conception of objectivity implied in it （and in Bohr＇s writings）. Then, I connect it with the epistemological pragmatism of the philosopher Richard Rorty. My aim is to reinterpret some issues of this quantum description that concern the category of objectivity from the Rortian perspective in a plausible way. This allows me to connect in a positive and a negative sense some quantum （and Bohrian） assumptions to the Rortian perspective, but mainly, it allows to reconsider the framework of scientific objects from the modern perspective to a new pragmatist and anti-essentialist point of view.展开更多
文摘Our main focus in this paper is to try to show Rorty＇s point of departure from mainstream pragmatist treatment of epistemology. In his pragmatic approach to epistemology, Rorty urges that a good pragmatist should abandon epistemology as a foundational and rational discipline and instead opt for conversation, the view that knowledge is an expression of judgment of a historically conditioned social group） According to Rorty, the view that we should disentangle ourselves from rigid canons of epistemology is the quest of classical pragmatism traceable to the writings of William James and John Dewey. On this showing, Rorty argues that conversationalism is consistent with mainstream or original pragmatism. Contrary to Rorty＇s claim we try to show, in the following pages, that his pragmatic approach to epistemology is a deviation from mainstream pragmatism. We establish that mainstream or classical pragmatists do not repudiate epistemology.
文摘Richard Rorty thinks he has the same agenda as Donald Davidson. He is wrong. Though Rorty contends truth as only metaphor liberates us, he actually undercuts a rich interpretative ability. Davidson＇s agenda provides ways to explore this ability by elucidating the conditions that reside in the make up of successful communication and in which truth claims are made about the world. Thus, Davidson and Rorty have different agenda, and Davidson＇s offers more promise for philosophy to help explain what we seem to know-we can communicate truthfully about the world.
文摘Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis is crucial for consequences for the pursuit of epistemology. A interpreting his views on the development of science and their commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of the original version of Kuhn＇s epoch-making book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （henceforth： SSR） should thus provide a thorough reflection on this thesis. However, this thesis is not easy to interpret. It is not only complex in itself but has also undergone a historical development--in Kuhn＇s own hands and in those of his interpreters. In this article, I sort out the different interpretations of it, in particular, in Part A. In Part B, I demonstrate their epistemological consequences. Under closer scrutiny, Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis contains several sub-theses Different senses of ＂incommensurability＂ thus need to be distinguished. However, the way in which those distinctions are drawn in Kuhn-scholarship differs. In paragraph I of Part A, I provide an overview of the reception of the incommensurability-thesis in Kuhn-scholarship. In Paragraph II, I trace its development in Kuhn＇s later writings： given its importance and contested nature, Kuhn later clarifies his original thesis. Those later clarifications＇ main function consists in domesticating the most radically relativistic aspects his original incommensurability-thesis had, at least, in the eyes of his interpreters. The upshot of Part A （Paragraphs I and II） is to provide a coherent interpretation of Kuhn＇s incommensurability-thesis. To that end, I distinguish in line with much of Kuhn-scholarship a semantic from a methodological sense of incommensurability. In part B, the question is raised： What sort of epistemological consequences follow from both senses of incommensurability？ In particular, what consequences follow for the issues of reference, subjectivity （objectivity）, pluralism, and realism？ The underlying question is to what extent Kuhnian incommensurability caters to a relativistic understanding of those issues. This question is answered in Paragraph Ill with the help of the analyses of a currently leading Kuhn-scholar, C. H. Sankey. His answers are taken as a vantage point for my concluding evaluation of the consequences of Kuhnian incommensurability in Paragraph IV.
文摘In this writing, I reconstruct the Principle of Complementarity in Quantum Mechanics, elaborated by Niels Bohr, and the conception of objectivity implied in it （and in Bohr＇s writings）. Then, I connect it with the epistemological pragmatism of the philosopher Richard Rorty. My aim is to reinterpret some issues of this quantum description that concern the category of objectivity from the Rortian perspective in a plausible way. This allows me to connect in a positive and a negative sense some quantum （and Bohrian） assumptions to the Rortian perspective, but mainly, it allows to reconsider the framework of scientific objects from the modern perspective to a new pragmatist and anti-essentialist point of view.
