A New Approach to China's SOE Reform and Governance

Over the past three decades since 1978,reform of China's SOEs has scored remarkable achievements after the three stages of decentralization,institutional innovation and state capital development.However,the reform at the current stage is confronted with complex situations and problems.Internationally,China's state sector is confronted with pressures from elevated national mandates and a stern international environment.Domestically,China's economic development urgently awaits transformation and changes are taking place in a factor-driven development environment familiar to SOEs.In terms of market-based operations,a great gap exists between the current conditions of the SOEs and the requirements of a sophisticated socialist market economic system.Under such circumstances,the state sector is responsible not only for appreciating the value of state assets but also for assuming the new mission of expediting the transformation of China's economic growth pattern,internationalization and the establishment of a sophisticated market economic system.These requirements mark a new milestone for SOE reform and development.Addressing the conflict between the profitability mandate and the public interest mandate is a key priority of SOE reform in the new era.This paper has approached SOE reform by dividing the state sector into three categories:SOEs that serve public policy,SOEs that serve specific functions,and general commercial SOEs,and creating different governance mechanisms for each type of SOEs.

Three decades of SOE reform:no pain,no gain

What lies ahead for China,difficulties or perhaps another three decades of glory? To address this question,a special event was held at Chongqing Technology and Business University:Symposium on Theories on and Reality of China’s 30 Years of Enterprise Reform and Development,annual meeting of the Chinese Institute of Business Administration for 2008. At the foot of a mountain just south of Chongqing,150 delegates in the field of economic research gathered for discussions on pains and gains of the 30 years of reform. Leading economists at the event included Chen Jiagui,vice president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),Zhang Guoyou,vice president of Peking University,and Jin Bei,deputy director of CASS’s Institute of Industrial Economics (IIE). The symposium was jointly sponsored by the Chinese Institute of Business Administration,Jiang Yiwei Academic Foundation for Enterprise Reform and Development,Chongqing Technology and Business University,and CASS Management Science Research Institute. The following is a group of articles written by staff reporters of the China Economist (CE).

SOE Reform: from Corporate System to Ownership System

China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restructuring is important not only as a contribution to the general economic development literature, but also for China to best understand how its development has played out so far, and thus how it might best be continued.

Challenges faced by SOE reform

State-owned enterprises’(SOE) greater independence from government offices as well as property rights reform have optimized SOEs’ shareholding structure. But the reform has to clear several hurdles before it can be fully realized. In 1998, the central government dismantled ministries that had been the direct administrators of large SOEs. Most functions of those ministries were transferred to industry associations. Only a few considered indispensable were taken over by other government offices. The move has pushed forward the SOE reform to some extent. On the other hand, being State-owned, those enterprises have to find new links with the government.

Revisiting China's SOE Reform Strategy

State-owned enterprise(SOE)reform is often singledout as the least successful component of China’ssuccessful reform history of the past two decades. Thisis supported by the poor performance of the SOE sectorand the financial burden it has imposed on the country’sfiscal and financial systems. Many observers strongly

An Empirical Research on Mixed- Ownership Reform and SOE Innovation： Evidence from China＇s Industrial Enterprises

Using the microscopic data of China's industrial enterprises, this paper measures innovation efficiency by the sales revenue of new products as a share in total sales revenue, and examines SOE mixed ownership reform's innovation efficiency effect using PSM method under a "quasi-natural experiment" theoretical framework. Results indicate that: Mixed-ownership reform can significantly increase corporate innovation efficiency. Reformed SOEs are more efficient at innovation than foreign-funded firms, private firms and firms invested by Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This paper provides robust evidence for evaluating SOE innovation performance after mixed-ownership reform, and offers policy implications for promoting SOE mixed-ownership reform.

China's Next Step:to Reform Monopoly Industries

Based on the study of enterprise managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs, this paper points out the new characteristics of managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs:administrative monopoly has become increasingly common, while corruption for personal gains by SOE leaders hits become less and less frequent.This means the reform of SOEs has entered a new stage in which the core problem is how to deal with administrative monopoly.

On the Nature and Direction of State-owned Enterprises Reform in a New Era

State-owned enterprises(SOEs) serve as an important material and political basis for socialism with Chinese characteristics. SOEs must be reformed in accordance with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is the fundamental basis for maintaining the nature and direction of reform for SOEs. Reforms must be built on the fundamental standpoint with people at the center, and aimed at emancipating, developing and protecting productive forces based on the principles of justice and fairness, which is also the direction for Chinese SOEs reform in the new era. Adherence to the public ownership of state-owned assets in the form of value and its market-oriented management in the form of use-value is not only the objective requirement of a production mode adapting to the growth of productive forces, but also the logic of SOEs reform in the new era. Meanwhile, SOEs need to highlight the top-level designs of governmental systems in the reform process, giving e ective play to the leading and guiding roles of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era.

国企瘦身健体改革的成效评估:基于企业造血功能的视角

本文以2012-2018年A股非金融行业上市公司为样本,以瘦身健体改革为准自然实验构建多时点双重差分模型,系统考察了瘦身健体改革对于国有控股公司造血功能的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著改善了国有控股公司的造血功能,并且主要通过剥离国有控股公司的战略性政策负担,促使其聚焦主业经营、降低组织臃肿程度和减少过度投资三种机制发挥作用。异质性检验表明,瘦身健体改革的政策效果主要存在于改革意愿较高、公司内部和外部治理环境较差的国有控股公司当中。总之,本研究为国有企业瘦身健体改革的积极效果提供了实证证据,对持续推进和深化国企改革具有很好的政策含义。

国企混改的理性优势、实践逻辑与路径优化

自2013年党的十八届三中全会提出“积极发展混合所有制经济”以来,混合所有制改革经历了前期的夯基垒台与立柱架梁、中期的重点推进与积厚成势,已积累了丰富的实践经验,取得了实质性突破和历史性成就。但与此同时,随着国有企业混合所有制改革实践的日益深化,其也面临着诸多争议、困惑和挑战,亟须在理论上作出回应。本文立足国有企业混合所有制改革实践,研究阐释了具有工具理性的混合所有制改革实践策略与中国共产党人民利益至上价值取向之间的契合性,基于价值理性与工具理性的有机统一剖析了中国特色国有企业混合所有制改革的独特优势;揭示了通过国有企业混合所有制改革做强做优做大国有企业并进一步推动国有经济高质量发展,实现坚持人民主体地位、维护人民经济利益、促进全体人民共同富裕等价值取向的内在机理;并从聚焦提升国有企业核心竞争力和增强国有企业核心功能以及营造高质量创新生态,完善产权保护制度和中国特色现代企业制度,优化收入分配机制和差异化管控机制等方面,为国有企业混合所有制改革的走深走实、规范有序、提质增效提供可资借鉴的优化路径。

China’s internal and external economic imbalances and fiscal reform

China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account surplus,this paper purports to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that while the chronic savings-consumption imbalance is an important contributor to China’s huge trade surplus,the fundamental underlying contributor is the income structure and savings structure imbalance stemming from the disproportionate increase in retained earnings relative to stagnant wage bills.Corporate retained earnings keep growing rapidly because corporate profit margins are"overstated"and state-owned enterprises"do not pay dividends."Only when these issues are resolved at the institutional level can the savings rate be reduced to an appropriate level with domestic demand boosted to eliminate excess trade surpluses and fundamentally fix internal and external economic imbalances.

国有企业改革的资源配置效应及其机制研究

本文通过梳理国有企业改革的制度背景和政策实践,提出国企改革引致的资源配置效应,并从国企改制前后、改制国企与未改制国企、改制国企与非国有企业三个维度进行实证分析。研究发现,混合所有制改革提升国有企业的全要素生产率和市场份额,改制国企的全要素生产率显著高于未改制国企,实现资源从国有企业向改制国企和非国有企业的重置,优化要素资源在企业间的配置效率。机制分析表明,国有企业改革通过减轻要素市场扭曲、消除行政性垄断、缓解融资约束、剥离政策性负担来实现资源配置效应。上述研究对深化国有企业改革、更好服务实体经济,助力经济高质量发展具有一定的理论支撑和参考价值。

瘦身健体改革抑制了国有企业成本粘性吗?

降本增效是深化国有企业改革和实现国有企业做强做优做大目标的重要举措之一。利用2016年国务院审议通过的《中央企业深化改革瘦身健体工作方案》这一外生事件作为准自然实验,采用双重差分模型系统地检验政府干预对国有企业成本粘性的影响及作用机制。实证研究结果表明,瘦身健体改革方案实施对国有企业成本粘性具有显著的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性这一现象并不因企业层级、盈利能力和市场竞争程度差异而发生显著变化。作用渠道检验发现,无论企业信息环境透明度和资产专用性情况如何,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性的现象均依然存在,但在信息透明度低、资产专用性强的国有企业中更为明显。研究结论不仅丰富了国有企业改革经济后果方面的研究,拓展了企业成本粘性影响因素的文献,而且有助于从国有企业降本增效的角度为推进供给侧结构性改革提供政策建议。

国有股权参股如何影响民营企业信用评级

民营经济是推进中国式现代化的生力军,民营企业信用评级不高是亟待解决的问题。混合所有制改革是利用不同股权的融合放大国有资本功能进而促进经济发展的重要举措,以民营企业参与混合所有制改革视角进行研究发现:国有股权参股能显著提升民营企业信用评级。影响机制检验发现,国有股权参股通过缓解融资约束和降低经营风险,提升民营企业信用评级。进一步研究发现,在管理层代理成本、国有股权制衡度、行业竞争程度及经济政策不确定性更高时,国有股权参股对民营企业信用评级的提升作用更有效。研究表明混合所有制改革承载着巨大制度红利,有助于实现民营企业健康持续发展,对国有资本和民营企业具有“1+1>2”效应,对混改政策实施效应和民营企业是否引入国有股权有重要决策参考意义。

政府政策引导下国有企业引入战略投资者演化博弈及仿真分析

构建演化博弈模型探究国有企业引入战略投资者过程中双方的行为逻辑和策略选择,求解稳定均衡策略,仿真模拟不同初始状态下博弈参与主体的策略选择及其受激励政策影响的动态演化过程。研究表明:政府激励政策会影响博弈双方的策略选择,且在不同初始状态下存在差异,当双方初始意愿较低时,国有企业选择引入策略的概率随激励力度增加而提升,初始意愿较高平时,战略投资者最优策略选择转为“参与”。国有企业初始意愿较高时,政策倾斜具有“锦上添花”的促进效应,初始意愿较低时,则减缓了其收敛速度;当双方初始意愿较高时,激励政策供给概率下降使参与主体的最优策略选择发生根本性变化。

混合所有制改革进程中国有与非国有资本相互融合的演化博弈分析

国有资本、集体资本、非公有资本等交叉持股、相互融合的混合所有制经济是我国基本经济制度的重要实现形式,积极推进混合所有制改革,促使国有与非国有资本融合发展意义重大。构建演化博弈模型分析了国有与非国有资本相互融合过程中策略选择的演化过程及其收敛趋势,并仿真模拟了政策激励影响博弈主体策略选择的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:国有与非国有资本相互融合的行为博弈存在演化稳定均衡策略,能否相互融合取决于事前交易成本、政策激励强度、政策倾斜与溢出以及新组建混合所有制企业预期收益。初始意愿高时,制度激励发挥了锦上添花效应,有效促进演化博弈系统收敛至理想状态,初始意愿低时具有减缓收敛速度的作用。事前经济激励具有正向引导效应,且初始意愿超过一定阈值后,将扭转博弈参与主体的最优策略选择,逐渐向“融合”转变。政策倾斜增加了国有资本的融合收益,但初始意愿偏低时,在模仿学习中仍倾向于“不融合”。政策溢出效应下降时,初始意愿超过一定阈值之后,理性的博弈参与者会转向“融合”策略。

典型央企对国有相对控股企业差异化管控模式的探索及启示

优化完善对混合所有制企业尤其是国有相对控股混改企业的管理,是深化混合所有制企业机制改革的关键,也是国企改革中一大难题。目前,国铁出资人对国铁相对控股企业的管控更多是沿用对国铁独资、全资及绝对控股公司的管控模式和治理手段,影响混改作用的发挥,亟需建立差异化管控模式。与此同时,部分央企和地方国有企业先行先试,积极探索创新,对国有相对控股混合所有制企业的差异化管控逐渐摸索了一些可供借鉴的经验。通过分析国企混改的政策法规要求,借鉴其他企业差异化管理经验,为建立完善国铁相对控股企业差异化管控模式提供启示。

以“公交+”思维推动公交出行产业改革发展——以济南公交传统辅业改革实践性探索为例

当前,城市公共交通行业面临着疫情常态化和出行方式多元化的冲击,带来了客流下降、吸引力降低等诸多困难,到了改革转型的重要关口。要保持行业的公益属性和吸引力,有必要推动公交出行产业改革发展,提高公交资源的利用效率,补强公交产业链。为此,国有公交企业应当大力推动运营主业和传统辅业融合发展,激发传统辅业经营活力。济南公交集团以“公交+”思维推动公交出行产业改革发展的实践充分体现了立足公交、立足市场、活用资源的特色,可供公交行业参考借鉴。