How ＂New SOEs＂ Come of Age： Four Decades of China＇s SOE Reform

China＇s complex and twisted journey of SOE reform over the past four decades is an unprecedented transformation in its history and is at the center stage of its economic reforms. Over the past four decades, SOEs transitioned from being affiliates of a planned economy to ＂new SOEs＂ as modern enterprises under the market economic system. This journey can be roughly divided into the following four stages： the reform to expand SOE autonomy during 1978-1993, the reform to create a modern enterprise system during 1993- 2003, the reform to create a new system for the administration of state assets during 2003- 2013, and the new era of classified SOE reform since 2013. After the four stages, China＇s SOE reform has made tremendous achievements, particularly since the 18th CPC National Congress. V~th policy readiness for SOE reform in the new era, reform should be carried out in a comprehensive and systematic manner for different types of SOEs in the future.

Analysis on auditing problems in SOEs joint share system reform

At the present stage of the SOEs joint share system reform, the problem of distorted accounting information, the failed financial audit and the ensuing erosion of the state： Owned assets, have severely impeded the process of the SOEs reform. This paper conducts an in-depth analysis on auditing problems in the process of the SOEs reform from managerial points of view, makes the suggestion that we should introduce governmental audit into the auditing supervision of the SOEs reform, and discusses its methods, approaches, contents and procedures in detail. This paper also indicates the possible obstacles of implementing this suggestion.

A New Approach to China's SOE Reform and Governance

Over the past three decades since 1978,reform of China's SOEs has scored remarkable achievements after the three stages of decentralization,institutional innovation and state capital development.However,the reform at the current stage is confronted with complex situations and problems.Internationally,China's state sector is confronted with pressures from elevated national mandates and a stern international environment.Domestically,China's economic development urgently awaits transformation and changes are taking place in a factor-driven development environment familiar to SOEs.In terms of market-based operations,a great gap exists between the current conditions of the SOEs and the requirements of a sophisticated socialist market economic system.Under such circumstances,the state sector is responsible not only for appreciating the value of state assets but also for assuming the new mission of expediting the transformation of China's economic growth pattern,internationalization and the establishment of a sophisticated market economic system.These requirements mark a new milestone for SOE reform and development.Addressing the conflict between the profitability mandate and the public interest mandate is a key priority of SOE reform in the new era.This paper has approached SOE reform by dividing the state sector into three categories:SOEs that serve public policy,SOEs that serve specific functions,and general commercial SOEs,and creating different governance mechanisms for each type of SOEs.

Three decades of SOE reform:no pain,no gain

What lies ahead for China,difficulties or perhaps another three decades of glory? To address this question,a special event was held at Chongqing Technology and Business University:Symposium on Theories on and Reality of China’s 30 Years of Enterprise Reform and Development,annual meeting of the Chinese Institute of Business Administration for 2008. At the foot of a mountain just south of Chongqing,150 delegates in the field of economic research gathered for discussions on pains and gains of the 30 years of reform. Leading economists at the event included Chen Jiagui,vice president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),Zhang Guoyou,vice president of Peking University,and Jin Bei,deputy director of CASS’s Institute of Industrial Economics (IIE). The symposium was jointly sponsored by the Chinese Institute of Business Administration,Jiang Yiwei Academic Foundation for Enterprise Reform and Development,Chongqing Technology and Business University,and CASS Management Science Research Institute. The following is a group of articles written by staff reporters of the China Economist (CE).

An Empirical Research on Mixed- Ownership Reform and SOE Innovation： Evidence from China＇s Industrial Enterprises

Using the microscopic data of China＇s industrial enterprises, this paper measures innovation efficiency by the sales revenue of new products as a share in total sales revenue, and examines SOE mixed ownership reform＇s innovation efficiency effect using PSM method under a ＂quasi-natural experiment＂ theoretical framework. Results indicate that： Mixed-ownership reform can significantly increase corporate innovation efficiency. Reformed SOEs are more efficient at innovation than foreign-funded firms, private firms and firms invested by Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This paper provides robust evidence for evaluating SOt？ innovation performance after mixed-ownership reform, and offers policy implications for promoting SOE mixed-ownership reform.

SOE Reform: from Corporate System to Ownership System

China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restructuring is important not only as a contribution to the general economic development literature, but also for China to best understand how its development has played out so far, and thus how it might best be continued.

Mixed-Ownership Reform

China encourages the inflow of foreign capital in SOE restructuring

Challenges faced by SOE reform

State-owned enterprises’(SOE) greater independence from government offices as well as property rights reform have optimized SOEs’ shareholding structure. But the reform has to clear several hurdles before it can be fully realized. In 1998, the central government dismantled ministries that had been the direct administrators of large SOEs. Most functions of those ministries were transferred to industry associations. Only a few considered indispensable were taken over by other government offices. The move has pushed forward the SOE reform to some extent. On the other hand, being State-owned, those enterprises have to find new links with the government.

国有企业工资溢价与形成机制

本文基于三轮中国企业雇主—雇员匹配数据追踪调查(CMEELS)数据,采用分位数回归和反事实分解方法,对2017—2021年国有企业工资溢价及其形成机制进行探究。研究发现:这段时期国企相对于非国企存在工资溢价,工资溢价主要集中在中高收入层次上,形成国企工资溢价的主要原因是国企和非国企间的劳动力市场分割。进一步分析表明,在高工资水平上,女性和农村户口持有者等群体在非国有企业受到了工资歧视,因此上述群体中存在较大的国企工资溢价。据此本文建议未来应坚持劳动力市场化改革方向,有针对性地打破国企和非国企之间的劳动力市场分割,加强对就业歧视行为的约束,提高中国劳动力市场运行效率。

国有企业集团内部放权路径研究

深化国有企业改革是全面深化改革的重要组成部分。本文将国有企业集团内部放权路径分为自上而下和自下而上两种,探讨母公司和子公司面临所在地竞争变化时如何放权。本文以行政审批中心设立为准自然实验,基于2005-2018年中国沪深A股国有控股上市公司及子公司数据,采用双重差分模型实证检验母公司所在地竞争程度和子公司所在地竞争程度对国有企业集团内部放权的影响。研究结果显示:母公司所在地区竞争加剧增加了内部放权,但子公司所在地区竞争加剧的影响不显著,即国有企业集团内部放权路径是自上而下的。这种自上而下的放权受到母公司信息处理过载和母公司信息获取成本的影响,当母公司业务繁忙、母公司市场竞争地位高、兼任人为高管和兼任人有集团外部兼任时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权;当母公司与子公司距离远和子公司规模大时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权。本文揭示了国有企业集团内部自上而下的放权路径,表明在国资监管“放管服”过程中,协调内部放权路径可能是打通改革“最后一公里”和激发国有企业活力的有效措施。

State-Owned Capital Participation in Private Enterprises:A Perspective of Debt Financing

This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.

China's Next Step:to Reform Monopoly Industries

Based on the study of enterprise managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs, this paper points out the new characteristics of managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs:administrative monopoly has become increasingly common, while corruption for personal gains by SOE leaders hits become less and less frequent.This means the reform of SOEs has entered a new stage in which the core problem is how to deal with administrative monopoly.

Private Placement,Employee Ownership Plan and Mixed Ownership Reform--A Case Study of Wuliangye Listed Company

The reform core of state-owned enterprises is to develop mixed-ownership’s economy effectively,therefore there are so many large-and medium-sized state-owned enterprises using a variety of resources,adopting various ways to realize mixed-ownership reforms,enriching the theories of mixed-ownership reform,and creating a large number of practical samples.Wuliangye Company,as a very famous making liquor company in China,has issued a large of new stocks to excellent dealers,administrative staffs,and outstanding employees,so that the company can draw into massive private capital in 2016,so Wuliangye Company have made the first step about mixed-ownership reform among Chinese state-owned enterprises.Through comparing the quantity of monetary capital and asset-liability ratio of Wuliangye Company before and after directional issuing new stocks,the distrust about only adding money and welfare tool for relative benefit people can be eliminated.Moreover,the affection of directional issuing new stocks can promote Wuliangye Company dealers and employees to hold shareholdings,and optimize ownership structure.Wuliangye Company has got the exploration for optimizing equity structure to solid foundation for speeding up stated-owned enterprises reform paces,also providing some useful experiences of other mixed-ownership reform,and the ways and patterns are worthy of learning and studying.

On the Nature and Direction of State-owned Enterprises Reform in a New Era

State-owned enterprises(SOEs) serve as an important material and political basis for socialism with Chinese characteristics. SOEs must be reformed in accordance with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is the fundamental basis for maintaining the nature and direction of reform for SOEs. Reforms must be built on the fundamental standpoint with people at the center, and aimed at emancipating, developing and protecting productive forces based on the principles of justice and fairness, which is also the direction for Chinese SOEs reform in the new era. Adherence to the public ownership of state-owned assets in the form of value and its market-oriented management in the form of use-value is not only the objective requirement of a production mode adapting to the growth of productive forces, but also the logic of SOEs reform in the new era. Meanwhile, SOEs need to highlight the top-level designs of governmental systems in the reform process, giving e ective play to the leading and guiding roles of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era.

国企混改的理性优势、实践逻辑与路径优化

自2013年党的十八届三中全会提出“积极发展混合所有制经济”以来,混合所有制改革经历了前期的夯基垒台与立柱架梁、中期的重点推进与积厚成势,已积累了丰富的实践经验,取得了实质性突破和历史性成就。但与此同时,随着国有企业混合所有制改革实践的日益深化,其也面临着诸多争议、困惑和挑战,亟须在理论上作出回应。本文立足国有企业混合所有制改革实践,研究阐释了具有工具理性的混合所有制改革实践策略与中国共产党人民利益至上价值取向之间的契合性,基于价值理性与工具理性的有机统一剖析了中国特色国有企业混合所有制改革的独特优势;揭示了通过国有企业混合所有制改革做强做优做大国有企业并进一步推动国有经济高质量发展,实现坚持人民主体地位、维护人民经济利益、促进全体人民共同富裕等价值取向的内在机理;并从聚焦提升国有企业核心竞争力和增强国有企业核心功能以及营造高质量创新生态,完善产权保护制度和中国特色现代企业制度,优化收入分配机制和差异化管控机制等方面,为国有企业混合所有制改革的走深走实、规范有序、提质增效提供可资借鉴的优化路径。

国企瘦身健体改革的成效评估:基于企业造血功能的视角

本文以2012-2018年A股非金融行业上市公司为样本,以瘦身健体改革为准自然实验构建多时点双重差分模型,系统考察了瘦身健体改革对于国有控股公司造血功能的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著改善了国有控股公司的造血功能,并且主要通过剥离国有控股公司的战略性政策负担,促使其聚焦主业经营、降低组织臃肿程度和减少过度投资三种机制发挥作用。异质性检验表明,瘦身健体改革的政策效果主要存在于改革意愿较高、公司内部和外部治理环境较差的国有控股公司当中。总之,本研究为国有企业瘦身健体改革的积极效果提供了实证证据,对持续推进和深化国企改革具有很好的政策含义。

China’s internal and external economic imbalances and fiscal reform

China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account surplus,this paper purports to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that while the chronic savings-consumption imbalance is an important contributor to China’s huge trade surplus,the fundamental underlying contributor is the income structure and savings structure imbalance stemming from the disproportionate increase in retained earnings relative to stagnant wage bills.Corporate retained earnings keep growing rapidly because corporate profit margins are"overstated"and state-owned enterprises"do not pay dividends."Only when these issues are resolved at the institutional level can the savings rate be reduced to an appropriate level with domestic demand boosted to eliminate excess trade surpluses and fundamentally fix internal and external economic imbalances.

国有企业改革的资源配置效应及其机制研究

本文通过梳理国有企业改革的制度背景和政策实践,提出国企改革引致的资源配置效应,并从国企改制前后、改制国企与未改制国企、改制国企与非国有企业三个维度进行实证分析。研究发现,混合所有制改革提升国有企业的全要素生产率和市场份额,改制国企的全要素生产率显著高于未改制国企,实现资源从国有企业向改制国企和非国有企业的重置,优化要素资源在企业间的配置效率。机制分析表明,国有企业改革通过减轻要素市场扭曲、消除行政性垄断、缓解融资约束、剥离政策性负担来实现资源配置效应。上述研究对深化国有企业改革、更好服务实体经济,助力经济高质量发展具有一定的理论支撑和参考价值。

瘦身健体改革抑制了国有企业成本粘性吗?

降本增效是深化国有企业改革和实现国有企业做强做优做大目标的重要举措之一。利用2016年国务院审议通过的《中央企业深化改革瘦身健体工作方案》这一外生事件作为准自然实验,采用双重差分模型系统地检验政府干预对国有企业成本粘性的影响及作用机制。实证研究结果表明,瘦身健体改革方案实施对国有企业成本粘性具有显著的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性这一现象并不因企业层级、盈利能力和市场竞争程度差异而发生显著变化。作用渠道检验发现,无论企业信息环境透明度和资产专用性情况如何,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性的现象均依然存在,但在信息透明度低、资产专用性强的国有企业中更为明显。研究结论不仅丰富了国有企业改革经济后果方面的研究,拓展了企业成本粘性影响因素的文献,而且有助于从国有企业降本增效的角度为推进供给侧结构性改革提供政策建议。

The state capital investing and operating company pilot reform and SOE bailouts

This paper explores the influence of the State Capital Investing and Operating Company(SCIOC)pilot reform on SOE bailout using a staggered differencein-differences model.Based on a sample of listed SOEs during 2011-2018,we find that when the real controllers of listed SOEs enter the list of SCIOCs,soft budget constraints are alleviated and listed subsidiaries are less likely to become distressed.Mechanism tests indicate that SCIOCs help distressed firms through exiting the market,reducing bank loans,enhancing corporate governance,and improving operating efficiency.Heterogeneity tests show that the effect of SCIOC establishment is more significant in central and western regions,in public welfare and special function industries,for central SCIOCs,for state capital investing companies,when firms are organized in more layers,and for firms that engage in M&As.The empirical results show that the implementation of SCIOCs benefits both micro-enterprise development and state capital layout optimization.