To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the dece...To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.展开更多
International Environmental Agreements （IEAs） are a form of cooperation ratified by countries which can improve the management of shared environmental resources. The authors analyze the stability of International Ea...International Environmental Agreements （IEAs） are a form of cooperation ratified by countries which can improve the management of shared environmental resources. The authors analyze the stability of International Eavironmental Agreements in leadership model. In 2006, Diamantoudi ＆ Sartzetakis found that a stable coalition consists of either 2, 3, or 4 members if the number of countries is greater than 4. Their model is reconsidered. It is shown that the size of stable IEAs decreases from 3 to 2 when the total number of countries involved increases. However, a situation that can guarantee 4 to be the size of stable IEAs could not be found.展开更多
This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terro...This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471034)the Talent Foundation of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (s0670-082).
文摘To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.
基金The research is supported by Centre interuniversitaire de RECHERCHE en economie quantitative (CIREQ).
文摘International Environmental Agreements （IEAs） are a form of cooperation ratified by countries which can improve the management of shared environmental resources. The authors analyze the stability of International Eavironmental Agreements in leadership model. In 2006, Diamantoudi ＆ Sartzetakis found that a stable coalition consists of either 2, 3, or 4 members if the number of countries is greater than 4. Their model is reconsidered. It is shown that the size of stable IEAs decreases from 3 to 2 when the total number of countries involved increases. However, a situation that can guarantee 4 to be the size of stable IEAs could not be found.
基金Supported by the Key Technologies Research and DevelopmentProgram of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan of China (No 2006BAK04A08)
文摘This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.
