A New Approach to China's SOE Reform and Governance

Over the past three decades since 1978,reform of China's SOEs has scored remarkable achievements after the three stages of decentralization,institutional innovation and state capital development.However,the reform at the current stage is confronted with complex situations and problems.Internationally,China's state sector is confronted with pressures from elevated national mandates and a stern international environment.Domestically,China's economic development urgently awaits transformation and changes are taking place in a factor-driven development environment familiar to SOEs.In terms of market-based operations,a great gap exists between the current conditions of the SOEs and the requirements of a sophisticated socialist market economic system.Under such circumstances,the state sector is responsible not only for appreciating the value of state assets but also for assuming the new mission of expediting the transformation of China's economic growth pattern,internationalization and the establishment of a sophisticated market economic system.These requirements mark a new milestone for SOE reform and development.Addressing the conflict between the profitability mandate and the public interest mandate is a key priority of SOE reform in the new era.This paper has approached SOE reform by dividing the state sector into three categories:SOEs that serve public policy,SOEs that serve specific functions,and general commercial SOEs,and creating different governance mechanisms for each type of SOEs.

Three decades of SOE reform:no pain,no gain

What lies ahead for China,difficulties or perhaps another three decades of glory? To address this question,a special event was held at Chongqing Technology and Business University:Symposium on Theories on and Reality of China’s 30 Years of Enterprise Reform and Development,annual meeting of the Chinese Institute of Business Administration for 2008. At the foot of a mountain just south of Chongqing,150 delegates in the field of economic research gathered for discussions on pains and gains of the 30 years of reform. Leading economists at the event included Chen Jiagui,vice president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),Zhang Guoyou,vice president of Peking University,and Jin Bei,deputy director of CASS’s Institute of Industrial Economics (IIE). The symposium was jointly sponsored by the Chinese Institute of Business Administration,Jiang Yiwei Academic Foundation for Enterprise Reform and Development,Chongqing Technology and Business University,and CASS Management Science Research Institute. The following is a group of articles written by staff reporters of the China Economist (CE).

SOE Reform: from Corporate System to Ownership System

China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restructuring is important not only as a contribution to the general economic development literature, but also for China to best understand how its development has played out so far, and thus how it might best be continued.

Challenges faced by SOE reform

State-owned enterprises’(SOE) greater independence from government offices as well as property rights reform have optimized SOEs’ shareholding structure. But the reform has to clear several hurdles before it can be fully realized. In 1998, the central government dismantled ministries that had been the direct administrators of large SOEs. Most functions of those ministries were transferred to industry associations. Only a few considered indispensable were taken over by other government offices. The move has pushed forward the SOE reform to some extent. On the other hand, being State-owned, those enterprises have to find new links with the government.

Revisiting China's SOE Reform Strategy

State-owned enterprise(SOE)reform is often singledout as the least successful component of China’ssuccessful reform history of the past two decades. Thisis supported by the poor performance of the SOE sectorand the financial burden it has imposed on the country’sfiscal and financial systems. Many observers strongly

Analysis on auditing problems in SOEs joint share system reform

At the present stage of the SOEs joint share system reform, the problem of distorted accounting information, the failed financial audit and the ensuing erosion of the state： Owned assets, have severely impeded the process of the SOEs reform. This paper conducts an in-depth analysis on auditing problems in the process of the SOEs reform from managerial points of view, makes the suggestion that we should introduce governmental audit into the auditing supervision of the SOEs reform, and discusses its methods, approaches, contents and procedures in detail. This paper also indicates the possible obstacles of implementing this suggestion.

国有企业工资溢价与形成机制

本文基于三轮中国企业雇主—雇员匹配数据追踪调查(CMEELS)数据,采用分位数回归和反事实分解方法,对2017—2021年国有企业工资溢价及其形成机制进行探究。研究发现:这段时期国企相对于非国企存在工资溢价,工资溢价主要集中在中高收入层次上,形成国企工资溢价的主要原因是国企和非国企间的劳动力市场分割。进一步分析表明,在高工资水平上,女性和农村户口持有者等群体在非国有企业受到了工资歧视,因此上述群体中存在较大的国企工资溢价。据此本文建议未来应坚持劳动力市场化改革方向,有针对性地打破国企和非国企之间的劳动力市场分割,加强对就业歧视行为的约束,提高中国劳动力市场运行效率。

国企混改、公司治理与企业绩效研究

发展混合所有制经济是深化新时期国企改革的重点。基于公司治理视角,系统分析国企混改对企业绩效的影响机制,以2010—2022年全部沪深上市国有企业数据为样本,采用固定效应模型、中介效应模型及双重差分模型分析引入战略投资者这一混改方式对国有企业公司治理和企业绩效的影响。实证结果表明:国企混改有利于提升企业绩效;公司治理在国企混改对企业绩效的影响中能够起到部分中介传导作用。进一步研究发现,国企混改政策的推行本身对于企业绩效有积极的政策效应;国企混改对企业绩效的影响效果在央企和地方国企、竞争性行业和垄断性行业里均有所不同。因此,政府应发挥引导和监管作用,深化国资国企改革,推动国有企业与民营资本合作共赢,战略投资者也应积极响应国家政策,助力国资民企合作共赢。

混合所有制改革能否促进国有企业数字化转型?

基于国有企业改革视角,以2013—2022年沪深A股国有上市公司为研究对象,实证检验混合所有制改革对国有企业数字化转型的影响。研究发现,混合所有制改革能够显著提升国有企业数字化水平,该结论在经过工具变量两阶段回归、倾向得分匹配、改变变量度量方法和计量估计方法、排除替代性解释影响等稳健性测试后仍然成立。作用机制检验结果表明,混合所有制改革通过治理效应和资源效应推动了国有企业数字化转型。异质性分析显示,对于市场化水平较高地区和政策性负担较大的国有企业,混合所有制改革对数字化转型的正向影响更明显。经济后果考察发现,混合所有制改革通过促进国有企业数字化转型显著提升了其市场价值。

国有企业集团内部放权路径研究

深化国有企业改革是全面深化改革的重要组成部分。本文将国有企业集团内部放权路径分为自上而下和自下而上两种,探讨母公司和子公司面临所在地竞争变化时如何放权。本文以行政审批中心设立为准自然实验,基于2005-2018年中国沪深A股国有控股上市公司及子公司数据,采用双重差分模型实证检验母公司所在地竞争程度和子公司所在地竞争程度对国有企业集团内部放权的影响。研究结果显示:母公司所在地区竞争加剧增加了内部放权,但子公司所在地区竞争加剧的影响不显著,即国有企业集团内部放权路径是自上而下的。这种自上而下的放权受到母公司信息处理过载和母公司信息获取成本的影响,当母公司业务繁忙、母公司市场竞争地位高、兼任人为高管和兼任人有集团外部兼任时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权;当母公司与子公司距离远和子公司规模大时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权。本文揭示了国有企业集团内部自上而下的放权路径,表明在国资监管“放管服”过程中,协调内部放权路径可能是打通改革“最后一公里”和激发国有企业活力的有效措施。

China's Next Step:to Reform Monopoly Industries

Based on the study of enterprise managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs, this paper points out the new characteristics of managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs:administrative monopoly has become increasingly common, while corruption for personal gains by SOE leaders hits become less and less frequent.This means the reform of SOEs has entered a new stage in which the core problem is how to deal with administrative monopoly.

国企混改的理性优势、实践逻辑与路径优化

自2013年党的十八届三中全会提出“积极发展混合所有制经济”以来,混合所有制改革经历了前期的夯基垒台与立柱架梁、中期的重点推进与积厚成势,已积累了丰富的实践经验,取得了实质性突破和历史性成就。但与此同时,随着国有企业混合所有制改革实践的日益深化,其也面临着诸多争议、困惑和挑战,亟须在理论上作出回应。本文立足国有企业混合所有制改革实践,研究阐释了具有工具理性的混合所有制改革实践策略与中国共产党人民利益至上价值取向之间的契合性,基于价值理性与工具理性的有机统一剖析了中国特色国有企业混合所有制改革的独特优势;揭示了通过国有企业混合所有制改革做强做优做大国有企业并进一步推动国有经济高质量发展,实现坚持人民主体地位、维护人民经济利益、促进全体人民共同富裕等价值取向的内在机理;并从聚焦提升国有企业核心竞争力和增强国有企业核心功能以及营造高质量创新生态,完善产权保护制度和中国特色现代企业制度,优化收入分配机制和差异化管控机制等方面,为国有企业混合所有制改革的走深走实、规范有序、提质增效提供可资借鉴的优化路径。

On the Nature and Direction of State-owned Enterprises Reform in a New Era

State-owned enterprises(SOEs) serve as an important material and political basis for socialism with Chinese characteristics. SOEs must be reformed in accordance with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is the fundamental basis for maintaining the nature and direction of reform for SOEs. Reforms must be built on the fundamental standpoint with people at the center, and aimed at emancipating, developing and protecting productive forces based on the principles of justice and fairness, which is also the direction for Chinese SOEs reform in the new era. Adherence to the public ownership of state-owned assets in the form of value and its market-oriented management in the form of use-value is not only the objective requirement of a production mode adapting to the growth of productive forces, but also the logic of SOEs reform in the new era. Meanwhile, SOEs need to highlight the top-level designs of governmental systems in the reform process, giving e ective play to the leading and guiding roles of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era.

国企瘦身健体改革的成效评估:基于企业造血功能的视角

本文以2012-2018年A股非金融行业上市公司为样本,以瘦身健体改革为准自然实验构建多时点双重差分模型,系统考察了瘦身健体改革对于国有控股公司造血功能的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著改善了国有控股公司的造血功能,并且主要通过剥离国有控股公司的战略性政策负担,促使其聚焦主业经营、降低组织臃肿程度和减少过度投资三种机制发挥作用。异质性检验表明,瘦身健体改革的政策效果主要存在于改革意愿较高、公司内部和外部治理环境较差的国有控股公司当中。总之,本研究为国有企业瘦身健体改革的积极效果提供了实证证据,对持续推进和深化国企改革具有很好的政策含义。

瘦身健体改革抑制了国有企业成本粘性吗?

降本增效是深化国有企业改革和实现国有企业做强做优做大目标的重要举措之一。利用2016年国务院审议通过的《中央企业深化改革瘦身健体工作方案》这一外生事件作为准自然实验,采用双重差分模型系统地检验政府干预对国有企业成本粘性的影响及作用机制。实证研究结果表明,瘦身健体改革方案实施对国有企业成本粘性具有显著的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性这一现象并不因企业层级、盈利能力和市场竞争程度差异而发生显著变化。作用渠道检验发现,无论企业信息环境透明度和资产专用性情况如何,瘦身健体改革显著抑制国有企业成本粘性的现象均依然存在,但在信息透明度低、资产专用性强的国有企业中更为明显。研究结论不仅丰富了国有企业改革经济后果方面的研究,拓展了企业成本粘性影响因素的文献,而且有助于从国有企业降本增效的角度为推进供给侧结构性改革提供政策建议。

China’s internal and external economic imbalances and fiscal reform

China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account surplus,this paper purports to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that while the chronic savings-consumption imbalance is an important contributor to China’s huge trade surplus,the fundamental underlying contributor is the income structure and savings structure imbalance stemming from the disproportionate increase in retained earnings relative to stagnant wage bills.Corporate retained earnings keep growing rapidly because corporate profit margins are"overstated"and state-owned enterprises"do not pay dividends."Only when these issues are resolved at the institutional level can the savings rate be reduced to an appropriate level with domestic demand boosted to eliminate excess trade surpluses and fundamentally fix internal and external economic imbalances.

国有企业改革的资源配置效应及其机制研究

本文通过梳理国有企业改革的制度背景和政策实践,提出国企改革引致的资源配置效应,并从国企改制前后、改制国企与未改制国企、改制国企与非国有企业三个维度进行实证分析。研究发现,混合所有制改革提升国有企业的全要素生产率和市场份额,改制国企的全要素生产率显著高于未改制国企,实现资源从国有企业向改制国企和非国有企业的重置,优化要素资源在企业间的配置效率。机制分析表明,国有企业改革通过减轻要素市场扭曲、消除行政性垄断、缓解融资约束、剥离政策性负担来实现资源配置效应。上述研究对深化国有企业改革、更好服务实体经济,助力经济高质量发展具有一定的理论支撑和参考价值。

国有股权参股如何影响民营企业信用评级

民营经济是推进中国式现代化的生力军,民营企业信用评级不高是亟待解决的问题。混合所有制改革是利用不同股权的融合放大国有资本功能进而促进经济发展的重要举措,以民营企业参与混合所有制改革视角进行研究发现:国有股权参股能显著提升民营企业信用评级。影响机制检验发现,国有股权参股通过缓解融资约束和降低经营风险,提升民营企业信用评级。进一步研究发现,在管理层代理成本、国有股权制衡度、行业竞争程度及经济政策不确定性更高时,国有股权参股对民营企业信用评级的提升作用更有效。研究表明混合所有制改革承载着巨大制度红利,有助于实现民营企业健康持续发展,对国有资本和民营企业具有“1+1>2”效应,对混改政策实施效应和民营企业是否引入国有股权有重要决策参考意义。

混合所有制改革进程中国有与非国有资本相互融合的演化博弈分析

国有资本、集体资本、非公有资本等交叉持股、相互融合的混合所有制经济是我国基本经济制度的重要实现形式,积极推进混合所有制改革,促使国有与非国有资本融合发展意义重大。构建演化博弈模型分析了国有与非国有资本相互融合过程中策略选择的演化过程及其收敛趋势,并仿真模拟了政策激励影响博弈主体策略选择的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:国有与非国有资本相互融合的行为博弈存在演化稳定均衡策略,能否相互融合取决于事前交易成本、政策激励强度、政策倾斜与溢出以及新组建混合所有制企业预期收益。初始意愿高时,制度激励发挥了锦上添花效应,有效促进演化博弈系统收敛至理想状态,初始意愿低时具有减缓收敛速度的作用。事前经济激励具有正向引导效应,且初始意愿超过一定阈值后,将扭转博弈参与主体的最优策略选择,逐渐向“融合”转变。政策倾斜增加了国有资本的融合收益,但初始意愿偏低时,在模仿学习中仍倾向于“不融合”。政策溢出效应下降时,初始意愿超过一定阈值之后,理性的博弈参与者会转向“融合”策略。

政府政策引导下国有企业引入战略投资者演化博弈及仿真分析

构建演化博弈模型探究国有企业引入战略投资者过程中双方的行为逻辑和策略选择,求解稳定均衡策略,仿真模拟不同初始状态下博弈参与主体的策略选择及其受激励政策影响的动态演化过程。研究表明:政府激励政策会影响博弈双方的策略选择,且在不同初始状态下存在差异,当双方初始意愿较低时,国有企业选择引入策略的概率随激励力度增加而提升,初始意愿较高平时,战略投资者最优策略选择转为“参与”。国有企业初始意愿较高时,政策倾斜具有“锦上添花”的促进效应,初始意愿较低时,则减缓了其收敛速度;当双方初始意愿较高时,激励政策供给概率下降使参与主体的最优策略选择发生根本性变化。