In this paper,we discuss the development process of local government special bonds,and the role channels of local government special debt investment in driving China’s economic growth.Based on the specific decomposit...In this paper,we discuss the development process of local government special bonds,and the role channels of local government special debt investment in driving China’s economic growth.Based on the specific decomposition of Xinjiang local government special bond investment,this paper uses the non-competitive input-output model for the first time to analyze the net pulling effect of Xinjiang local government special bond investment on Xinjiang’s GDP and employment in 2020.Two measure calibers are set in this paper based on whether the financing costs are considered or not;in addition,we set up four scenarios based on two conditions:Whether to consider retained fun and whether to consider using special-purpose bond investment to leverage social capital.The results show that:1)when financing costs are not considered,the RMB77.4 billion local government special-purpose bonds can push the GDP of Xinjiang to grow by RMB42.27 billion,RMB35.12 billion,RMB77.548billion and RMB69.34 billion respectively under the four scenarios;2)when financing costs are not considered,the number of jobs driven by the RMB77.4 billion local government special-purpose bonds was respectively 372,300,324,500,718,500 and 601,300 in the four scenarios;3)when financing costs are considered,the RMB77.4 billion local government special-purpose bonds can push the GDP of Xinjiang to grow by RMB71.876 billion and RMB64.268 billion under scenario 3)and scenario 4).展开更多
While the existing literature suggests political liberalization enhances the freedom of foreign direct investment (FDI), the observation that some countries with more liberal political regimes have more restrictive ...While the existing literature suggests political liberalization enhances the freedom of foreign direct investment (FDI), the observation that some countries with more liberal political regimes have more restrictive policies toward direct investment than others remains unexplained. With a theoretical model of plural political competition and empirical evidences gathered from panel data, I argue that the liberalizing effect of political liberty on foreign direct investment hinges on the local factor endowment of the country experiencing democratization. I develop a theory of investment policy formation that takes into account the strategic response from domestic societal actors to redistribution of political power and its impact on FDI liberalization. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the empirical results show political liberalization is more likely to lead to liberalization of foreign direct investment when the capital-labor ratio in the economy is relatively low.展开更多
文摘In this paper,we discuss the development process of local government special bonds,and the role channels of local government special debt investment in driving China’s economic growth.Based on the specific decomposition of Xinjiang local government special bond investment,this paper uses the non-competitive input-output model for the first time to analyze the net pulling effect of Xinjiang local government special bond investment on Xinjiang’s GDP and employment in 2020.Two measure calibers are set in this paper based on whether the financing costs are considered or not;in addition,we set up four scenarios based on two conditions:Whether to consider retained fun and whether to consider using special-purpose bond investment to leverage social capital.The results show that:1)when financing costs are not considered,the RMB77.4 billion local government special-purpose bonds can push the GDP of Xinjiang to grow by RMB42.27 billion,RMB35.12 billion,RMB77.548billion and RMB69.34 billion respectively under the four scenarios;2)when financing costs are not considered,the number of jobs driven by the RMB77.4 billion local government special-purpose bonds was respectively 372,300,324,500,718,500 and 601,300 in the four scenarios;3)when financing costs are considered,the RMB77.4 billion local government special-purpose bonds can push the GDP of Xinjiang to grow by RMB71.876 billion and RMB64.268 billion under scenario 3)and scenario 4).
文摘While the existing literature suggests political liberalization enhances the freedom of foreign direct investment (FDI), the observation that some countries with more liberal political regimes have more restrictive policies toward direct investment than others remains unexplained. With a theoretical model of plural political competition and empirical evidences gathered from panel data, I argue that the liberalizing effect of political liberty on foreign direct investment hinges on the local factor endowment of the country experiencing democratization. I develop a theory of investment policy formation that takes into account the strategic response from domestic societal actors to redistribution of political power and its impact on FDI liberalization. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the empirical results show political liberalization is more likely to lead to liberalization of foreign direct investment when the capital-labor ratio in the economy is relatively low.