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Pricing Game Model of Wasted Clothing Recycling and Remanufacturing Based on Government Subsidy
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作者 WANG Mingjing ZHUANG Meiling LIU Jing 《Journal of Donghua University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2019年第1期46-51,共6页
In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil ... In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it. 展开更多
关键词 wasted CLOTHING RECYCLING and REMANUFACTURING PRICING game model government SUBSIDY stacklberg differential game theory
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基于消费者从众特性的零售平台的定价机制研究 被引量:14
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作者 张千帆 于晓娟 +1 位作者 张亚军 张榕 《管理学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第9期1379-1384,1412,共7页
以B2C零售商由自营转向自营与联营混合模式为背景,基于消费者的从众特性,建立两阶段Stacklberg博弈模型,分析消费者的从众特性对零售平台自营商品与入驻商家联营商品的定价策略的影响。并深入探讨从众特性对二者定价差、销售量及佣金比... 以B2C零售商由自营转向自营与联营混合模式为背景,基于消费者的从众特性,建立两阶段Stacklberg博弈模型,分析消费者的从众特性对零售平台自营商品与入驻商家联营商品的定价策略的影响。并深入探讨从众特性对二者定价差、销售量及佣金比例的影响。研究表明,在考虑消费者从众特性的情况下,自营与联营商品的定价都会下降,定价策略并不相同,零售平台可以通过制定合适的佣金比例有效缓解自营商品与联营商品之间的直接竞争。 展开更多
关键词 零售平台 自营 联营 stacklberg两阶段博弈 定价机制
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