The Implementation Mechanism of SocialResponsibility in Chinese State-ownedCompanies

The concept of corporate social responsibility was origined in the United States in the early 1990 s. This theory is put forward,and quickly caused the widespread attention of various disciplines. With the transition of the planned economy to marketeconomy in our country, most of the enterprises in China will still refuse to take care of the social responsibility and a series ofproblems become the biggest contradiction in China＇s economic development and social development. So it is necessary forChina to slove these problems.

Chinese Oil Companies＇ Overseas Cooperation in 2016

The paper analyzed the development and features of China's oil companies' overseas business in 2016.Despite the plummeting crude price and a weak global economy,these companies managed to do well in foreign countries.They steadily increased their shares of oil and gas in overseas oil and gas projects with their distinctive and unique ways:the three state-owned oil companies had focused on the countries involved in the One-BeltOne-Road Initiative,and others had been stressed more on international cooperation in a broader sense and areas.The small-and middle-scale companies had been matured and grew during the process.The central and local governments also played indispensable roles by providing need support for the cooperations.

State-owned Enterprises' Outward Investment and the Structural Reform in China

Since China＇s accession to the WTO in 2001, China has been on a steep learning curve in terms of engaging in outward direct investment, and state-owned enterprises （SOEs） have played a predominant role in this drive. We argue that investment overseas by SOEs is a double-edged sword as far as its impact on domestic reform is concerned. Investing overseas offers opportunities to deepen structural reform in China, but such investment could also strengthen the monopoly position of some SOEs, which is inconsistent with the objective of domestic reform. Therefore, it is important for China to deepen domestic reform with respect to competition, ownership and regulations, to maximize the benefits from investing overseas＇. The present paper also discusses how building market-compatible institutions will resuh in increased innovation. This provides opportunities for Chinese firms to effectively catch up with the advanced technologies to remain competitive in overseas markets.

Private Placement,Employee Ownership Plan and Mixed Ownership Reform--A Case Study of Wuliangye Listed Company

The reform core of state-owned enterprises is to develop mixed-ownership’s economy effectively,therefore there are so many large-and medium-sized state-owned enterprises using a variety of resources,adopting various ways to realize mixed-ownership reforms,enriching the theories of mixed-ownership reform,and creating a large number of practical samples.Wuliangye Company,as a very famous making liquor company in China,has issued a large of new stocks to excellent dealers,administrative staffs,and outstanding employees,so that the company can draw into massive private capital in 2016,so Wuliangye Company have made the first step about mixed-ownership reform among Chinese state-owned enterprises.Through comparing the quantity of monetary capital and asset-liability ratio of Wuliangye Company before and after directional issuing new stocks,the distrust about only adding money and welfare tool for relative benefit people can be eliminated.Moreover,the affection of directional issuing new stocks can promote Wuliangye Company dealers and employees to hold shareholdings,and optimize ownership structure.Wuliangye Company has got the exploration for optimizing equity structure to solid foundation for speeding up stated-owned enterprises reform paces,also providing some useful experiences of other mixed-ownership reform,and the ways and patterns are worthy of learning and studying.

Selective enforcement of regulation

Regulatory agencies may,whether outside of set rules or within their discretion,depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules,which we term selective enforcement.Taking China,a country in transition,as an example,and using cases and large-sample tests,we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement.The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance.After controlling for the degree of violation,state-owned-enterprises(SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies;and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question,the less severe the punishment.It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished.We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously.This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies' expectations of obtaining refinancing.The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.