On the Coalitional Rationality of the Banzhaf Value and Other Non-Efficient Semivalues

In the Inverse Set relative to a Semivalue, we are looking for a new game for which the Semivalue of the original game is coalitional rational. The problem is solved by means of the Power Game of the given game. The procedures of building the new game, as well as the case of the Banzhaf Value are illustrated by means of some examples.

On the Coalitional Rationality and the Inverse Problem for Shapley Value and the Semivalues

In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values, having some fairness properties, expressed in most cases by groups of axioms. In an earlier work, we solved what we called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, in which the main result was offering an explicit formula providing the set of all games with an a priori given Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector. However, in this set there is an infinite set of games for which the Semivalues are not coalitional rational, perhaps not efficient, so that these are not fair practical solutions of the above fundamental problem. Among the Semivalues, coalitional rational solutions for the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value have been given in two more recent works. In the present paper, based upon a general potential basis, relative to Semivalues, for a given game and a given Semivalue, we solve the connected problem: in the Inverse Set, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is also coalitional rational. Several examples will illustrate the corresponding numerical technique.

ANALYSIS OF GROUP MULTIUSER DETECTION BASED ON COALITION GAME THEORY

Coalition game theory is introduced to investigate the performance,fairness and stability of decorrelating group multiuser detection receiver,not only from the perspective of individual nodes,but also various coalitions and the whole system as well. Firstly,to derive how the system scale with coalition size,a stochastic model with transferable payoffs (stochastic TU-model) is provided. Secondly,to find the most preferred coalition structures from the view point of individual nodes,a model with Non-Transferable payoffs (NTU-model) is presented. Theoretical analysis and simulation results suggest that stochasticaly the grand coalition is payoff maximizing for the system as a whole,while individual nodes with good-conditioned channels may prefer local "win-win coalitions".

On the Coalitional Rationality and the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution

In earlier works we introduced the Inverse Problem, relative to the Shapley Value, then relative to Semivalues. In the explicit representation of the Inverse Set, the solution set of the Inverse Problem, we built a family of games, called the almost null family, in which we determined more recently a game where the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Allocations are colalitional rational. The Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution is another value for cooperative transferable utilities games (TU games), showing how to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition, in case that this has been formed. In the present paper, we solve the similar problem for this new value: given a nonnegative vector representing the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution of a TU game, find out a game in which the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution is kept the same, but it is colalitional rational. The new game will belong to the family of almost null games in the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value, and it is proved that the threshold of coalitional rationality will be higher than the one for the Shapley Value. The needed previous results are shown in the introduction, the second section is devoted to the main results, while in the last section are discussed remarks and connected problems. Some numerical examples are illustrating the procedure of finding the new game.

Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance

The dynamic signaling game-model is employed to study countermeasures of Q, U and C for supply-demand on financial market. As the game result, the mixed equilibrium of Q and U exists naturally without FRS. It is concluded that FRS on market admittance is objective demand of financial market, also the rational management behavior of government FRSI. And in addition to the empirical criteria, the FRS agreements between FRSI and financial-institutions should be considered as one of advanced FRS techniques. These must cover:① the regulation conformed status investigation with sufficient frequency,② corresponding punitive measures with sufficient strength. Thus the information can be delivered FRSI have ensured only qualified and regulation-conformed financial-institutions could be allowed to enter. That could safeguard the steadiness of the financial market.

Hierarchical Game Approach for Optimization of Regional Integrated Energy System Clusters Considering Bounded Rationality

Regional integrated energy system(RIES)cluster,i.e.,multi-source integration and multi-region coordination,is an effective approach for increasing energy utilization efficiency.The hierarchical architecture and limited information sharing of RIES cluster make it difficult for traditional game theory to accurately describe their game behavior.Thus,a hierarchical game approach considering bounded rationality is proposed in this paper to balance the interests of optimizing RIES cluster under privacy protection.A Stackelberg game with the cluster operator(CO)as the leader and multiple RIES as followers is developed to simultaneously optimize leader benefit and RIES utilization efficiency.Concurrently,a slight altruistic function is introduced to simulate the game behavior of each RIES agent on whether to cooperate or not.By introducing an evolutionary game based on bounded rationality in the lower layer,the flaw of the assumption that participants are completely rational can be avoided.Specially,for autonomous optimal dispatching,each RIES is treated as a prosumer,fexibly switching its market participation role to achieve cluster coordination optimization.Case studies on a RIES cluster verify effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies:cooperators,defectors,punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered.By adopting approximate best response dynamics,we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in[Nature(London) 425(2003) 390],but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation.Compared with previous results of infinite populations,which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain cooperation.In addition,we characterize that loner’s payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner’s payoff.It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner’s payoff will influence the cooperation.Finally,we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

A rational quantum state sharing protocol with semi-off-line dealer

A rational quantum state sharing protocol with the semi-off-line dealer is proposed.Firstly,the dealer Alice shares an arbitrary two-particle entangled state with the players by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR)pairs and Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger(GHZ)states.The EPR pairs are prepared by Charlie instead of the dealer,reducing the workload of the dealer.Secondly,all players have the same probability of reconstructing the quantum state,guaranteeing the fairness of the protocol.In addition,the dealer is semi-off-line,which considerably reduces the information exchanging between the dealer and the players.Finally,our protocol achieves security,fairness,correctness,and strict Nash equilibrium.

On the Gas Routing via Game Theory

The delivery of the natural gas obtained by drilling, fracking and sending the product to consumers is done usually in two phases: in the first phase, the gas is collected from all wells spread on a large area, and belonging to several companies, and is sent to a depot owned by the city;then, in the second phase, another company is taking the gas on a network of ducts belonging to the city, along the streets to the neighborhoods and the individual consumers. The first phase is managed by the gas producing companies on the ducts owned by each company, possibly also on some public ducts. In this paper, we discuss only this first phase, to show why the benefits of these companies depend on the cooperation of the producers, and further, how a fair allocation of the total gas obtained, to the drilling companies, is computed. Following the model of flow games, we generate a cooperative transferable utilities game, as shown in the first section, and in this game any efficient value gives an allocation of benefits to the owners of ducts in the total network. However, it may well happen that the chosen value is not coalitional rational, in the game, that is, it does not belong to the Core of the game. By using the results obtained in an earlier work of the author, sketched in the second section, we show in the last section how the same allocation may be associated to a new game, which has the corresponding value a coalitional rational value. An example of a three person flow game shows the game generation, as well as the procedure to be used for obtaining the new game in which the same value, a Shapley Value, will give a coalitional rational allocation.

Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value

In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.

考虑电动汽车用户有限理性的定制化电价套餐设计

考虑到售电公司对提高市场占有率和收益的需求,电动汽车用户对经济和舒适的追求,以及电动汽车保有量基数大且还在持续快速上升的情况,提出了一种考虑电动汽车用户有限理性的定制化电价套餐设计方法。首先,利用蒙特卡洛方法模拟生成一些电动汽车用户的充电需求以增加充电负荷数据,并采用k-medoids聚类算法对电动汽车用户按其充电负荷聚类出典型电动汽车用户的充电需求曲线。然后,通过熵权法计算电动汽车用户效用,并在此基础上应用演化博弈论分析电动汽车用户在有限理性情况下的电价套餐选择情况。最后,建立考虑电动汽车用户有限理性的电价套餐双层优化模型,上层模型优化目标为售电公司购售电收益最大,下层模型优化目标为电动汽车用户效用最大。算例结果表明该定制化电价套餐不但能够有效地提高售电公司的营业利润,而且能够降低用户用电成本。

基于合作博弈的虚拟电厂联盟策略与收益分配机制研究

虚拟电厂可通过资源互补提升潜在收益,但也面临合作联盟规模、主体利益保障及主体隐私保护3个关键问题。首先证明了虚拟电厂合作博弈的存在性以及主体理性假设下合作联盟整体参与市场的唯一性。其次基于非对称纳什议价方法,提出了以净功率输出为贡献度进行度量的合作收益分配机制,保障合作联盟稳定性。然后计及各虚拟电厂的隐私保护需求,提出了dual-block交替方向乘子法(ADMM)分布式求解方法,避免多主体ADMM迭代引起的收敛性问题。最后通过算例验证了所提合作收益机制的有效性和分布式求解算法的高效性。

考虑不同救援能力的应急救援人员派遣演化博弈

为解决突发事件初期救援人员的供需不平衡问题,提出构建突发事件应急救援人员派遣的演化博弈模型.综合考虑突发事件和次生灾害对救援网络道路的破坏,以及有限理性的受灾群众对救援人员派遣存在的竞争心理因素,从受灾群众视角,分析多个受灾点种群对救援人员派遣的博弈问题,利用复制者动态方程模拟各受灾点对救援人员派遣策略选择的动态演化过程,构建具有多个救援点和多个受灾点的多阶段救援人员派遣模型,并通过算例分析各受灾点救援人员派遣的动态演化过程和最佳方案.结果表明,利用综合考虑应急救援过程的多阶段动态特性和受灾点间的有限理性博弈心理模型,求解救援派遣方案是实用且可行的.参数敏感性分析结果给出了分别适用于3种不同救援场景的派遣方案.研究成果可为突发事件应急救援人员的派遣决策提供参考依据.

基于“情理之间”的高校科研建筑实践思考

目前,我国高校科研建筑呈现复合、多元的蓬勃发展态势。本文通过对“情理”的进一步挖掘与归纳,从理性思维和感性情感两方面归纳科研建筑的设计策略,并以三亚崖州湾科技城南海资源保护开发与利用产业创新平台项目为例展开具体论述,以期在新时代下为高校科研建筑的创新设计提供有益思考。

感觉的学习论意义及其现实指向

实现课堂教学变革,发展学生核心素养,要克服理性至上的教学,重视感觉的学习论意义,引导学生的感知学习。作为哲学范畴的“感觉”与思维对立统一,中西方哲学从认识论的角度探讨了感官感觉对人的认知发展、经验生成的意义,形成了对感觉和感觉经验的系统理解。从感觉的本质来看,感觉指向身体,感觉是身体机能的生动体现。对感觉的承认体现了对现实世界客观性的正确把握。从教育学的立场审视感觉,感觉教育、直观教学等思想揭示了感觉对个体认知发展和学习活动展开的重要价值,感觉是认知生成和学习发生的前提。感觉是人对客观世界刺激的反映,是认识的初级形式,为知觉、表象等感性认识形式奠定基础,感觉、知觉、表象与思维之间存在着逻辑转化关系。在教学中,教师要克服理性至上的弊端,以感知学习促进学生的认知进阶,引导学生的感官参与,丰富其学习中的可感体验,以实现学生感性与理性的逻辑转化。

体感游戏在支气管哮喘患儿缓解期的应用价值

目的 探究体感游戏在支气管哮喘患儿缓解期的应用价值。方法 选取我院2020年1月至2022年1月治疗后的100例缓解期支气管哮喘患儿为研究对象,随机分为观察组(n=51)和对照组(n=49)。患儿均予以常规规范治疗,观察组结合体感游戏运动康复,对照组采用常规运动康复,4周为1个周期,共干预3个周期后比较两组患儿静息/运动状态下基础指标,比较肺功能和6分钟步行距离(6MWD)变化,统计患儿生活质量(PAQLQ)、症状控制(r-ACQ)相关评分。结果 干预后,观察组运动完成率为89.36%(42/47),高于对照组的69.77%(30/43),差异有统计学意义(χ~2=5.388,P=0.020);运动后5min,观察组患儿心率[(112.42±6.12)次/分]低于对照组心率[(128.19±7.42)次/分],差异有统计学意义(P<0.05);观察组患儿MMEF(88.63±7.33)%高于对照组(79.34±6.94)%,差异有统计学意义(P<0.05);观察组患儿PAQLQ总分(136.62±11.83)分、6MWD(579.45±61.35)m均高于对照组(131.48±12.53)分、(545.82±58.46)m,观察组r-ACQ评分(20.41±3.48)低于对照组(23.21±4.13),差异有统计学意义(P<0.05)。干预12周内,观察组患儿的发作次数为(1.42±0.31)次,少于对照组患儿的(2.97±0.86)次,差异有统计学意义(t=11.567,P<0.001)。结论 体感游戏用于支气管哮喘患儿运动康复治疗中可提高患儿运动完成率和运动能力,有效改善患儿的肺功能,提高患儿生活质量,有助于改善哮喘控制水平。

康德美学何以耽搁了感官愉悦感的审美时间性

审美生活作为感官愉悦感的心智能力是只能直接感受可感的审美对象,不能做任何间接之事,这是审美生活一次性、原发性的绝对时机化。康德以科学生活、宗教生活所使用的回忆、反思、判断等理性心智,长臂管辖不受待见的感觉与感官愉悦感,审美时机化消失殆尽。这一心智能力的错配使得康德只偏爱视听感官,造成其他审美感官被截肢,审美对象流失严重,审美时间性之中的审美时宜、审美同时性、审美时体的流畅性也就被耽搁了。

人工智能时代的师生交往:挑战与应对

人工智能时代交往方式的变革和教育生态的智能化,引发师生交往的一系列挑战。交往目的上,智能技术强大的工具性,容易使师生陷入对功利化目的的盲目追求中,消解师生交往的生命价值;交往主体上,数字化身生成性、跨时空、不朽性等特征,可能诱发师生沉溺于虚拟交往中,遮蔽师生交往的育人属性,削弱师生之间的伦理关怀;交往手段上,基于数字化社交媒介进行的师生互动,可能导致师生交往逐渐被数字媒介所固化和引导,不利于公共价值与公共德行的内化;交往时空上,基于虚拟时空进行的师生交往,真实身体的整全知觉被数智化客体的分离知觉所替代,可能导致师生交往认知体验的异化。师生交往的意义和价值在于,在交往过程中以正义的方式对具备正义性的人的本质的不断实现,让置身其中的个体能够绽放出生命的质感。因此,智能时代的师生交往应注重交往目的的整全性,将师生交往置于生命发展的价值指引下;发挥交往中人的主体性,重建师生交往的伦理关怀;充分开发多元交往手段,加强对数字媒介交往的公共性治理;建立正确的时空观,注重虚实交往中认知体验的具身性,以此破解智能技术引发的师生交往困境。

博弈论视角下职业网球竞赛特征探析

文章运用文献资料法、内容分析法、逻辑推理法等研究方法,以博弈论为研究视角,对职业网球的竞赛特征进行系统分析与探讨。认为:职业网球比赛是兼顾静态与动态性质的重复零和博弈;回合前期倾向于非完美信息而回合后期倾向完美信息博弈状态;博弈过程受共同知识和相对知识交互影响,随对手之间熟悉程度的加深存在相对知识向共同知识过度的倾向;受竞技水平和知识影响,竞赛双方策略空间呈差异化特征;对手之间策略的相互牵制性使比赛倾向于纳什均衡;为力争获胜,任何各方均遵循最大最小化原则;策略偏好、风格与打法的交互作用共同形成球员的声誉效应;尽管理性同收益呈非线性关系,但竞赛双方仍以序贯理性为策略对抗的前提。