We examine two strategies for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction （WMD）： ＂sanctions＂ and ＂monitoring and inspections＂. Our main conclusions are summarized as follows. Firstly, there is a substit...We examine two strategies for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction （WMD）： ＂sanctions＂ and ＂monitoring and inspections＂. Our main conclusions are summarized as follows. Firstly, there is a substitutive relationship between sanctions and monitoring and inspections. We posit that the proliferation of WMD may be prevented through intensified sanctions or increased monitoring and inspections. Secondly, monitoring activities may be decreased through the increased effectiveness of sanctions aimed at preventing proliferation. Thirdly, if the increased development costs of WMD can decrease the need for inspection activities sufficiently, the extent of monitoring activities could also reduce.展开更多
In today＇s complex web of relations due to the end of the confrontation between the East and West, nuclear materials, technologies, know-how, and scientists have been diffused to states and non-state actors that act ...In today＇s complex web of relations due to the end of the confrontation between the East and West, nuclear materials, technologies, know-how, and scientists have been diffused to states and non-state actors that act irrationally most of the time. The precedent example of nuclear North Korea has given rise to new concerns like whether the low levels of military casualties stemming from nuclear or near-nuclear capable countries will damage the credibility of US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） extended deterrence. The ambiguity about how the future of the Iranian Geneva interim agreement will be finalized certainly feeds such kinds of concerns among Tehran＇s neighbors. Till now, both Turkey and South Korea have directly felt and lived through similar kinds of threats. It is true that, during the Cold War years, these two countries have enjoyed the benefit of American assured nuclear security guarantee. However, the current US/NATO extended deterrence due to the mentioned newly arising threats of our times has fallen short of stopping the skirmishes that are occurring at low levels of confrontation. That is why this paper will try to analyze and compare South Korean and Turkish cases so as to comprehend whether there is a necessity to re-think extended deterrence mechanisms that are differently dispatched to meet Ankara＇s and Seoul＇s peculiar security needs.展开更多
文摘We examine two strategies for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction （WMD）： ＂sanctions＂ and ＂monitoring and inspections＂. Our main conclusions are summarized as follows. Firstly, there is a substitutive relationship between sanctions and monitoring and inspections. We posit that the proliferation of WMD may be prevented through intensified sanctions or increased monitoring and inspections. Secondly, monitoring activities may be decreased through the increased effectiveness of sanctions aimed at preventing proliferation. Thirdly, if the increased development costs of WMD can decrease the need for inspection activities sufficiently, the extent of monitoring activities could also reduce.
文摘In today＇s complex web of relations due to the end of the confrontation between the East and West, nuclear materials, technologies, know-how, and scientists have been diffused to states and non-state actors that act irrationally most of the time. The precedent example of nuclear North Korea has given rise to new concerns like whether the low levels of military casualties stemming from nuclear or near-nuclear capable countries will damage the credibility of US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） extended deterrence. The ambiguity about how the future of the Iranian Geneva interim agreement will be finalized certainly feeds such kinds of concerns among Tehran＇s neighbors. Till now, both Turkey and South Korea have directly felt and lived through similar kinds of threats. It is true that, during the Cold War years, these two countries have enjoyed the benefit of American assured nuclear security guarantee. However, the current US/NATO extended deterrence due to the mentioned newly arising threats of our times has fallen short of stopping the skirmishes that are occurring at low levels of confrontation. That is why this paper will try to analyze and compare South Korean and Turkish cases so as to comprehend whether there is a necessity to re-think extended deterrence mechanisms that are differently dispatched to meet Ankara＇s and Seoul＇s peculiar security needs.
