In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted b...In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder’s bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner’s-bid pricing rules.展开更多
In this paper, we present a novel, dynamic collaboration cloud platform in which a Combinatorial Auction（CA）-based market model enables the platform to run effectively. The platform can facilitate expense reduction ...In this paper, we present a novel, dynamic collaboration cloud platform in which a Combinatorial Auction（CA）-based market model enables the platform to run effectively. The platform can facilitate expense reduction and improve the scalability of the cloud, which is divided into three layers： The user-layer receives requests from end-users, the auction-layer matches the requests with the cloud services provided by the Cloud Service Provider（CSP）, and the CSP-layer forms a coalition to improve serving ability to satisfy complex requirements of users.In fact, the aim of the coalition formation is to find suitable partners for a particular CSP. However, identifying a suitable combination of partners to form the coalition is an NP-hard problem. Hence, we propose approximation algorithms for the coalition formation. The Breadth Traversal Algorithm（BTA） and Revised Ant Colony Algorithm（RACA） are proposed to form a coalition when bidding for a single cloud service in the auction. The experimental results show that RACA outperforms the BTA in bid price. Other experiments were conducted to evaluate the impact of the communication cost on coalition formation and to assess the impact of iteration times for the optimal bidding price. In addition, the performance of the market model was compared to the existing CA-based model in terms of economic efficiency.展开更多
文摘In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder’s bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner’s-bid pricing rules.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61070133, 61170201, and 61472344)the Collegiate Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (Grant No. 11KJD520011)+1 种基金Six talent peaks project in Jiangsu Province (No. 2011-DZXX-032)the Scientific Research Foundation of Graduate School of Jiangsu Province (No. CXZZ13 0901)
文摘In this paper, we present a novel, dynamic collaboration cloud platform in which a Combinatorial Auction（CA）-based market model enables the platform to run effectively. The platform can facilitate expense reduction and improve the scalability of the cloud, which is divided into three layers： The user-layer receives requests from end-users, the auction-layer matches the requests with the cloud services provided by the Cloud Service Provider（CSP）, and the CSP-layer forms a coalition to improve serving ability to satisfy complex requirements of users.In fact, the aim of the coalition formation is to find suitable partners for a particular CSP. However, identifying a suitable combination of partners to form the coalition is an NP-hard problem. Hence, we propose approximation algorithms for the coalition formation. The Breadth Traversal Algorithm（BTA） and Revised Ant Colony Algorithm（RACA） are proposed to form a coalition when bidding for a single cloud service in the auction. The experimental results show that RACA outperforms the BTA in bid price. Other experiments were conducted to evaluate the impact of the communication cost on coalition formation and to assess the impact of iteration times for the optimal bidding price. In addition, the performance of the market model was compared to the existing CA-based model in terms of economic efficiency.
