Audit information quality is important for capital market to develop healthily. The efficiency is limited, and in a long time, it just depends on market to govern audit behavior. In order to improve the audit quality,...Audit information quality is important for capital market to develop healthily. The efficiency is limited, and in a long time, it just depends on market to govern audit behavior. In order to improve the audit quality, the government has to govern independent audit behavior. It is difficult to observe CPA＇s behavior directly, however, the government has to game with multiple agencies. This paper analyzes the game behaviors among the government, the accounting institutions and the CPA based on welfare economics theory and game theory. The paper＇s aim is to provide advice for government to choose the appropriate governing behaviors.展开更多
The setting-up of the Malaysian Audit Oversight Board （AOB） in 2010 under the Securities Commission Amendment Act 2010 has extended the role of regulators into the statutory audit domain for public listed companies....The setting-up of the Malaysian Audit Oversight Board （AOB） in 2010 under the Securities Commission Amendment Act 2010 has extended the role of regulators into the statutory audit domain for public listed companies. Although the auditing profession in Malaysia has International Auditing Standards as prescribed minimum level of quality in the delivery of audit assurance services, self-regulation by the profession alone appears inadequate to ensure the delivery of quality audit services. With co-regulation, auditors now are monitored not just by the profession but also by a new statutory body with considerable regulatory powers to sanction auditors where quality of the audit process has been found wanting. This study solicits the opinions of auditors on their expectations of what the new regulator can achieve. Based on interviews with a sample of 30 auditors, the study finds that the majority believe that audit quality will be taken to a new level following AOB＇s remit of registration of auditors, compliance inspection with International Standard on Quality Control （ISQC）, monitoring of financial statement quality, and its power of sanctions. A review of AOB＇s early years＇ inspection confirms these expectations.展开更多
Auditor independence provisions enshrined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act （SOX） were promulgated in 2002 in response to the Errron-Anderson scandal leading to a diminution of trust in the audit profession. In seeking to r...Auditor independence provisions enshrined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act （SOX） were promulgated in 2002 in response to the Errron-Anderson scandal leading to a diminution of trust in the audit profession. In seeking to regulate auditor independence in the name of investor protection, SOX has been heralded as ＂ground-breaking＂ public interest reform. Ironically, when one considers the substance of these reforms and contrasts them with the situation prevailing in South Africa, a different impression results. Despite the fact that South Africa is classified as a ＂developing＂ nation and one which has only recently transitioned to democracy, many of the auditor independence principles legislated under SOX have been part of generally accepted practice in South Africa since the 1950s. Accordingly, SOX may not be the progressive example of auditor regulation that it is generally perceived to be.展开更多
文摘Audit information quality is important for capital market to develop healthily. The efficiency is limited, and in a long time, it just depends on market to govern audit behavior. In order to improve the audit quality, the government has to govern independent audit behavior. It is difficult to observe CPA＇s behavior directly, however, the government has to game with multiple agencies. This paper analyzes the game behaviors among the government, the accounting institutions and the CPA based on welfare economics theory and game theory. The paper＇s aim is to provide advice for government to choose the appropriate governing behaviors.
文摘The setting-up of the Malaysian Audit Oversight Board （AOB） in 2010 under the Securities Commission Amendment Act 2010 has extended the role of regulators into the statutory audit domain for public listed companies. Although the auditing profession in Malaysia has International Auditing Standards as prescribed minimum level of quality in the delivery of audit assurance services, self-regulation by the profession alone appears inadequate to ensure the delivery of quality audit services. With co-regulation, auditors now are monitored not just by the profession but also by a new statutory body with considerable regulatory powers to sanction auditors where quality of the audit process has been found wanting. This study solicits the opinions of auditors on their expectations of what the new regulator can achieve. Based on interviews with a sample of 30 auditors, the study finds that the majority believe that audit quality will be taken to a new level following AOB＇s remit of registration of auditors, compliance inspection with International Standard on Quality Control （ISQC）, monitoring of financial statement quality, and its power of sanctions. A review of AOB＇s early years＇ inspection confirms these expectations.
文摘Auditor independence provisions enshrined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act （SOX） were promulgated in 2002 in response to the Errron-Anderson scandal leading to a diminution of trust in the audit profession. In seeking to regulate auditor independence in the name of investor protection, SOX has been heralded as ＂ground-breaking＂ public interest reform. Ironically, when one considers the substance of these reforms and contrasts them with the situation prevailing in South Africa, a different impression results. Despite the fact that South Africa is classified as a ＂developing＂ nation and one which has only recently transitioned to democracy, many of the auditor independence principles legislated under SOX have been part of generally accepted practice in South Africa since the 1950s. Accordingly, SOX may not be the progressive example of auditor regulation that it is generally perceived to be.
