Formal analysis of robust email protocol based on authentication tests

Based on the authentication tests and the strand space model, the robust email protocol with perfect forward secrecy is formally analyzed, and the security shortcomings of the protocol is pointed out. Meanwhile, the man-in-the-middle attack to the protocol is given, where the attacker forges the messages in the receiving phase to cheat the two communication parties and makes them share the wrong session keys with him. Therefore, the protocol is not ensured to provide perfect forward secrecy. In order to overcome the above security shortcomings, an advanced email protocol is proposed, where the corresponding signatures in the receiving phase of the protocol are added to overcome the man-in-the-middle attack and ensure to provide perfect forward secrecy. Finally, the proposed advanced email protocol is formally analyzed with the authentication tests and the strand space model, and it is proved to be secure in authentication of the email sender, the recipient and the server. Therefore, the proposed advanced email protocol can really provide perfect forward secrecy.

Efficient Protocol-Proving Algorithm Based on Improved Authentication Tests

A new efficient protocol-proving algorithm was proposed for verifying security protocols. This algorithm is based on the improved authentication tests model, which enhances the original model by formalizing the message reply attack. With exact causal dependency relations between messages in this model, the protocol-proving algorithm can avoid the state explosion caused by asynchronous. In order to get the straight proof of security protocols, three authentication theorems are exploited for evaluating the agreement and distinction properties. When the algorithm terminates, it outputs either the proof results or the potential flaws of the security protocol. The experiment shows that the protocol-proving algorithm can detect the type flaw attack on Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, and prove the correctness of NSL protocol by exploring only 10 states.

Research and improvement on the limitation of authentication test

This paper elaborated on the limitation of authentication test theorem, illustrated the fundamental cause of that limitation through examples, then enhanced authentication test to solve this problem, and also proved the soundness of that improvement with formal method. The enhanced theory can deal with protocols with test component as proper subterm of other regular node＇ s component under certain conditions, and extend the application scope of authentication test. With enhanced authentication test, the automatic protocol verification tools will be more efficient and convenient.

A Secure Three-Factor Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme for Multi-Server Environment

Multi-server authenticated key agreement schemes have attracted great attention to both academia and industry in recent years.However,traditional authenticated key agreement schemes in the single-server environment are not suitable for the multi-server environment because the user has to register on each server when he/she wishes to log in various servers for different service.Moreover,it is unreasonable to consider all servers are trusted since the server in a multi-server environment may be a semi-trusted party.In order to overcome these difficulties,we designed a secure three-factor multi-server authenticated key agreement protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography,which needs the user to register only once at the registration center in order to access all semi-trusted servers.The proposed scheme can not only against various known attacks but also provides high computational efficiency.Besides,we have proved our scheme fulfills mutual authentication by using the authentication test method.