The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of collective bargaining on employee motivation in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.The continued restless among employees at various gold mines in the midlands pr...The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of collective bargaining on employee motivation in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.The continued restless among employees at various gold mines in the midlands province has resulted in productivity levels dwindling.There has been increased labour turnover by employees as well as increased union representation to management.Questionnaire were used to collect data.In this article a population of one thousand employees was used.A sample of two hundred employees was selected across the board.The results of the study indicate positive relationships between collective bargaining and job satisfaction among the employees in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.Implications of these results are that the human resource interventions are required in order to create an environment in which employees can freely engage in collective bargaining.Furthermore,the results indicate that collective bargaining engenders intrinsic motivation and above all allows for the protection of employee’s rights and welfare as well as promoting industrial democracy.This study recommends that managers should guard against preventing or obstructing employees from seeking legal redress to protect their interest.In addition,labour officers should be given the right of reasonable access to workers during working hours at their organisations for the purposes of advising the workers on the law.The employees should be given a latitude to belong to a trade union and or workers committee.展开更多
Currently,limited licensed frequency bands cannot meet the increasing demands for various wireless communication applications any more.It is necessary to extend wireless communication networks to unlicensed spectrum.I...Currently,limited licensed frequency bands cannot meet the increasing demands for various wireless communication applications any more.It is necessary to extend wireless communication networks to unlicensed spectrum.In this paper,we propose a new bargaining framework for unlicensed band access to achieve high spectrum efficiency,where one radio access technology(RAT)(such as macro cellular network)“competes”the unlicensed bands with multiple other RATs(such as small cellular networks or Wi-Fi)virtually.Considering that macro cell can share unlicensed frequencies with multiple small cells which are in the same coverage area for more freedom,we use bargaining game theory to fairly and effectively share the unlicensed spectrum between macro and multiple heterogeneous small cell networks,where bargaining loss and time dissipation loss for virtual“price”of unlicensed bands are mainly considered.In the oneto-many bargaining process,we also develop a multiple RAT alliance game strategy to reduce transmission loss in a joint manner.Simulation results show that the proposed unlicensed band sharing algorithm significantly improves the spectrum efficiency performance compared with the other practical schemes for heterogeneous networks.展开更多
This paper presents a symmetric cooperation strategy for cooperative relay networks with multiple users. The multi-user symmetric cooperation model and the relay selection algorithm are proposed. Then, the time slot a...This paper presents a symmetric cooperation strategy for cooperative relay networks with multiple users. The multi-user symmetric cooperation model and the relay selection algorithm are proposed. Then, the time slot allocation problem is cast into a bargaining problem, and the optimal time slot allocation solution is obtained by Nash bargaining solution (NBS). Moreover, we also consider the implementations of the cooperation strategy, i.e., the grouping and admission control algorithm. Simulation results show that users can obtain larger rates under the symmetric cooperation strategy than the non-cooperative case.展开更多
Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate int...Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.展开更多
Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation (PA) between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information...Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation (PA) between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate (SER) at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.展开更多
On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and pro...On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and product nature, find different bargaining power and product nature important role for channel structure, and also present equilibrium result. Furthermore, the academic proof for channel structure choice is presented.展开更多
According to the utility function and spectrum demand of the cognitive users,a novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game was proposed under the wireless environment of Rayleigh fading.On the bas...According to the utility function and spectrum demand of the cognitive users,a novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game was proposed under the wireless environment of Rayleigh fading.On the basis of this mechanism,we proposed a new distributed bargaining algorithm based on Nash product;then the spectrum prices and system utilities were obtained.Theoretical analysis results showed that with a close total utility to the optimal,the Nash bargaining mechanism cannot only improve the fairness between primary systems remarkably,but also reach to the stable equilibrium in finitely repeated games.Finally,simulation results were given to demonstrate the correctness of these conclusions and the efficiency of the algorithm.展开更多
The Tanzania Zambia Railway stretches 1,860 kilometers from the East African Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to New Kapiri-Mposhi in land locked Zambia.It is defined as a bi-national organization as opp...The Tanzania Zambia Railway stretches 1,860 kilometers from the East African Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to New Kapiri-Mposhi in land locked Zambia.It is defined as a bi-national organization as opposed to either transnational or multinational because it is jointly owned and managed by the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia.Its construction was made possible by Chinese interest-free loan to the two Governments.Few development projects in Africa have been charged with as much political and ideological dynamite as Tanzania Zambia Railway.To the Western powers,angry that the Chinese had entered territory which they considered their own preserve,it was a Red Railway intended to thrust communism into the very heart of Africa.For the white regimes in Southern Africa,grimly attempting to hold back demands for majority rule,it was seen as Africa’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,carrying guerrilla further,armed with Chinese thoughts and weapons to the banks of the Zambezi River.The Chinese regarded the project as a Friendship Route to strengthen the new African states against the forces of imperialism and for Tanzania and Zambia it was a Freedom Railway,which should prove an instrument in increasing their independence.These reactions underpin not only the complexity of the establishment and management of a bi-national organization but also present challenges to the two national trade unions on how best they can represent their members.Industrial relations literature has cited differences in countries’historical,social,political,economic,and ideological background as the main obstacles in the development of collective bargaining machinery in transnational or multinational organizations.A study in Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority has attempted to develop an integrated bi-national collective bargaining machinery whose collective agreements are likely to be legally enforceable in their respective countries.This paper explores the development of trade unions in both Tanzania and Zambia which can be divided in three phases:first,the construction phase;second,the consolidation phase;and the third and final phase,trade union liberalization and political pluralism which covers the development of a bi national collective bargaining model with its Joint Industrial Council structure and negotiation procedures.The paper compares and contrasts trade union development in the two contracting states and critically examines how each phase has influenced trade union development.It provides a brief historical outline of collective bargaining process and spells out advantages and limitations of bi-national collective bargaining machinery.The paper concludes by observing that one of the main objectives of regional groupings is economic integration and suggests that integrated collective bargaining machinery be adopted as an ideal industrial relations model for regional groupings such as the African Union(AU),Southern African Development Community(SADC),Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA),Economic Community for West African States(ECOWAS),Eastern African Community,and other regional groupings around the world since it localizes industrial relations function in general and collective bargaining in particular.展开更多
From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is...From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is discussed and the equilibrium result is found. Also the theoretical evidences for competing channel structure choice are given.展开更多
As the rapid development of electronic commerce in our country in recent years it is becoming focus how to use electronic commerce to realize non-distant communication of E2C and E2E which is called the second generat...As the rapid development of electronic commerce in our country in recent years it is becoming focus how to use electronic commerce to realize non-distant communication of E2C and E2E which is called the second generation of electronic commerce. This paper combines the All Set theory with Matter Element transform into bargaining theory to build All Set bargaining model. In this model, the bargaining conditions of both sides are viewed as Matter Element which is the basic cell of extension theory. By using All Set theory, shell theory, fuzzy control and extension theory, the process of Matter Element transform from original Matter Element to final Matter Element which can be satisfied by both sides in bargaining is discussed. There are four axioms are distracted based on the All Set bargaining model. At last we extend our bi-persons bargaining model to multi-persons bargaining model by using soft matching system, and make it possible for intelligent bargaining on the supporting of electronic commerce.展开更多
针对微网独立运行时面临运行成本高,受可再生能源出力和多能负荷功率不确定性影响大等问题,提出一种基于混合两阶段鲁棒优化的多微网合作运行方法。首先,为了应对源荷双重不确定性挑战,在传统两阶段鲁棒优化基础上,提出一种基于多场景...针对微网独立运行时面临运行成本高,受可再生能源出力和多能负荷功率不确定性影响大等问题,提出一种基于混合两阶段鲁棒优化的多微网合作运行方法。首先,为了应对源荷双重不确定性挑战,在传统两阶段鲁棒优化基础上,提出一种基于多场景数据的最恶劣概率场景驱动的混合两阶段鲁棒优化方法,并采用可并行计算列与约束生成(column and constraint generation,C&CG)算法来提高求解效率。然后,在建立的多微网点对点分布式能源交易系统框架上,根据纳什谈判理论构造多微网合作成本最小化问题和收益分配问题,并提出一种耦合可并行计算C&CG的交替方向乘子法进行求解。最后,根据各微网不同的贡献率,设计一种基于点对点电能交易贡献度的非对称纳什谈判机制来分配各微网的合作收益。算例结果表明,所提方法能兼顾系统的鲁棒性、经济性和隐私性,并实现每个微网公平合理的收益分配。展开更多
文摘The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of collective bargaining on employee motivation in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.The continued restless among employees at various gold mines in the midlands province has resulted in productivity levels dwindling.There has been increased labour turnover by employees as well as increased union representation to management.Questionnaire were used to collect data.In this article a population of one thousand employees was used.A sample of two hundred employees was selected across the board.The results of the study indicate positive relationships between collective bargaining and job satisfaction among the employees in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.Implications of these results are that the human resource interventions are required in order to create an environment in which employees can freely engage in collective bargaining.Furthermore,the results indicate that collective bargaining engenders intrinsic motivation and above all allows for the protection of employee’s rights and welfare as well as promoting industrial democracy.This study recommends that managers should guard against preventing or obstructing employees from seeking legal redress to protect their interest.In addition,labour officers should be given the right of reasonable access to workers during working hours at their organisations for the purposes of advising the workers on the law.The employees should be given a latitude to belong to a trade union and or workers committee.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61871433,61828103in part by the Research Platform of South China Normal University and Foshan
文摘Currently,limited licensed frequency bands cannot meet the increasing demands for various wireless communication applications any more.It is necessary to extend wireless communication networks to unlicensed spectrum.In this paper,we propose a new bargaining framework for unlicensed band access to achieve high spectrum efficiency,where one radio access technology(RAT)(such as macro cellular network)“competes”the unlicensed bands with multiple other RATs(such as small cellular networks or Wi-Fi)virtually.Considering that macro cell can share unlicensed frequencies with multiple small cells which are in the same coverage area for more freedom,we use bargaining game theory to fairly and effectively share the unlicensed spectrum between macro and multiple heterogeneous small cell networks,where bargaining loss and time dissipation loss for virtual“price”of unlicensed bands are mainly considered.In the oneto-many bargaining process,we also develop a multiple RAT alliance game strategy to reduce transmission loss in a joint manner.Simulation results show that the proposed unlicensed band sharing algorithm significantly improves the spectrum efficiency performance compared with the other practical schemes for heterogeneous networks.
基金supported by National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program) (No. 2010CB731800)Key Project of National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60934003)Scientific and Technological Supporting Project of Hebei Province(No. 072435155D)
文摘This paper presents a symmetric cooperation strategy for cooperative relay networks with multiple users. The multi-user symmetric cooperation model and the relay selection algorithm are proposed. Then, the time slot allocation problem is cast into a bargaining problem, and the optimal time slot allocation solution is obtained by Nash bargaining solution (NBS). Moreover, we also consider the implementations of the cooperation strategy, i.e., the grouping and admission control algorithm. Simulation results show that users can obtain larger rates under the symmetric cooperation strategy than the non-cooperative case.
文摘Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60972059)Project Funded by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (PAPD)+3 种基金Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China (Nos. 2010QNA27 and 2011QNB26)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 20100481185)the Ph. D. Programs Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Nos. 20090095120013 and 20110095120006)Talent Introduction Program, and Young Teacher Sailing Program of China University of Mining and Technology
文摘Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation (PA) between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate (SER) at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.
文摘On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and product nature, find different bargaining power and product nature important role for channel structure, and also present equilibrium result. Furthermore, the academic proof for channel structure choice is presented.
基金Sponsored by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863Program)(Grant No.2008AA12Z305)
文摘According to the utility function and spectrum demand of the cognitive users,a novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game was proposed under the wireless environment of Rayleigh fading.On the basis of this mechanism,we proposed a new distributed bargaining algorithm based on Nash product;then the spectrum prices and system utilities were obtained.Theoretical analysis results showed that with a close total utility to the optimal,the Nash bargaining mechanism cannot only improve the fairness between primary systems remarkably,but also reach to the stable equilibrium in finitely repeated games.Finally,simulation results were given to demonstrate the correctness of these conclusions and the efficiency of the algorithm.
文摘The Tanzania Zambia Railway stretches 1,860 kilometers from the East African Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to New Kapiri-Mposhi in land locked Zambia.It is defined as a bi-national organization as opposed to either transnational or multinational because it is jointly owned and managed by the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia.Its construction was made possible by Chinese interest-free loan to the two Governments.Few development projects in Africa have been charged with as much political and ideological dynamite as Tanzania Zambia Railway.To the Western powers,angry that the Chinese had entered territory which they considered their own preserve,it was a Red Railway intended to thrust communism into the very heart of Africa.For the white regimes in Southern Africa,grimly attempting to hold back demands for majority rule,it was seen as Africa’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,carrying guerrilla further,armed with Chinese thoughts and weapons to the banks of the Zambezi River.The Chinese regarded the project as a Friendship Route to strengthen the new African states against the forces of imperialism and for Tanzania and Zambia it was a Freedom Railway,which should prove an instrument in increasing their independence.These reactions underpin not only the complexity of the establishment and management of a bi-national organization but also present challenges to the two national trade unions on how best they can represent their members.Industrial relations literature has cited differences in countries’historical,social,political,economic,and ideological background as the main obstacles in the development of collective bargaining machinery in transnational or multinational organizations.A study in Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority has attempted to develop an integrated bi-national collective bargaining machinery whose collective agreements are likely to be legally enforceable in their respective countries.This paper explores the development of trade unions in both Tanzania and Zambia which can be divided in three phases:first,the construction phase;second,the consolidation phase;and the third and final phase,trade union liberalization and political pluralism which covers the development of a bi national collective bargaining model with its Joint Industrial Council structure and negotiation procedures.The paper compares and contrasts trade union development in the two contracting states and critically examines how each phase has influenced trade union development.It provides a brief historical outline of collective bargaining process and spells out advantages and limitations of bi-national collective bargaining machinery.The paper concludes by observing that one of the main objectives of regional groupings is economic integration and suggests that integrated collective bargaining machinery be adopted as an ideal industrial relations model for regional groupings such as the African Union(AU),Southern African Development Community(SADC),Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA),Economic Community for West African States(ECOWAS),Eastern African Community,and other regional groupings around the world since it localizes industrial relations function in general and collective bargaining in particular.
文摘From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is discussed and the equilibrium result is found. Also the theoretical evidences for competing channel structure choice are given.
文摘As the rapid development of electronic commerce in our country in recent years it is becoming focus how to use electronic commerce to realize non-distant communication of E2C and E2E which is called the second generation of electronic commerce. This paper combines the All Set theory with Matter Element transform into bargaining theory to build All Set bargaining model. In this model, the bargaining conditions of both sides are viewed as Matter Element which is the basic cell of extension theory. By using All Set theory, shell theory, fuzzy control and extension theory, the process of Matter Element transform from original Matter Element to final Matter Element which can be satisfied by both sides in bargaining is discussed. There are four axioms are distracted based on the All Set bargaining model. At last we extend our bi-persons bargaining model to multi-persons bargaining model by using soft matching system, and make it possible for intelligent bargaining on the supporting of electronic commerce.
文摘针对微网独立运行时面临运行成本高,受可再生能源出力和多能负荷功率不确定性影响大等问题,提出一种基于混合两阶段鲁棒优化的多微网合作运行方法。首先,为了应对源荷双重不确定性挑战,在传统两阶段鲁棒优化基础上,提出一种基于多场景数据的最恶劣概率场景驱动的混合两阶段鲁棒优化方法,并采用可并行计算列与约束生成(column and constraint generation,C&CG)算法来提高求解效率。然后,在建立的多微网点对点分布式能源交易系统框架上,根据纳什谈判理论构造多微网合作成本最小化问题和收益分配问题,并提出一种耦合可并行计算C&CG的交替方向乘子法进行求解。最后,根据各微网不同的贡献率,设计一种基于点对点电能交易贡献度的非对称纳什谈判机制来分配各微网的合作收益。算例结果表明,所提方法能兼顾系统的鲁棒性、经济性和隐私性,并实现每个微网公平合理的收益分配。