Effect of Collective Bargaining on Employee Motivation in the Zimbabwean Gold Mining Sector

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of collective bargaining on employee motivation in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.The continued restless among employees at various gold mines in the midlands province has resulted in productivity levels dwindling.There has been increased labour turnover by employees as well as increased union representation to management.Questionnaire were used to collect data.In this article a population of one thousand employees was used.A sample of two hundred employees was selected across the board.The results of the study indicate positive relationships between collective bargaining and job satisfaction among the employees in the Zimbabwean gold mining sector.Implications of these results are that the human resource interventions are required in order to create an environment in which employees can freely engage in collective bargaining.Furthermore,the results indicate that collective bargaining engenders intrinsic motivation and above all allows for the protection of employee’s rights and welfare as well as promoting industrial democracy.This study recommends that managers should guard against preventing or obstructing employees from seeking legal redress to protect their interest.In addition,labour officers should be given the right of reasonable access to workers during working hours at their organisations for the purposes of advising the workers on the law.The employees should be given a latitude to belong to a trade union and or workers committee.

基于迭代Bargaining策略优化服务合成执行路径

服务质量(QoS)是优化服务合成执行路径的关键研究内容,当前绝大多数存在的方法很少注意到商业环境下服务商之间存在的隐性竞争压力可能会迫使服务商动态改变他们的QoS值以至于合成优化执行路径发生改变。针对此问题,提出一个基于迭代Bargaining策略的约束违背纠正方法。该方法使用本地最优化策略,在没有考虑用户QoS约束的情况下建立一条最优执行路径。对此路径,全局QoS计算模型和全局约束违背检查模型能找出所有发生的约束违背。一个迭代的Bargaining策略被递归作用于关键路径执行节点,使得更好服务提供商被选出替换原有执行节点,从而一个优化的执行路径能被重新建立以满足用户综合的QoS约束需求。

Unlicensed Band Sharing Based on Bargaining Game for Heterogeneous Networks

Currently,limited licensed frequency bands cannot meet the increasing demands for various wireless communication applications any more.It is necessary to extend wireless communication networks to unlicensed spectrum.In this paper,we propose a new bargaining framework for unlicensed band access to achieve high spectrum efficiency,where one radio access technology(RAT)(such as macro cellular network)“competes”the unlicensed bands with multiple other RATs(such as small cellular networks or Wi-Fi)virtually.Considering that macro cell can share unlicensed frequencies with multiple small cells which are in the same coverage area for more freedom,we use bargaining game theory to fairly and effectively share the unlicensed spectrum between macro and multiple heterogeneous small cell networks,where bargaining loss and time dissipation loss for virtual“price”of unlicensed bands are mainly considered.In the oneto-many bargaining process,we also develop a multiple RAT alliance game strategy to reduce transmission loss in a joint manner.Simulation results show that the proposed unlicensed band sharing algorithm significantly improves the spectrum efficiency performance compared with the other practical schemes for heterogeneous networks.

An improving energy efficiency cooperation algorithm based on Nash bargaining solution in selfish user cooperative networks

A bandwidth-exchange cooperation algorithm based on the Nash bargaining solution （NBS） is proposed to encourage the selfish users to participate with more cooperation so as to improve the users＇ energy efficiency. As a result, two key problems, i.e. , when to cooperate and how to cooperate, are solved. For the first problem, a proposed cooperation condition that can decide when to cooperate and guarantee users＇ energy efficiency achieved through cooperation is not lower than that achieved without cooperation. For the second problem, the cooperation bandwidth allocations （CBAs） based on the NBS solve the problem how to cooperate when cooperation takes place. Simulation results show that, as the modulation order of quadrature amplitude modulation （QAM） increases, the cooperation between both users only occurs with a large signal-to-noise ratio （SNR）. Meanwhile, the energy efficiency decreases as the modulation order increases. Despite all this, the proposed algorithm can obviously improve the energy efficiency measured in bits-per-Joule compared with non-cooperation.

Modelling the Iranian Petroleum Contract fiscal regime using bargaining game theory to guide contract negotiators

Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.

Multi-user Symmetric Cooperation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution in Cooperative Relay Networks

This paper presents a symmetric cooperation strategy for cooperative relay networks with multiple users. The multi-user symmetric cooperation model and the relay selection algorithm are proposed. Then, the time slot allocation problem is cast into a bargaining problem, and the optimal time slot allocation solution is obtained by Nash bargaining solution （NBS）. Moreover, we also consider the implementations of the cooperation strategy, i.e., the grouping and admission control algorithm. Simulation results show that users can obtain larger rates under the symmetric cooperation strategy than the non-cooperative case.

Bargaining Game Theoretic Power Control in Selfish Cooperative Relay Networks

Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.

Study about the Asymmetry Competing Channel Structure under Bargaining Power

On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and product nature, find different bargaining power and product nature important role for channel structure, and also present equilibrium result. Furthermore, the academic proof for channel structure choice is presented.

国际关系语境中术语Bargaining和Negotiation的数字话语分析

国际关系术语Bargaining和Negotiation的概念进行研究,具有重要的社会语言学研究意义。本研究以1974-1983年《国际组织》发表的期刊为数字话语语料,基于数字话语分析框架“语境化洋葱层模型”,对Bargaining和Negotiation的相关概念发展和语义关系进行定量与定性分析。研究结果表明,Bargaining和Negotiation的概念都与OED中给出的定义及先前学者提出的观点基本一致,但Negotiation在OED中的定义不能完整地概括它们在实际语境下的含义。本文试图对其在国际关系语境下的定义给予了补充,并通过检索和分析发现Bargaining在语义场中更偏向作为Negotiation这个整体的一部分。

Optimal Time and Bandwidth Allocation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution for Cooperative Cognitive Systems

In this paper,we propose a cooperative spectrum sharing strategy based on the Nash bargaining solution.Specifically,the primary system leases a fraction of its transmission time to the secondary system in exchange for cooperation to improve its transmission performance.To gain access to the spectrum of the primary system,the secondary system needs to split a fraction of its transmission bandwidth to help to forward the primary signal.As a reward,the secondary system can use the remaining bandwidth to transmit its own signal.We find a unique solution for this time and bandwidth allocation using the Nash bargaining solution.Simulation results demonstrate that the performance of the primary and secondary systems can both be improved by the proposed spectrum sharing strategy.

A novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game in cognitive radios

According to the utility function and spectrum demand of the cognitive users,a novel mechanism based on Nash bargaining for primary system game was proposed under the wireless environment of Rayleigh fading.On the basis of this mechanism,we proposed a new distributed bargaining algorithm based on Nash product;then the spectrum prices and system utilities were obtained.Theoretical analysis results showed that with a close total utility to the optimal,the Nash bargaining mechanism cannot only improve the fairness between primary systems remarkably,but also reach to the stable equilibrium in finitely repeated games.Finally,simulation results were given to demonstrate the correctness of these conclusions and the efficiency of the algorithm.

Collective Bargaining During the Crisis： The Portuguese Case

Following a period of significant development at the end of the 1990s, with economic growth rates greater than those of the European Union, the Portuguese economy stagnated in 2002 and even declined in 2003. The current context of international crisis has just interrupted the fragile growth trend initiated in 2004： In fact, real GDP, which increased by 1.9 percent in 2007, had a growth rate of zero in 2008 and declined by 2.9 percent in 2009. The crisis has abruptly increased the closure of companies and unemployment jumped from 7.3% in the second haft of 2008 to 10.1% in the forth quarter of 2009. Notwithstanding, social dialog was resilient to this situation of economic crisis, as shown by the number of collective agreements negotiated by the social partners, the number of workers covered by collective agreements and the observed increase in real wages. Additionally, social partners have agreed on a reform of the Labour Code. Are this data enough evidence of social concentration on crisis management？ This paper will analyze this issue, giving particular attention to collective bargaining in Portugal and the crisis impact on the industrial relations system and their actors

Developing Integrated Collective Bargaining System in a Bi National Organization:The Case of the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority(TAZARA)

The Tanzania Zambia Railway stretches 1,860 kilometers from the East African Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to New Kapiri-Mposhi in land locked Zambia.It is defined as a bi-national organization as opposed to either transnational or multinational because it is jointly owned and managed by the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia.Its construction was made possible by Chinese interest-free loan to the two Governments.Few development projects in Africa have been charged with as much political and ideological dynamite as Tanzania Zambia Railway.To the Western powers,angry that the Chinese had entered territory which they considered their own preserve,it was a Red Railway intended to thrust communism into the very heart of Africa.For the white regimes in Southern Africa,grimly attempting to hold back demands for majority rule,it was seen as Africa’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,carrying guerrilla further,armed with Chinese thoughts and weapons to the banks of the Zambezi River.The Chinese regarded the project as a Friendship Route to strengthen the new African states against the forces of imperialism and for Tanzania and Zambia it was a Freedom Railway,which should prove an instrument in increasing their independence.These reactions underpin not only the complexity of the establishment and management of a bi-national organization but also present challenges to the two national trade unions on how best they can represent their members.Industrial relations literature has cited differences in countries’historical,social,political,economic,and ideological background as the main obstacles in the development of collective bargaining machinery in transnational or multinational organizations.A study in Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority has attempted to develop an integrated bi-national collective bargaining machinery whose collective agreements are likely to be legally enforceable in their respective countries.This paper explores the development of trade unions in both Tanzania and Zambia which can be divided in three phases:first,the construction phase;second,the consolidation phase;and the third and final phase,trade union liberalization and political pluralism which covers the development of a bi national collective bargaining model with its Joint Industrial Council structure and negotiation procedures.The paper compares and contrasts trade union development in the two contracting states and critically examines how each phase has influenced trade union development.It provides a brief historical outline of collective bargaining process and spells out advantages and limitations of bi-national collective bargaining machinery.The paper concludes by observing that one of the main objectives of regional groupings is economic integration and suggests that integrated collective bargaining machinery be adopted as an ideal industrial relations model for regional groupings such as the African Union(AU),Southern African Development Community(SADC),Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA),Economic Community for West African States(ECOWAS),Eastern African Community,and other regional groupings around the world since it localizes industrial relations function in general and collective bargaining in particular.

Study about the Competing Channel Structure under Bargaining Power

From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is discussed and the equilibrium result is found. Also the theoretical evidences for competing channel structure choice are given.

The ＂Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model＂ as a Bargaining Solution Analysis for Local Government Decision From Territory-Community to ＂Behavioral＂ Community： The Case of Greece

Local development as a local management process tables a number of questions, mainly concerning on conflict resolution between the three power local poles： （1） State and its appointed State peripheral Departments; （2） Local authorities; and （3） Local people and their local movements/lobbies. As the three poles are in a constant negotiations, then each of them should prevail over the other two, thus be introduced in the bargaining problem. Bargaining behavior must therefore be defined. The suggested ＂＇win-win-win papakonstantinidis model＂ （coming from Nash win-win extended approach） tries to find ways for the three-pole bargaining conceptual equilibrium, under conditions, thus maximizing expected utilities for all the involved parts in local decision-making by applying a combination of Descriptive Behavior （DB）, Rational Choice, Instrumental Rationality, and the Applied Behavioral Analysis （ABA） methodologies, then an updating community＇s behavioral state is expected, thus transforming the technical territory-community perception to a behavioral community perception, by sensitizing its population, towards the ＂guanxi relations＂ paradigm.

Some Kinds of Bargaining Equilibria of Multi-objective Games

To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to the individual welfare functions,we transform the multi–objective game into a single-objective game and define its bargaining equilibrium,which is a Nash equilibrium of the single-objective game.And then,based on certain continuity and concavity of the multi-objective game's payoff function,we proof the bargaining equilibrium still exists and is also a weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium.Moreover,we analyze several special bargaining equilibria,and compare them in a few examples.

Plea Bargaining in Criminal Dispute Settlement

In order to settle criminal cases promptly and save on judicial resources, using plea bargaining to settle criminal disputes is both an immediate need and a rational choice for China. In the application of plea bargaining, comprehensive consideration should be given to multiple values, including efficiency, justice, harmony, and tempering severity with leniency, Plea bargaining should be applied in cases that do not involve a felony, should be based on a determination of the nature of the crime, and should be limited to bargaining over penalties. Plea bargaining agreements are entered into by the procurator and the defendant, and do not extend to the judge.

A Dynamic Bargaining Game with Externalities

Negotiation and bargaining are the common means of solving economic and political prob-lems.In these problems,players often form coalitions for activities.In the environment with externalities,the worth of a coalition depends not only on itself,but also on the coalition structure of other players.This paper studies dynamic bargaining games with externalities and analyzes the effect of externality on the payoffs of players.Based on the Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining game,the authors study a two-person dynamic game with externalities and extend it to the case of n players.The research shows that externality affects the results of this bargaining game,and coalition structures affect the payoffs of players.Players in this bargaining game can always form grand coali- tion if an allocation is effective,but some coalition structures may not be formed under some certain conditions.

A Dynamic Multi-Player Bargaining Game with Veto Players

This paper studies the effect of veto right on players’income in multi-player dynamic bargaining game.Based on a basic multi-person dynamic bargaining model generalized by the Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model,the authors construct a dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players by adding a constraint to its negotiation process,which is obtained by studying the influence of exercising the veto right exercised by veto players.The authors emphatically describe the strategic game form of this dynamic bargaining game and study its equilibrium,then we analyze the relationship between the minimum acceptable payoff of the veto players and the equilibrium income.The research shows that veto right may increase the benefits of veto players and decrease the benefits of non-veto players.Veto players will not affect the players’benefits and the form of equilibrium when the minimum acceptable payoff of every veto player is relatively low.When the minimum acceptable payoff of the veto player is high enough,he can only get the minimum acceptable payoff,and his benefit increases as his minimum acceptable payoff increases.In this case,the veto player has intention to obtain more resources by presenting a higher minimum acceptable payoff.

Ordering policies and coordination in a twoechelon supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns

This paper investigates the ordering policies of two competitive retailers,and the coordination status of a two-echelon supply chain by considering the fairness concerns of channel members.We consider that two retailers compete with each other over price,where overstock and shortage are allowed.We assume that the demand is stochastic and considered with additive form.First,based on the Nash bargaining fairness reference point,we obtain the optimal decisions of the fairness-concerned channel members in both the centralized and the decentralized cases using a two-stage game theory.Secondly,we analyze the coordination status of the supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns using ideas of optimization.Finally,numerical experiments are used to illustrate the influence of some parameters,the fairness-concerned behavioral preference of the channel members on the optimal decisions and the coordination status of supply chain.Some managerial insights are obtained.