Pervasive computing, which requires applications composed of independent and distributed components, is an important domain for dynamic ubiquitous heterogeneous environment. However, one of the critical challenges it ...Pervasive computing, which requires applications composed of independent and distributed components, is an important domain for dynamic ubiquitous heterogeneous environment. However, one of the critical challenges it faces is resource allocation. To overcome the difficulty, enhanced universal service terminal （UST＋） is designed as a reflective middleware combined distributed components with particular features to achieve user goals. Moreover, a novel algorithm based on microeconomics is presented to resolve conflicting resource allocation and is implemented on top of the UST＋. Besides, an example outlines how this algorithm is used in pervasive computing, and the simulation results illustrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve high performance at low cost.展开更多
Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to ...Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.展开更多
In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria ...In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.展开更多
In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the...In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.展开更多
Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pric...Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pricing of China is therefore presented in this paper. The es EVE method is different from two part and one part tariffs. It is more like the UK's method in form, but revised for China with some new concepts and procedure. The main contributions of it include: (1) Find two kinds of eigenvalue, namely EVEs, in an optimization model, (2) Define new concepts of virtual units and feasible region, (3) Twice merit orderings are employed successively to find marginal price. They are simple maximum and minimum comparison procedures and so on. The special economic significance of the method for China is discussed, and some suggestion for ESI restructuring based on es EVE method are provided. A case study is offered at the end of the paper.展开更多
A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procur...A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.展开更多
基金supported by the Hi-Tech Research and Development Program of China (2009AA01Z262,2006DFA11050)the Beijing Munical Education Commission (KM200910016003)
文摘Pervasive computing, which requires applications composed of independent and distributed components, is an important domain for dynamic ubiquitous heterogeneous environment. However, one of the critical challenges it faces is resource allocation. To overcome the difficulty, enhanced universal service terminal （UST＋） is designed as a reflective middleware combined distributed components with particular features to achieve user goals. Moreover, a novel algorithm based on microeconomics is presented to resolve conflicting resource allocation and is implemented on top of the UST＋. Besides, an example outlines how this algorithm is used in pervasive computing, and the simulation results illustrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve high performance at low cost.
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62173066)Open Project of Sichuan Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Terminal Co-built by Province and City(SCITLAB-1014)。
文摘Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70231010 and No.70321001)
文摘In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China (70071012)
文摘In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.
文摘Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pricing of China is therefore presented in this paper. The es EVE method is different from two part and one part tariffs. It is more like the UK's method in form, but revised for China with some new concepts and procedure. The main contributions of it include: (1) Find two kinds of eigenvalue, namely EVEs, in an optimization model, (2) Define new concepts of virtual units and feasible region, (3) Twice merit orderings are employed successively to find marginal price. They are simple maximum and minimum comparison procedures and so on. The special economic significance of the method for China is discussed, and some suggestion for ESI restructuring based on es EVE method are provided. A case study is offered at the end of the paper.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(7127105171371002+1 种基金71471032)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,NEU,China(N140607001)
文摘A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.
