A Generation Pricing Method with Capacity Bidding

Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pricing of China is therefore presented in this paper. The es EVE method is different from two part and one part tariffs. It is more like the UK's method in form, but revised for China with some new concepts and procedure. The main contributions of it include: (1) Find two kinds of eigenvalue, namely EVEs, in an optimization model, (2) Define new concepts of virtual units and feasible region, (3) Twice merit orderings are employed successively to find marginal price. They are simple maximum and minimum comparison procedures and so on. The special economic significance of the method for China is discussed, and some suggestion for ESI restructuring based on es EVE method are provided. A case study is offered at the end of the paper.

Electronic Auction Scheme Based on Smart Contract and IPFS

Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.

Secure blockchain bidding auction protocol against malicious adversaries

In recent years,with the development of blockchain,electronic bidding auction has received more and more attention.Aiming at the possible problems of privacy leakage in the current electronic bidding and auction,this paper proposes an electronic bidding auction system based on blockchain against malicious adversaries,which uses the secure multi-party computation to realize secure bidding auction protocol without any trusted third party.The protocol proposed in this paper is an electronic bidding auction scheme based on the threshold elliptic curve cryptography.It can be implemented without any third party to complete the bidding auction for some malicious behaviors of the participants,which can solve the problem of resisting malicious adversary attacks.The security of the protocol is proved by the real/ideal model paradigm,and the efficiency of the protocol is analyzed.The efficiency of the protocol is verified by simulating experiments,and the protocol has practical value.

BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN HOMOGENOUS MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS

A homogenous multi-unit auction model is studied in two conditions： One is that the bidders face budget constraints and another is that the bidders do not face budget constraints. Two equilibrium bidding strategies of each bidder are presented in these two conditions. By comparing them, the authors show that the equilibrium unit price bid in the presence of budget constraints will be less than that in the absence of budget constraints. The difference between the two equilibrium bids leads to the reduced revenue of the seller. And this difference will decrease as the number of the bidders increases.