Regulation of toxins and bioregulators under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

In this paper we highlight how the apparent double coverage of toxins and bioregulators by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC)in fact masks a regulatory gap that has left such potentially dangerous agents neglected by both the control regimes during a period of rapid advances in relevant chemical,life and associated sciences and technologies.We first review what toxins,bioregulators and other mid-spectrum agents are and why they are of such concern and then examine how they are regulated under the BTWC and CWC.This paper then examines an illustrative range of contemporary chemical and life science research and associated activities of concern drawn from case study research on China,India,Iran,Russia,Syria and the United States,and assesses how the CWC and BTWC States Parties have inadequately addressed these threats.We then examine how both the CWC and BTWC Review Conferences failed to address these long-term challenges,and we end by providing a series of recommendations for how both regimes can be strengthened in this area.

Strengthening biological security after COVID-19:Using cartoons for engaging life science stakeholders with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes.Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse,not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation.In this paper,we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security.We first discuss the issue of‘dual use’in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.Second,we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC).Third,we report on the development of an innovative awarenessraising tool,a cartoon series,that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues.Finally,we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

Key issues in the implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists: A survey of biosecurity education projects

In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct.In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines,a smallscale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discover what resources and experience have been accumulated.It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed,but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly.In particular,an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations(UN)languages.Additionally,more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities.While advantage should be taken now of the available national,regional and international networks of people involved in related activities,it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network(INSEN)organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).