Disease Control, Prevention and On-Farm Biosecurity: The Role of Veterinary Epidemiology

Domesticated and non-domesticated animals, including wildlife, deliver significant financial and nonfinancial benefits to the human community;however, disease can have a dramatic impact on the morbidity, mortality, and productivity of these animal populations and hence can directly and indirectly affect the human communities associated with them. This manuscript provides an overview of the important features to consider for the prevention and control of disease, with a focus on livestock diseases,and highlights the key role veterinary epidemiology plays in this endeavor. Measures of disease frequency and the type of epidemiological studies required to identify risk factors for diseases are summarized,with a focus on the use of these in the implementation of measures to control disease. The importance of biosecurity in maintaining disease-free flocks/herds is discussed and the steps taken to implement good biosecurity measures are outlined. It is concluded that a sound knowledge of veterinary epidemiology is required when developing control programs for disease and implementing biosecurity programs at a farm, regional, and national level.

Adoption of HPAI biosecurity measures： The Chinese broiler industry

Highly pathogenic avian influenza （HPAI） contamination via wild birds and rodents poses a threat to food security and safety. As chicken meat comprises an increasing proportion of diet in China, it is useful to determine whether broiler farmers are adopting wild bird and rodent controls to minimize the risk of HPAI impacts on food supply. Our study surveyed a cross sectional sample of 331 Chinese broiler farmers in six provinces. We find that only 47% of farmers （mainly farmers with large herds） adopted control measures against wild birds and rodents, while 14% adopted no measures. Farm size was the biggest driver of adoption followed by proportion of farm revenue derived from broiler production. However, southern farmers were at a far greater probability of non-adoption. We suggest that assistance in the form of education/training programs and subsidized traps or baiting controls across smaller producers could help raise of the adoption level toward more effective HPAI control.

Biosecurity Practices and Geospatial Map of Ontario Backyard Poultry Flocks

The CFO （Chicken Farmers of Ontario） has taken important steps to increase biosecurity practices within backyard poultry flocks in order to thwart infectious diseases. The present study originally intended to describe biosecurity practices within this milieu, so as to determine their nearest neighbor and density, as well as the average distance between backyard and commercial broiler flocks. To that effect, paper questionnaire and survey interviews were used （May-July, 2011）, while backyard and commercial broiler chicken flocks were geocoded. The response rates collected from the study produced these findings regarding： growers＇ health practices toward flocks, hygienic precautions relative to the production area, regularity of bird inspection and cleaning after each folk, protocol used to dispose of dead birds, mixing （or lack thereof） of flocks with other livestock, as well as the average distance between small flocks and commercial farms. The study concludes that education material should focus on improving the growers＇ understanding of issues examined in the study, focusing on areas of weakness in respect to biosecurity practices.

The Potential Role of Smart Mobile Technology in Mitigating Ireland’s Tourism Biosecurity Risk

The use of smart mobile technology could potentially ease Ireland’s level of biosecurity risk from tourism. Smart mobile technology is capable of improving communication of biosecurity monitoring, mitigation, and eradication measures to tourists in Ireland. The scope of this research is to assess biosecurity communication from Ireland’s major ports, state agencies, and governing bodies involved in outdoor recreational activities. The aim of this paper is to assess Ireland’s biosecurity communication for any smart mobile technology in national agencies. A mixed method approach was utilised which consisted of content analysis as well as structured qualitative interviews. Analysis has revealed that no evidence of smart mobile technology for biosecurity communication is in place for tourists arriving in Ireland’s ports or in national agencies. The importance of timely communication of biosecurity measures and alerts seems to not have been recognised. The use of this technology could mitigate the risk of tourists vectoring dangerous microbes and aiding biological invasions. This paper concludes that a low emphasis on adopting smart mobile technology could be unnecessarily contributing to Ireland’s biosecurity risk. It offers an opportunity to be improved before a serious biosecurity breach occurs possibly resulting in a lost tourist season or expensive eradication programmes as has been witnessed in other destinations worldwide.

Biosecurity Threats about the Combination of Aerobiology, Morphology and Genetic Manipulation of Fungal Spores

The passive flight of large numbers of mitospores ensures propagation and survival of many fungal species. Moreover, many fungi have a surplus DNA context which allows for easier manipulation and tampering, especially when inserting eukaryotic genes and translation systems. These facts taken together suggest a high prominence of the sporogonic airborne fungi in biosecurity/biodefence priority lists, but due to the low virulence and mortality of the fungal pathogens, they do not figure high, or, sometimes, not at all. The disruptive effect of biosecurity fungal threats is important per se and genetic manipulations are to further it. Novel, long range and high-persistence sampling methods, using robotics and unmanned systems already fielded in other applications may extend surveillance and responsive sampling. Effects-based, proteomic approaches may provide a solution for deliberate incidents, while polyphasic taxonomy may resolve spontaneous incidents and assist medical diagnosis, but in the biosecurity context, where mass collection and processing of samples and speed in producing robust results are vital, complex approaches might be proved more of a hindrance than an asset.

Dual Use and Biosecurity: the Case of the Avian Flu H5N1

The classical dual use problem—the potential for harmful as well as beneficial application of scientific findings—has become more immediate in biotechnology than in most other fields of science. Terrorist misuse of the information on the development of pathogenic organisms can lead to catastrophic outcomes. Therefore, particular in biosciences researchers are faced with the dilemma to find a proper balance between the right to know and the dangers of knowing. In this paper this dilemma is illustrated by the research on the influenza A virus subtype H5N1, commonly known as “bird flu”. The pros and cons of the full publication on the development of a dangerous airborne type are discussed.

Key issues in the implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists: A survey of biosecurity education projects

In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct.In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines,a smallscale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discover what resources and experience have been accumulated.It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed,but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly.In particular,an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations(UN)languages.Additionally,more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities.While advantage should be taken now of the available national,regional and international networks of people involved in related activities,it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network(INSEN)organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).

Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for codes of conduct for scientists:Promoting responsible sciences and strengthening biosecurity governance

Formulated and endorsed by the international scientific community,the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines are a set of ten guiding principles and standards of conduct designed to promote responsible sciences and strengthen biosecurity governance at national and institutional levels.It may be used to develop new or enhance,supplement,and update the existing codes of conduct adaptive to a specific context and responsive to the bio-risks arising from the rapid advances in biological sciences.

Significance of and outlook for the Biosecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China

The Biosecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China is the first basic,comprehensive,systematic,and overarching law of biosecurity in China,involving biosecurity risks,national biosecurity governance,and systems for minimizing the biosecurity threats.This article elaborates on the formulation,content,features,and significance of the law,and provides an outlook for its evolution.

Surveillance of emerging infectious diseases for biosecurity

Emerging infectious diseases, such as COVID-19, continue to pose significant threats to human beings and their surroundings. In addition, biological warfare, bioterrorism, biological accidents, and harmful consequences arising from dual-use biotechnology also pose a challenge for global biosecurity. Improving the early surveillance capabilities is necessary for building a common biosecurity shield for the global community of health for all. Furthermore, surveillance could provide early warning and situational awareness of biosecurity risks. However, current surveillance systems face enormous challenges, including technical shortages, fragmented management, and limited international cooperation. Detecting emerging biological risks caused by unknown or novel pathogens is of particular concern. Surveillance systems must be enhanced to effectively mitigate biosecurity risks. Thus, a global strategy of meaningful cooperation based on efficient integration of surveillance at all levels, including interdisciplinary integration of techniques and interdepartmental integration for effective management, is urgently needed. In this paper, we review the biosecurity risks by analyzing potential factors at all levels globally. In addition to describing biosecurity risks and their impact on global security, we also focus on analyzing the challenges to traditional surveillance and propose suggestions on how to integrate current technologies and resources to conduct effective global surveillance.

Biosafety and biosecurity in the era of biotechnology:The Middle East region

Biotechnology became a paradigm-shifting science among all subfields of biology.The benefits of biotechnology have reached many practical fields,whether human health,animal,and/or agricultural.However,wherever there is a biotechnology practice,there is an associated biohazard with it,and its negative impact may reach all living entities including humans.Therefore,the cooperation of the leading institutions in this field has culminated in creating the concepts and applications of biosafety and biosecurity.The countries of the Middle East are considered biotechnology-practicing and have shown a clear acceptance to this field.But unfortunately,the Middle East region is one that is facing the most multichallenges,which would constitute real and noticeable concern at the local and international levels.Such challenges represented by wars and armed conflicts,deteriorating economic conditions,the large number of refugees,and the spread of many epidemics.Thus,limiting the region’s ability to deal with the surrounding biological hazards and struggling the way to the one health concept.Therefore,this article aims to shed light on the activities of the Middle East countries in the field of biotechnology and to address potential biological threats,whether natural such as the spread of viruses,or intentional such as biological attacks and bioterrorism.The article also shows the capacity of the countries of the region in the field of biosafety and biosecurity based on available information.Accordingly,some countries are lacking the required level of preparedness to face potential biological threats.Multi-institutional and international cooperation between the concerned countries will significantly enhance the capacity of the region in biosafety and biosecurity to meet the level of biological risk.Search methodology:wide range of related keywords(based on the section)combined with the name of the region,or one country individually have been searched using available search engines and databases such as google scholar and PubMed.After scanning the content of the found results,irrelevant articles have been excluded.Figures 2,3,4,6,and 7 were created by biorender.com.

Challenges and recent progress in the governance of biosecurity risks in the era of synthetic biology

Considerable progress has been achieved in basic research and the biotechnological application of biological sciences in recent years.Synthetic biology integrates systems biology,engineering,computer science,and other disciplines to achieve the“modification of life”or even the“creation of life”via the redesign of existing natural systems or the development of new biological components and devices.However,the research and application of synthetic biology can create potential risks,such as aggravation of species with complex gene modifications,threats to species diversity,abuse of biological weapons,laboratory leaks,and man-made mutations.Without a suitable governance system,such research activities could result in harm to humans,plants,and animals,as well as to natural ecological systems.In this article,we first briefly summarize technical progress in synthetic biology in recent years and the potential bioethical and biosecurity risks,and then describe current international treaties,guidance documents,and national regulatory measures designed to address potential harm caused by the dual-use property of synthetic biology,including the Biological Weapons Convention,the Convention on Biological Diversity,and the Model Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists(Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists).In addition,we also present some recommendations for better governance of synthetic biology research and applications in China,including strengthening the biosecurity capacity,improving the biosecurity regulatory system,and promoting multilevel international cooperation to effectively address the potential biosecurity risks of synthetic biology.

Regulation and management of the biosecurity for synthetic biology

Synthetic biology(SynBio)is a high-profile interdiscipline combining engineering with science.As a dual-purpose discipline,SynBio is bringing large changes to many fields and providing great benefits to humans.However,due to its characteristic of complexity and uncertainty,SynBio also presents potential biosafety and biosecurity risks.Biosecurity risks refer to unauthorized access,loss,theft,misuse,diversion or intentional release.If a biosecurity accident happens,it would pose a huge threat to humans and nature.Therefore,it is crucial to establish a set of regulations and management practices for the biosecurity risks of SynBio.In this paper,we summarized the sources of the biosecurity risks of SynBio,from its research materials,products,technologies,information to Do-it-yourself synthetic biology.We reviewed and analyzed the current situation of regulation and management of biosecurity for SynBio in the international community and in China.We found that in most countries and regions,SynBio risks commonly follow the regulation and management of Genetically Modified Organisms which has loopholes if applied to the regulation for SynBio without any amendments.Here,we proposed suggestions for the Chinese-featured regulation and management of biosecurity for SynBio,including a top-to-bottom governing framework,a think-tank implementation mechanism,a Synthetic Biology Laboratory Biosecurity Manual safeguarding system,and strengthening biosecurity education on synthetic biology and self-regulation awareness among relevant personnel.Through this work,we aim to improve the standardized process of biosecurity regulation and management for SynBio in China and thereby map out a peaceful,profitable,and practical development path for synthetic biology.

Synthetic biology:Recent progress,biosafety and biosecurity concerns,and possible solutions

Synthetic biology is a new interdisciplinary research area that uses engineering principles as guidelines for biological investigation.With research goals to modify existing biological systems or to create new ones,the recent applications of synthetic biology have expanded approaches and tools for conventional biological research.In this article,we first briefly review the development and progress of synthetic biology over the past decade.Although the contributions of synthetic biology to basic life science research,human health,environmental protection,and even economic growth have been widely observed,potential biosafety,biosecurity,and ethical risks related to synthetic biology have also emerged in recent years as technology becomes less expensive,more mature,and more accessible.We provide a brief assessment of the risks associated with the possible misuse or abuse of this technology in various areas and discuss concerns from three points of view:biosafety,biosecurity risks,and ethics.Finally,to address challenges arising from the rapid progress of synthetic biology,technical,ethical,and regulatory measures were developed or discussed in recent years,including laboratory level precautionary measures for biosafety and biosecurity related to synthetic biology(such as genetic safeguards and firewalls),ethical codes of conduct for biological scientists,and regulations or oversight rules from personal,national,and international perspectives.A brief summary of these efforts is provided.

Biosafety and biosecurity law in Thailand:From legislation to practice

Thailand has continuously established biosafety and security laws since 1932.The present law,the Pathogens and Animal Toxins Act 2015,was established for the controlled production,possession,sales,import,export,and transit of pathogens and animal toxins.The law is in accordance with the current world situation—that is,outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases and the development of modern biotechnology,such as genetic modification of pathogens with the potential for beneficial or harmful use.The principles of the pathogen control measures of Thai law are similar to those of foreign laws in countries such as Canada,the United States,Singapore,and the People’s Republic of China.Control measures are based on the risk levels of pathogens to humans,animals,and the environment.This review briefly presents details of the law’s development in Thailand.Details are given in comparison with those of other countries;the export and import of pathogens and animal toxins according to EU export controls are also discussed.The practice and experience of applying the law in Thailand are also presented.Dissemination of enforcement details will ensure effective legal biosafety and biosecurity control measures in Thailand.This may be useful for establishing a law involving regulatory controls for biosafety and biosecurity.

Biosafety and biosecurity

With the profound changes in the international security situation,the progression of globalization,and the continuous advancement of biotechnology,the risks and challenges posed by major infectious diseases and bioterrorism to the international community are also increasing.Biosafety,therefore,presents new opportunities for international cooperation and global governance.The world has become more integrated and now shares a common destiny in terms of biosafety.In the face of the current risks and challenges,the international community must work together to avert threats,advance mutual interests,and safeguard global biosecurity.In the context of the current situation regarding biosafety and biosecurity,we conducted the present analysis,and present here some appropriate countermeasures.

Hospital biosecurity capacitation:Analysis and recommendations for the prevention and control of COVID-19

The outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019(COVID-19)in December 2019 highlighted several concerns regarding hospital biosafety capacitation in the People’s Republic of China,although the epidemic is now under control.This study examined the primary problems related to hospital biosecurity,including the absence of a hospital emergency system,inadequate management and control of nosocomial infection,limited hospital laboratory capacity,and poor hospital admission capacity.Accordingly,this study puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions for hospitals to deal with future biosecurity events,such as a major epidemic:first,biosecurity management systems and emergency response mechanisms in hospitals need to be set up;second,the investment and guarantee mechanisms for hospital biosecurity construction should be improved;third,the capacity building of biosecurity incident management requires special attention in general hospitals;and finally,comprehensive plans need to be developed for the integrated construction of medical treatment and prevention facilities through diseasecontrol systems.

Biosecurity risk mapping and gap analysis in South East Asia

Introduction:In today’s globalized world where travel is commonplace,a threat in one region can easily spread throughout the whole world.It is,therefore,essential for multi-disciplinary risk assessment,risk mitigation,and collaborative strategies to take place among various stakeholders to mitigate this.Any strategic plan to deal with biosecurity,therefore,needs to be a complete loop,top to bottom and bottom to top.This paper describes the results of Project 62,which involved mapping and biosecurity risk assessment in South East Asia.Materials and methods:The mapping and biosecurity risk assessment activities for the participating partner countries was carried out in two phases.The first phase involved risk assessment by six partnercountry bio-experts for their own countries and the second phase involved conducting a joint Strengths,Weaknesses,Opportunities,and Threats(SWOT)analysis and risk assessment for the South East Asian region as whole,together with international bio-experts at a workshop.Results and discussion:The following key recommendations of the project show that biosecurity needs to be addressed through stakeholder engagement at multiple levels starting from the top echelons of the government to the worker who needs to recognize and understand the threats they might face:1.Systematic analysis of existing information from BWC ISU Article 10,IHR capacities,JEE,UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Action Plan,EU CBRN NAP,and other relevant sources to develop a common understanding of the definition of biosecurity for all stakeholders in the region.2.Creation of programs for awareness building in biosecurity,not limiting them to laboratory biosecurity but using an all-inclusive approach to include border biosecurity,pandemic response,etc.3.Creation of a country-specific list of high-risk biological materials.4.Compulsory standardized biosecurity training,including responsible conduct in biosecurity research.5.Framework for one-health and security interface addressing biosecurity threats.6.Framework for ensuring information security in relation to biosecurity.7.Involvement of local/regional experts in the implementation of EU-CBRN CoE projects.

Understanding Farmers’ Preferences Towards Insurance Schemes that Promote Biosecurity Best Management Practices

Plant pest and disease outbreaks,which occur with increasing frequency and intensity,cause catastrophic losses and threaten food security in many areas around the world.These impacts are expected to be exacerbated by climate change.Tackling this challenge requires mechanisms that ensure the financial security of farmers while incentivizing private biosecurity efforts to prevent future outbreaks.This study explored crop producers’ preferences for a subsidized insurance scheme as an instrument to manage novel biotic risks.Specific ally,we developed a choice experiment to evaluate Spanish growers’ willingness to pay for a crop insurance product that promotes compliance with best biosecurity management practices.Our results show that while growers are willing to pay more for high coverage products that increase the resilience of crops to potential catastrophic outbreaks,there is neither a strong demand nor widespread availability of such tools.Farmers required reductions in premiums before undertaking risk prevention measures;they are more willing to pay for schemes that link their eligibility to access to ad hoc funds in the eventuality of a catastrophic outbreak than they are to purchase insurance.Our findings also suggest that Spanish growers prefer expanding the eligible risks covered by insurance and envisage a role for insurance in offering biosecurity protection.