Cash holdings,corporate governance,and acquirer returns

Background:The wealth effect of limiting shareholder rights via anti-takeover provisions(ATPs)is a contentious issue.By taking the differential effect hypothesis perspective,our study aims to provide additional evidence about the relation between ATPs and acquisition performance.Methods:We examine the interaction of antitakeover provisions(ATPs)with firm characteristics and governance environment in explaining the cross-section of bidder announcement returns.Using a sample of 3,340 completed acquisitions by 1,217 firms during 1996–2006,we test the association between ATPs,firm characteristics,and governance environments with bidder returns.Results:We find that ATPs hurt acquisition performance only when acquirers hold a high level of excess cash.Similarly,ATPs are associated with lower bidder returns only when industry competition is weak and public pension fund ownership is low as well.By contrast,when industry competition is intense and/or public pension fund ownership is high,ATPs do not hurt bidder returns.Conclusions:The complementarity among ATPs,excess cash,industry competition,and public pension fund ownership suggests that ATPs per se do not necessarily result in value-destroying acquisitions for all firms.We address the endogeneity issue of unknown variables by using a proxy for firm prestige and draw the same conclusions.

Determinants of corporate cash holdings in tranquil and turbulent period:evidence from an emerging economy

Using a sample of 280 firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange,we empirically investigate factors that determine corporate cash holdings in different periods from 2005 to 2014.We divide the sample into three sub-periods—pre-crisis,crisis,and post-crisis—and apply a panel data model to estimate the results.The results suggest that financial crises affect firms’cash holdings policies.Further,findings show that financial crisis has influenced the relationship of size and leverage with cash holdings.In particular,cash flow,liquidity,and tangibility are major determinants of cash holdings in the sub-periods.We present important implications for corporate managers,academicians,and policymakers.

VAT Neutrality and Corporate Cash Holdings—Based on the Research of Uncredited VAT Refund Policy

This paper regards the uncredited value-added tax(VAT)refund policy promulgated in 2018 as an exogenous shock to improve the neutrality for VAT.Based on the statistics of listed companies in the non-financial sectors from 2013 to 2020,this paper applies the difference-in-differences(DID)approach to study the impact of the uncredited VAT refund policy on corporate cash holdings.The study finds that the policy has eased the impact of non-tax-neutral impact of non-refundable tax credits and lowered the level of corporate cash holdings.Furthermore,the analysis of capital sources verified that the policy has optimized the corporate capital conditions.These findings have proved to be robust after a series of tests.At the level of cross-sectional differences,the uncredited VAT refund policy exerts both"resource effect"and"signal effect",enabling companies to reduce cash holdings in the dimensions of both tax endowment and market expectation.At the level of policy effects,the policy improved the corporate behavior of high cash holdings for the production and operation cycle,with more notable impact on enterprises with higher tax credit rating.At the level of economic consequences,the adjustment of corporate cash holdings induced by uncredited VAT refund policy has significantly improved operating performance and reduced performance volatility,with a greater impact on enterprises with high capital intensity.The research findings evaluate the uncredited VAT refund policy from the perspective of tax neutrality,laying a theoretical foundation for further optimizing the uncredited VAT refund policy and the modern fiscal,tax and financial systems.

How and Why Do Firms Adjust Their Cash Holdings toward Targets？ Evidence from China

We examine the dynamic adjustment of cash holdings of publicly traded Chinese firms during 1998-2006. The empirical evidence is supportive of the dynamic trade-off theory of cash holdings. In particular, there is strong evidence of asymmetric adjustments, i.e., adjustments from above the target are significantly faster than those from below. Moreover, the speeds of adjustment （SOA） are heterogeneous for firms facing differential adjustment costs. More specifically, the adjustment speed is higher in firms with bank lines of credit, positively related to the deviation from the target, but it is negatively related to firm size. Furthermore, in terms of adjustment method, firms make adjustments to their targets primarily through debt and equity financing when they are in cash shortage, On the other hand, the dividend payments play a minimal role in it. Lastly, in terms of motives for adjustment, we find that the precautionary motive arising from financial constraints well explains the cash holdings adjustment behaviors of Chinese listed firms.

Board faultlines and the value of cash holdings:Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers,which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings.Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016,we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings.The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value.This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes.Furthermore,the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises(SOEs)than in non-SOEs.As an important governance mechanism,management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings.Overall,we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value.We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.

Why Greater Cash Holdings and Short-Term Debt Simultaneously Persist？ The Case of Transition Economy

This study observes and explores a puzzle in Chinese firms whereby both cash holdings and short-term debt simultaneously account for more than 20% of total assets for at least two consecutive years over the sample period. This phenomenon conflicts with the principle of corporate value maximization, and is not clearly explained by the classical theories in corporate finance. Based on the implications in the extant literature and discussions of institutional constraints of the transition economy in China, this paper develops four hypotheses that are involved with agency conflicts between the largest shareholders and creditors and the formation of this puzzling financial structure. The empirical analyses suggest that the largest shareholders with tunneling motives seek to hold more cash to serve their private interests and/or the consequent operational deficit of the listed corporations. To the ends, these corporations tend to manage the timing of short term debt financing to increase cash reserves temporarily at the end of year. Essentially, greater cash holdings on the balance sheet of these corporations related with the puzzle become a misleading signal for potential creditors, possibly contributing to the refinancing of short-term debt of these listed firms for the following year. Hence, the puzzling financial structure is connected with the timing of debt financing and adverse selection of creditors. This study enriches the stream of literature on cash holdings and debt maturity, and provides new evidence on the impact of agency problems of the largest shareholders on the association between cash holdings and debt maturity in the context of a transition economy.

CEO organizational identification and firm cash holdings

As the decision-makers and implementers of a firm’s financial strategy,executives play a critical role in cash holding activities,and their psychological characteristics have a major impact on cash holdings.This paper investigates the association between CEO organizational identification and firm cash holdings.The empirical results show that CEO organizational identification is negatively associated with firm cash holdings,and the negative association is more pronounced when the level of financial development is higher and economic uncertainty is lower.Further analysis reveals that the higher a CEO’s organizational identification,the higher the firm’s R&D investment and capital expenditure,and high CEO organizational identification can increase the value of firm cash holdings.Overall,our findings supplement the literature on organizational identification and cash holdings,and on the effect of executives’psychological characteristics on corporate financial decision-making.

Optimal cash holding decision with uncertain control

The decision-making of cash holdings is very important for the daily operation of enterprises.This present paper tries to establish uncertain optimal cash holding models with the constraint of safe cash holding area,and discusses the solutions of the models by establishing Lagrange function under KKT condition.On the one hand,this paper enriches the existing cash holding models,on the other hand,it is also a comprehensive discussion on the application of uncertainty theory in cash holding management.

Coping with the Bullwhip Effect Using Inventory or Cash: An Environment-Behavior-Performance Paradigm

The bullwhip effect is w idely found in business and exerts adverse effects on business activities.To investigate the influence of the bullwhip effect on firm s'performance and their responses,this study proposed an environment-behavior-performance analysis fram ework and offered a new perspective for studying the bullwhip effect.Using data collected from 1,734 listed manufacturers in China from 2002 to 2017,we adopted regression models to test the proposed m odel and conducted a series of robustness tests.We find that the bullwhip effect is positively related to operating risk,inventory,and cash holdings,and the moderate levels of inventory and cash are negatively associated with operating risk.Specifically,inventory and cash play different roles and work together to alleviate operating risk induced by the bullwhip effect.However,excess resource holdings are positively associated with operating risk.Therefore,firm swith different levels of resources should hold suitable levels of inventory,cash,or both as contingent responses to the bullwhip effect.

Assets Expropriation via Cash Dividends?Free Cash Flow or Tunneling

This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership control than those of firms with higher ownership control. This is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. However, when investment opportunities are considered, the free cash flow hypothesis better explains firms' dividend policy. Investors value more the cash dividends of firms with fewer investment opportunities and higher probability of expropriation. This study indicates that investors are concerned with the potential asset expropriation through cash payouts, unless firms possess high growth opportunities.