Traffic congestion problem is one of the major problems that face many transportation decision makers for urban areas. The problem has many impacts on social, economical and development aspects of urban areas. Hence t...Traffic congestion problem is one of the major problems that face many transportation decision makers for urban areas. The problem has many impacts on social, economical and development aspects of urban areas. Hence the solution to this problem is not straight forward. It requires a lot of effort, expertise, time and cost that sometime are not available. Most of the existing transportation planning software, specially the most advanced ones, requires personnel with lots practical transportation planning experience and with high level of education and training. In this paper we propose a comprehensive framework for an Intelligent Decision Support System (IDSS) for Traffic Congestion Management System that utilizes a state of the art transportation network equilibrium modeling and providing an easy to use GIS-based interaction environment. The developed IDSS reduces the dependability on the expertise and level of education of the transportation planners, transportation engineers, or any transportation decision makers.展开更多
This paper presents a Game-theoretic optimization via Parallel Min-Max Ant System(PMMAS)algorithm is used in practice to determine the Nash equilibrium value to resolve the confusion in choosing appropriate bidders of...This paper presents a Game-theoretic optimization via Parallel Min-Max Ant System(PMMAS)algorithm is used in practice to determine the Nash equilibrium value to resolve the confusion in choosing appropriate bidders of multi-round procurement problem in software project management.To this end,we introduce an approach that proposes:(i)A Game-theoretic model of multiround procurement problem(ii)A Nash equilibrium strategy corresponds to multi-round strategy bid(iii)An application of PSO for the determination of global Nash equilibrium.The balance point in Nash Equilibrium can help to maintain a sustainable structure not only in terms of project management but also in terms of future cooperation.As an alternative of procuring entities subjectively,a methodology to support decision making has been studied using Nash equilibrium to create a balance point on benefit in procurement where buyers and suppliers need multiple rounds of bidding.Our goal focus on the balance point in Nash Equilibrium to optimizing bidder selection in multi-round procurement which is the most beneficial for both investors and selected tenderers.Our PMMAS algorithm is implemented based on MPI(message passing interface)to find the approximate optimal solution for the question of how to choose bidders and ensure a path for a win-win relationship of all participants in the procurement process.We also evaluate the speedup ratio and parallel efficiency between our algorithm and other proposed algorithms.As the experiment results,the high feasibility and effectiveness of the PMMAS algorithm are verified.展开更多
In this paper, we investigate the link resource management problem for optical networks, to achieve the resource cost during the information transmission. We use the differential game to formulate the cost control pro...In this paper, we investigate the link resource management problem for optical networks, to achieve the resource cost during the information transmission. We use the differential game to formulate the cost control problem for the link resource management, to minimize the resource allocation cost functions, which dynamic behaviours are described by differential equations. Each link controls its transmission bandwidth based on the Nash equilibriums of the differential game. The effectiveness of the proposed model is given through numerical simulations.展开更多
Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers, with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. In Bernstein and Federgruen [6], they have analyzed a contract model ...Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers, with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. In Bernstein and Federgruen [6], they have analyzed a contract model with single supplier and multiples retailers and price dependent demand, where retailers compete on retail prices. Each retailer decides a number of products he procures from the supplier and his retail price to maximize his own profit. This is achieved after giving the wholesale and buy-back prices, which are determined by the supplier as the supplier’s profit is maximized. Bernstein and Federgruen have proved that the retail prices become a unique Nash equilibrium solution under weak conditions on the price dependent distribution of demand. The authors, however, have not mentioned the numerical values and proprieties on these retail prices, the number of products and their individual and overall profits. In this paper, we analyze the model numerically. We first indicate some numerical problems with respect to theorem of Nash equilibrium solutions, which Bernstein and Federgruen proved, and we show their modified results. Then, we compute numerically Nash equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale and buy-back prices for the supplier’s and retailers’ profits, and supply chain optimal retailers’ prices. We also discuss properties on relation between these values and the demand distribution.展开更多
文摘Traffic congestion problem is one of the major problems that face many transportation decision makers for urban areas. The problem has many impacts on social, economical and development aspects of urban areas. Hence the solution to this problem is not straight forward. It requires a lot of effort, expertise, time and cost that sometime are not available. Most of the existing transportation planning software, specially the most advanced ones, requires personnel with lots practical transportation planning experience and with high level of education and training. In this paper we propose a comprehensive framework for an Intelligent Decision Support System (IDSS) for Traffic Congestion Management System that utilizes a state of the art transportation network equilibrium modeling and providing an easy to use GIS-based interaction environment. The developed IDSS reduces the dependability on the expertise and level of education of the transportation planners, transportation engineers, or any transportation decision makers.
基金Vietnam National Foundation for Science and TechnologyDevelopment(NAFOSTED)under grant number 102.03-2019.10.
文摘This paper presents a Game-theoretic optimization via Parallel Min-Max Ant System(PMMAS)algorithm is used in practice to determine the Nash equilibrium value to resolve the confusion in choosing appropriate bidders of multi-round procurement problem in software project management.To this end,we introduce an approach that proposes:(i)A Game-theoretic model of multiround procurement problem(ii)A Nash equilibrium strategy corresponds to multi-round strategy bid(iii)An application of PSO for the determination of global Nash equilibrium.The balance point in Nash Equilibrium can help to maintain a sustainable structure not only in terms of project management but also in terms of future cooperation.As an alternative of procuring entities subjectively,a methodology to support decision making has been studied using Nash equilibrium to create a balance point on benefit in procurement where buyers and suppliers need multiple rounds of bidding.Our goal focus on the balance point in Nash Equilibrium to optimizing bidder selection in multi-round procurement which is the most beneficial for both investors and selected tenderers.Our PMMAS algorithm is implemented based on MPI(message passing interface)to find the approximate optimal solution for the question of how to choose bidders and ensure a path for a win-win relationship of all participants in the procurement process.We also evaluate the speedup ratio and parallel efficiency between our algorithm and other proposed algorithms.As the experiment results,the high feasibility and effectiveness of the PMMAS algorithm are verified.
基金supported by National Science Foundation Project of P. R. China (No.61501026,U1603116)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.FRF-TP-15-032A1)
文摘In this paper, we investigate the link resource management problem for optical networks, to achieve the resource cost during the information transmission. We use the differential game to formulate the cost control problem for the link resource management, to minimize the resource allocation cost functions, which dynamic behaviours are described by differential equations. Each link controls its transmission bandwidth based on the Nash equilibriums of the differential game. The effectiveness of the proposed model is given through numerical simulations.
文摘Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers, with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. In Bernstein and Federgruen [6], they have analyzed a contract model with single supplier and multiples retailers and price dependent demand, where retailers compete on retail prices. Each retailer decides a number of products he procures from the supplier and his retail price to maximize his own profit. This is achieved after giving the wholesale and buy-back prices, which are determined by the supplier as the supplier’s profit is maximized. Bernstein and Federgruen have proved that the retail prices become a unique Nash equilibrium solution under weak conditions on the price dependent distribution of demand. The authors, however, have not mentioned the numerical values and proprieties on these retail prices, the number of products and their individual and overall profits. In this paper, we analyze the model numerically. We first indicate some numerical problems with respect to theorem of Nash equilibrium solutions, which Bernstein and Federgruen proved, and we show their modified results. Then, we compute numerically Nash equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale and buy-back prices for the supplier’s and retailers’ profits, and supply chain optimal retailers’ prices. We also discuss properties on relation between these values and the demand distribution.