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The Coalition Cooperative Game Method and Its Application in Multi-objective Optimization Design 被引量:1
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作者 LI Bi-yan 《International Journal of Plant Engineering and Management》 2011年第2期125-128,共4页
This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors a... This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into different strategic spaces which belong to each player, then it constructs a payoff function based on the coalition mechanism. Each game player takes its own revenue function as a target and obtains the best strategy versus other players. The best strategies of all players consist of the strategy permutation of a round game and it obtains the final game solutions through multi-round games according to the convergence criterion. A multi-objective optimization example of the luff mechanism of compensative sheave block shows the effectiveness of the coalition cooperative game method. 展开更多
关键词 coalition cooperative game multi-objective optimization fuzzy clustering luff mechanism
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Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures 被引量:5
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作者 WANG Lei GAO HongWei +2 位作者 PETROSYAN Leon QIAO Han SEDAKOV Artem 《Science China Mathematics》 SCIE CSCD 2016年第5期1015-1028,共14页
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d... The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed. 展开更多
关键词 cooperative game theory coalition structure strategic stability imputation distribution procedure deviation instant ε-Nash equilibrium strong ε-Nash equilibrium
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