The cost of collusion:economic thinking on the uniform accommodation price of the hotel industry in Kunming,Yunnan

This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the collusive behavior,and thinks that the collusive price is not helpful to the development of tourism industry, the pillar industry in YunnanProvince.

Collusion detector based on G-N algorithm for trust model

In the open network environment, malicious attacks to the trust model have become increasingly serious. Compared with single node attacks, collusion attacks do more harm to the trust model. To solve this problem, a collusion detector based on the GN algorithm for the trust evaluation model is proposed in the open Internet environment. By analyzing the behavioral characteristics of collusion groups, the concept of flatting is defined and the G-N community mining algorithm is used to divide suspicious communities. On this basis, a collusion community detector method is proposed based on the breaking strength of suspicious communities. Simulation results show that the model has high recognition accuracy in identifying collusion nodes, so as to effectively defend against malicious attacks of collusion nodes.

Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department:a theoretical analysis of low‑price collusion in SBIC

We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.

DEFENSE AGAINST COLLUSION SCHEME BASED ON ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are being deployed for a wide variety of applications and the security problems of them have received considerable attention. Considering the limitations of power, computation capability and storage resources, this paper proposed an efficient defense against collusion scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography for wireless sensor networks in order to solve the problems that sensor node-key leaking and adversaries make compromised nodes as their collusions to launch new attack. In the proposed scheme, the group-key distribution strategy is employed to compute the private key of each sensor node, and the encryption and decryption algorithms are constructed based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The command center (node) only needs to broadcast a controlling header with three group elements, and the authorized sensor node can correctly recover the session key and use it to decrypt the broadcasting message. Analysis and proof of the proposed scheme's efficiency and security show that the proposed scheme can resist the k-collusion attack efficiently.

Collusion between Aggregated Industries in General Equilibrium

We analyze an infinite horizon difference game between four aggregated industries-production of producer goods, production of consumption goods, federation of labor unions, and commercial banking sector. Consumers do not behave strategically. They make their decisions on the basis of maximization of average discounted utility. Therefore, we do not include them in the set of players in the game. The payoffof each production industry and the commercial banking sector is equal to the average discounted sum of real dividends of its owners. The payoff of the federation of labor unions is equal to the average discounted sum of real wages and real unemployment benefits. A strict strong perfect general equilibrium is the applied solution concept for the game. It requires that there does not exist a coalition of players that can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation payoffs of its members in some subgame by a coordinated deviation. It is a refinement of Rubinstein＇s concept of a strong perfect equilibrium. We formulate and prove the sufficient condition for its existence. It is based on the assumption that no one of the aggregated industries can have a positive output without using some minimal amount of output of each other aggregated industry as an input. By definition, in each subgame, the equilibrium payoff vector in a strict strong perfect general equilibrium is strictly Pareto efficient. Thus, if each consumer either has only income from wage and unemployment benefit or receives dividend from only one aggregated industry, and his nominal income in each period along the equilibrium path exceeds social minimum, it is not possible to weakly Pareto improve the vector of consumers＇ average discounted real incomes. This holds not only for the whole game but also for each subgame starting in the first phase of some period.

A Collusion-Resistant Distributed Agent-Based Signature Delegation (CDASD) Protocol for E-Commerce Applications

Mobile agent technology is promising for e-commerce and distributed computing applications due to its properties of mobility and autonomy. One of the most security-sensitive tasks a mobile agent is expected to perform is signing digital signatures on a remote untrustworthy service host that is beyond the control of the agent host. This service host may treat the mobile agents unfairly, i.e. according to its’ own benefit rather than to their time of arrival. In this research, we present a novel protocol, called Collusion-Resistant Distributed Agent-based Signature Delegation (CDASD) protocol, to allow an agent host to delegate its signing power to an anonymous mobile agent in such a way that the mobile agent does not reveal any information about its host’s identity and, at the same time, can be authenticated by the service host, hence, ensuring fairness of service provision. The protocol introduces a verification server to verify the signature generated by the mobile agent in such a way that even if colluding with the service host, both parties will not get more information than what they already have. The protocol incorporates three methods: Agent Signature Key Generation method, Agent Signature Generation method, Agent Signature Verification method. The most notable feature of the protocol is that, in addition to allowing secure and anonymous signature delegation, it enables tracking of malicious mobile agents when a service host is attacked. The security properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed, and the protocol is compared with the most related work.

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。

地缘关系与机构投资者合谋报价:来自科创板IPO的经验证据

本文以科创板IPO公司为样本,基于地缘关系考察了机构投资者合谋报价行为。研究发现,科创板IPO过程中,存在地缘关系的机构投资者一致报价概率显著更高;在考虑了信息相似性、锚点报价问题、羊群效应及其他关系类型的替代性解释后,该研究结果依然成立,这表明机构投资者涉嫌实施基于地缘关系的合谋报价行为。拓展性分析显示,监管加强后,机构投资者报价行为随之改变,存在地缘关系的机构投资者一致报价频率降低,微小差异报价频率提升,从而降低了合谋报价嫌疑与被监管机构关注的风险;IPO公司信息环境较好时,机构投资者基于地缘关系的合谋报价嫌疑较低。本文不仅丰富了IPO领域的理论研究,也为舆论关切的机构投资者合谋报价问题提供了经验证据和机理解释。

新形势下串通投标犯罪数据化侦查实践路径

招投标全流程电子化的日益普及给串通投标犯罪侦查工作带来了一定困难。如何不断提升串通投标犯罪的数据化侦查能力和水平,已经成为全国经济犯罪侦查理论与实务部门广泛关注并亟待解决的问题。本文通过文献研究、案例分析等方法探讨了新形势下我国串通投标犯罪产生的原因、手段及危害,较为系统地阐释了如何综合利用各种数据导侦工具、采用企业基因测序、社会网络分析等方法和技术研判风险企业、分析违法资金流向等问题,深入挖掘显性和隐性犯罪网络,锁定重点人物,构建完整的证据体系,实现对串通投标犯罪的全链条式打击。

抗理性敌手共谋的安全K-prototype聚类

针对云环境下数据隐私泄露及聚类过程中云服务器间共谋的问题,提出一种抗理性敌手共谋的安全协作K-prototype聚类方案,目的在不泄露各方隐私数据情况下根据距离度量将相似的数据进行聚类。首先,考虑到同态加密不直接支持非线性计算,基于同态加密和加性秘密共享技术设计安全比较协议和安全大于协议,并确保输入数据、中间结果及模型参数均为加性秘密份额形式,以防止单个服务器能够获得完整数据,且能实现非线性函数的精确计算,在已设计的安全计算协议基础上,实现安全距离计算、安全聚类标签更新、安全聚类中心更新、聚类标签及聚类中心重构;其次,根据博弈均衡理论设计多种高效激励机制,构造互制合约及举报合约以约束云服务器诚实非共谋地执行聚类任务;最后,对所提的安全计算协议及合约进行理论分析,并对该方案的性能进行实验验证。实验结果表明,与明文环境下的模型精度相比,该方案的模型精度损失控制在0.22%内,进而验证了所提方案的有效性。

基于随机演化博弈视角的绿色农产品生产与合谋监管研究

考虑政府绿色农产品安全生产监管下,农企与第三方检测机构合谋寻租导致市面上“伪绿色”产品频现等问题。该研究将高斯白噪声作为随机干扰项引入,构建了政府监管部门、农企和第三方检测机构在绿色生产与质量监管中的三方随机演化博弈模型。在此基础上,通过数值仿真分析,探讨了随机扰动因素、政府奖惩等因素对各主体策略选择及演化至稳定状态收敛速度的影响;最后,结合数值仿真结果提出了相关政策和建议,以期对当前绿色食品生产与监管提供参考依据。

平行行为的反垄断规制

长期以来,传统寡头市场中大企业协调一致的平行行为的反垄断规制一直困难重重,也由此产生了一系列相互交错的制度工具。这些制度工具包含多种相互关联的基本概念,也反映了反垄断规制对于平行行为的复杂的理论立场。随着算法时代的来临,反垄断法将面对数量更多、更为稳固的平行行为。必须进一步将缺乏合意证据的“协议”、滥用共同支配地位行为、算法合谋等视为一个同源的整体——平行行为,并明确反垄断法相应的制度工具及其发展变化,才能更好地实现对平行行为的规制。

共同机构所有权与股票市场稳定:协同治理还是合谋垄断?

随着我国资本市场的快速发展,机构投资者在同一行业持股多家公司(共同机构所有权)的经济现象日益普遍。从股价崩盘风险视角研究共同机构所有权如何影响股票市场稳定,实证研究发现:共同机构所有权显著加剧股价崩盘风险,支持合谋垄断的观点。异质性检验发现:共同机构所有权对股价崩盘风险的影响在产业资本持股更高和信息环境较差的公司样本中更显著。作用机制检验发现:存在共同机构所有权的公司会显著减少年报中负面语调的披露,并且《中华人民共和国反垄断法》的实施能够显著抑制共同机构所有权对股价崩盘风险的影响,从而验证合谋垄断动机下的坏消息隐藏机制。

有限公司股权对外转让行为的效力研究——以侵害股东优先购买权为视角

2023年《公司法》第84条就优先购买权作出规定,用以保护有限公司的人合性特征,但对侵害股东优先购买权具体情形仍未予言明,致使司法裁判和理论学说已有争议仍存在。亟待2023年《公司法》在其司法解释中对股权对外转让行为进行体系化完善。在股权转让行为方面,应采用区分原则明确股权转让行为系债权行为;在优先购买权性质认定方面,应采用公司组织法上的特殊权利说保障其他股东的顺位优势;在以侵害优先购买权主张股权转让合同无效时,应根据《民法典》规定分别对欺诈、通谋行为等情形的转让合同效力进行认定。

连锁股东与费用粘性:市场合谋视角

企业间基于连锁股东形成的社会网络关系是影响企业经营管理的重要因素,而学术界主要关注到连锁股东产生的协同效应,对其负面影响关注不足。从市场合谋的视角出发,以2007-2022年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,检验连锁股东对费用粘性的影响。研究发现,连锁股东显著提高了企业的费用粘性,体现为连锁股东的市场合谋效应。从影响机制看,连锁股东主要通过委派董事和减少股权激励提高企业费用粘性。异质性分析表明,行业集中度越高、市场竞争地位越高,连锁股东的负面影响越大;提高股权制衡度、内部控制质量、交易所信息披露考评和分析师关注度能有效缓解连锁股东合谋导致的费用粘性增加。研究结论不仅为上市公司间复杂股权关系形成的经济动因提供了经验证据,还为反垄断相关法规及政策的修订与完善提供了新的参考依据。

机构大股东交叉持股与企业市场势力

本文基于我国资本市场股权结构高度集中的特征,探究机构大股东交叉持股对企业市场势力的影响。研究发现,我国资本市场机构大股东交叉持股可以显著提高投资组合公司的产品市场势力,支持了“合谋效应”假说。异质性检验发现,股权集中度越高,合谋效应越强;相比于金融资本,产业资本交叉持股的合谋效应更强。机制检验发现,机构大股东交叉持股还会通过向上操纵持股公司的生产成本以“合理化”产品价格上升。经济后果检验发现,机构大股东交叉持股的合谋效应会显著弱化《反垄断法》的实施效果。本文揭示了机构大股东交叉持股的合谋效应,讨论了其对企业市场势力的影响,对市场监管具有重要的政策启示。

打击合谋促进了并购吗

在反垄断执法授权模式下,中国以省级执法机关为主查处合谋案件。本文结合手动构建的横向垄断协议执法数据和中国企业并购数据,使用面板数据双向固定效应模型分析了省级反垄断执法机关打击合谋与企业并购之间的关联性。研究发现:(1)打击合谋显著提升了本省企业发起的月度并购次数。这种策略性并购具有区域和行业异质性。(2)打击合谋更倾向于提升本省企业发起的同省并购、同行业并购、本省合谋行业的并购。(3)打击合谋不存在跨省威慑效应,本省执法机关查处合谋并未显著激励其他省份同一(合谋)行业发起更多并购。(4)考虑到并购成本,偿债能力高的企业更倾向于增加并购次数。本文在中国反垄断执法授权制度下发现了并购对合谋的替代性,尤其是该替代效应具有区域和行业异质性,主要在本省、本行业范围内显著。本文研究对我国反垄断执法具有一定政策启示,反垄断执法机关需要关注企业对打击合谋政策的策略性反应。

共犯意思联络的教义学展开

意思联络是共同犯罪的成立要件,作为一种事实认知活动,是界定共犯行为性质的判断资料,不能与因果性混同。意思联络涉及法秩序对共犯行为法益侵害性的客观初步评价,建立在特定事实与犯罪关联性的基础上,具有与故意过失不同的评价内容。在对故意认定存在扩张倾向的司法现状下,有必要基于行为主义的要求,强调意思联络的独立地位与客观属性。我国刑法采取定罪与量刑分离的双层区分模式,并无对共同正犯的专门规定,共谋与德日刑法中的正犯性评价无关,共同正犯的结果归属应个别进行,没有必要承认共谋共同正犯概念。对意思联络的形成发挥重要作用者是共同正犯,在结果归属阶段,共同正犯与狭义共犯具有不同评价侧重。

港口与船公司新型合谋策略的演化与均衡分析

为在新型轴辐合谋背景下探讨港航系统实施轴辐合谋模式的可能性,构建一个港口和两家船公司之间的轴辐合谋模型,分析具有产能约束的港口和船公司在轴辐合谋下的均衡策略。研究发现:轴辐合谋前,船公司之间默契合谋会对港口利润造成损失;轴辐合谋后,港口和船公司分别降低其服务价格和运价,在保证船公司利润不变的情况下港口利润得到改善,港航系统总利润实现增加;从长期角度看轴辐合谋将成为港口和船公司的最优策略。港口与船公司轴辐合谋的稳定性大于船公司默契合谋的稳定性。该研究结果可为预防和规制航运业新的合谋模式提供决策参考。

连锁股东与企业权益资本成本——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

连锁股东已经成为资本市场上的重要现象,但学术界关于连锁股东公司治理职能的研究却较为缺乏。以2007—2022年A股上市公司为样本,实证考察连锁股东对企业权益融资行为的影响。研究发现,连锁股东能够显著降低企业权益资本成本,且连锁股东数量越多、持股比例越高对企业权益资本成本的影响越显著。该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验和内生性处理之后仍然稳健。通过考察其作用机制发现,连锁股东通过抑制代理问题、缓解融资约束和降低债务融资成本而降低了企业权益资本成本;异质性检验发现,连锁股东对非国有控股企业和大规模企业权益资本成本的降低作用更为显著。研究证实了连锁股东的协同治理效应,为缓解企业融资难、融资贵问题提供了经验证据,对加强资本市场建设提供了微观视角的参考借鉴。