INFORMATION STRUCTURES AND PRICING DECISIONS IN COMPETING SUPPLY CHAINS

The paper investigates the pricing decisions of two competing supply chains under the different information structures. Each retailer has private information about the market demand and has the right to decide whether or not to share the information with the manufacturer. Three demand-information structures, i.e., information sharing in both supply chains, information sharing in only one supply chain and information sharing in neither supply chain, are considered. We investigate the value of information by comparing the information structures, and find that the information value not only works in the channel directly, but also does in the competing channel indirectly. Information sharing in a supply chain always benefits its manufacturer, but hurts its retailer; while it benefits both the manufacturer and the retailer of competing supply chain, regardless of whether this competing supply chain has information sharing. From the perspective of channel, when t^e competition is more intense, information sharing in a supply chain makes this supply chain better off, and when the competition is less intense, the information sharing in a supply chain makes this supply chain worse off. However, it always makes the competing supply chain better off regardless of whether the competing supply chain has information sharing.

The Impact of Cost Sharing on Green Technology Investment in Competing Supply Chains

The investment in green technology in the process of product design and production is viewed asa powerful tool for sustainable development and carbon emission reduction However,the substantial cost and pressure of competition weaken incentives for manufacturers to engage in green technology.In this paper,we consider two competitive manufacturer-retailer supply chains,where each manufacturer sells partially substitutable products through the exclusive retailer,study green technology investment selection by manufacturers,and examine the efficacy of retailer cost sharing scheme.Our analysis shows that a dominant equilibrium strategy for both manufacturers is to invest in green technologies,whether cost sharing is in place or not.Retailer sharing the cost of manufac turer green technology investment can avoid firms'preference confliction over the green technology investment and improve social welfare simultaneously when both the cost-sharing rate and the degree of product/channel competition are relatively low.We also find that green technology investment by manufacturers does not necessarily curb total carbon emission,and the cost sharing can either strengthen or weaken the carbon emission reduction of green technology investment.

Decision-making in blockchain-enabled supply chain: A systematic literature review

In the digital economy era,the blockchain-enabled supply chain(SC)has become a popular re-search topic.However,systematic research on the application of blockchain technology in SCs remains inadequate.Accordingly,this study aims to review the literature on the blockchain-en-abled SC from the following three perspectives:()application of blockchain traceability in SC management,(i)model of blockchain-enabled sC competition,and(ii)design of coordination mechanism in the blockchain-enabled sC.Several future research directions related to the blockchain-enabled SC are also presented.The findings provide academic and practical insights intotheblockchain-enabled SC.

Carbon Quotas,Subsidies and Engineering Machinery Remanufacturing

Engineering machinery manufacturing and remanufacturing are significant sources of greenhouse gases.In the context of emission reduction and resource recovery,the authors analyze the impact of current carbon quota allocations and government subsidies policies on manufacturers' profits and recovery rates in a closed-loop supply chain.A simplified model consists of two manufacturers,one retailer and a third-party recycler.The study found that carbon quotas and government subsidies can both promote the improvement of recovery rates under certain conditions,and have similar effects in regulating interest distribution between manufacturers.The combination of the two methods can effectively realize the targets of recycling and carbon emissions reduction.