The Improvement of Port Management Stimulated by the Development of Container Traffic Container transport started to flourish in the 70s and grew rapidly. Comparing the traffic volume of 1990 with that of 1975, the Ja...The Improvement of Port Management Stimulated by the Development of Container Traffic Container transport started to flourish in the 70s and grew rapidly. Comparing the traffic volume of 1990 with that of 1975, the Japanese ports handled 7. 82 million TEUs in 1990 and 1.87 million TEUs in 1975 while the "Four Small Dragonsnhandied 18. 10 million TEUs in 1990 and 1.68 million TEUs in 1975,4.2 times and 10.75 times increase respectively.展开更多
Many ocean transportation hub systems consist of two container ports that share the container handling business in the area. The container flow passing through a port is the main measurement of the port＇s competitive...Many ocean transportation hub systems consist of two container ports that share the container handling business in the area. The container flow passing through a port is the main measurement of the port＇s competitiveness. In this paper we adopt a Hotelling model to study the container port competition in a so-called ＂dual gateway-port system＂. The system contains two ports and two terminals, one belonging to each port. The two governments in which the two ports are located compete on cargo fees and the two terminals determine service price and service quality. We study two models with different levels of competition between the terminals. In the ftrst model, the two terminals are owned by two different operators and in the second model, the two terminals are centralized under one operator. The second model exists in practice but is not well studied in the literature. We derive the cargo fee, terminal service price, and service quality equilibria for these two models. We investigate the competition outcome sensitivity with a numerical study. The numerical results reveal that governments prefer terminals to compete with each other. If the terminals do not have competitive advantages in their service quality, then terminal centralization brings more profits to the terminal operator than the competition case.展开更多
文摘The Improvement of Port Management Stimulated by the Development of Container Traffic Container transport started to flourish in the 70s and grew rapidly. Comparing the traffic volume of 1990 with that of 1975, the Japanese ports handled 7. 82 million TEUs in 1990 and 1.87 million TEUs in 1975 while the "Four Small Dragonsnhandied 18. 10 million TEUs in 1990 and 1.68 million TEUs in 1975,4.2 times and 10.75 times increase respectively.
基金The authors appreciate the anonymous referees and the editor for their help to improve the quality of the paper. This paper was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, NSFC Nos. 71001073, 71302109, 71471118, the Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of Ministry of Education of China （No. 14YJC630096）, the Distinguished University Young Scholar Program of Guangdong Province （No. Yq2013140）, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities （No. 15JNQM028） and Natural Science Foundation of SZU （Grant Nos. 201422 and 827000074）.
文摘Many ocean transportation hub systems consist of two container ports that share the container handling business in the area. The container flow passing through a port is the main measurement of the port＇s competitiveness. In this paper we adopt a Hotelling model to study the container port competition in a so-called ＂dual gateway-port system＂. The system contains two ports and two terminals, one belonging to each port. The two governments in which the two ports are located compete on cargo fees and the two terminals determine service price and service quality. We study two models with different levels of competition between the terminals. In the ftrst model, the two terminals are owned by two different operators and in the second model, the two terminals are centralized under one operator. The second model exists in practice but is not well studied in the literature. We derive the cargo fee, terminal service price, and service quality equilibria for these two models. We investigate the competition outcome sensitivity with a numerical study. The numerical results reveal that governments prefer terminals to compete with each other. If the terminals do not have competitive advantages in their service quality, then terminal centralization brings more profits to the terminal operator than the competition case.
