The duality of cultural and creative industry can maintain the independence of creative birth and management as well as taking into account of the artistic and marketability of creativity.Income distribution contracts...The duality of cultural and creative industry can maintain the independence of creative birth and management as well as taking into account of the artistic and marketability of creativity.Income distribution contracts that link the design process to the commercial value of creative ideas can solve the problem of quantitative incentives for creative subjects.At the same time,it can encourage creative subjects to complete commercial and artistic design activities.The principal-agent relationship between the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain is utilized to stimulate the creation of creative ideas in line with market conditions,so as to solve the problem of duality reconciliation of cultural and creative industries.Through the design of the cultural creative industry chain dual task creative incentive contract,in the process of encouraging creative design subjects to complete the design of the work to give consideration to the coordination of duality.By analyzing the influences of design capability,risk,cost coefficient and binary correlation on the optimal investment level and the optimal risk sharing level of creative subjects in two types of design activities,the input transfer caused by the variation of the above conditions is further discussed.展开更多
Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some ...Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists' expertise and information in evaluating projects.展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71373227)Shanghai Design Science Category IV Peak Discipline Funding Project,China(No.DD18002)+1 种基金General Projects of Shanghai Philosophy and Social Science Planning in 2020,China(No.2020BWY028)Shanghai Style Transboundary Art Research Base of Donghua University,China。
文摘The duality of cultural and creative industry can maintain the independence of creative birth and management as well as taking into account of the artistic and marketability of creativity.Income distribution contracts that link the design process to the commercial value of creative ideas can solve the problem of quantitative incentives for creative subjects.At the same time,it can encourage creative subjects to complete commercial and artistic design activities.The principal-agent relationship between the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain is utilized to stimulate the creation of creative ideas in line with market conditions,so as to solve the problem of duality reconciliation of cultural and creative industries.Through the design of the cultural creative industry chain dual task creative incentive contract,in the process of encouraging creative design subjects to complete the design of the work to give consideration to the coordination of duality.By analyzing the influences of design capability,risk,cost coefficient and binary correlation on the optimal investment level and the optimal risk sharing level of creative subjects in two types of design activities,the input transfer caused by the variation of the above conditions is further discussed.
文摘Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists' expertise and information in evaluating projects.