LCT和GCT联合鉴别未知水样中N,N-二烷基氨基乙基磺酸及其类似物

N,N-dialkylaminoethane-2-sulfonic acids are environmental marker compounds of V type nerve agents,hence analysis of them is very important for verification of the chemical weapons convention(CWC).In this article,liquid chromatography-high resolution time of flight mass spectrometry coupled with accurate mass measurement were used to discriminate N,N-disopropyl aminoethane-2-sulfonic acid and a CWC non-related compound 3-(N-Morpholino)propanesulfonic acid in Water.The method was fast,simple and accurate,proving that high resolution mass spectrometry is a good technique for the analysis of unknown toxicant.

Regulation of toxins and bioregulators under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

In this paper we highlight how the apparent double coverage of toxins and bioregulators by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC)in fact masks a regulatory gap that has left such potentially dangerous agents neglected by both the control regimes during a period of rapid advances in relevant chemical,life and associated sciences and technologies.We first review what toxins,bioregulators and other mid-spectrum agents are and why they are of such concern and then examine how they are regulated under the BTWC and CWC.This paper then examines an illustrative range of contemporary chemical and life science research and associated activities of concern drawn from case study research on China,India,Iran,Russia,Syria and the United States,and assesses how the CWC and BTWC States Parties have inadequately addressed these threats.We then examine how both the CWC and BTWC Review Conferences failed to address these long-term challenges,and we end by providing a series of recommendations for how both regimes can be strengthened in this area.

Strengthening biological security after COVID-19:Using cartoons for engaging life science stakeholders with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes.Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse,not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation.In this paper,we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security.We first discuss the issue of‘dual use’in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.Second,we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC).Third,we report on the development of an innovative awarenessraising tool,a cartoon series,that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues.Finally,we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

Development of and prospects for the biological weapons convention

Biological weapons are used in wars to wound or kill people or animals and destroy crops with pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses,as well as toxins and other biologically active substances.These are highly infectious,easily communicable,widely destructive,long-acting,and difficult to prevent and treat.Thus,a major challenge for the international community is preventing the spread of biological weapons throughout the world.The Biological Weapons Convention(BWC)is a multilateral treaty that clearly prohibits the development,production,stockpiling,acquisition and preservation of biological and toxic weapons,as well as the design and delivery of biological warfare agents,except for the purpose of prevention,protection and other peaceful uses.The BWC is,to a certain extent,binding on countries capable of manufacturing biological weapons,and has become a powerful tool enabling the international community to jointly deal with the threats posed by biological weapons.However,its effectiveness has been reduced by the lack of a corresponding verification mechanism.With the rapid development of biotechnology,global biosecurity is faced with new and highly uncertain challenges and threats,which requires the member countries of the BWC to cooperate with,promote,and supervise each other in making constant improvements to the BWC in an effort to maintain global peace and stable development.

Lessons for biosecurity education from the International Nuclear Security Education Network

With the rapid advances in technology and life science,biological security is now at a defining moment.The mandate of the 2022 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 9th Review Conference emphasised the urgent need for new tools to strengthen the Convention.In this paper,we review the development and efforts of the International Nuclear Security Education Network(INSEN)to provide examples of best practice for implementation of the newly founded International Biological Security Education Network(IBSEN).Learning from the lessons of the INSEN,the sustainability of the network through continuous engagement of its members is essential for the further development of global biosecurity education.

Key issues in the implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists: A survey of biosecurity education projects

In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct.In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines,a smallscale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discover what resources and experience have been accumulated.It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed,but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly.In particular,an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations(UN)languages.Additionally,more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities.While advantage should be taken now of the available national,regional and international networks of people involved in related activities,it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network(INSEN)organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).