On September 22,the inaugural meeting of the China Federation of International Mining CapacityCooperationEnterprises('Federation')was held in Tianjin.Vice Minister of Land and Resources Cao Weixing attended th...On September 22,the inaugural meeting of the China Federation of International Mining CapacityCooperationEnterprises('Federation')was held in Tianjin.Vice Minister of Land and Resources Cao Weixing attended the meeting and delivered a speech.Heads of the departments and units directly under the National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC)and the Ministry of展开更多
The empirical analyses on agricultural industrialization pattern and local animal husbandry in northwestern areas show that the industrialization development of husbandry in northwestern areas faces international and ...The empirical analyses on agricultural industrialization pattern and local animal husbandry in northwestern areas show that the industrialization development of husbandry in northwestern areas faces international and national competitive pressures. The survival ability and competitive ability are the key points of husbandry industrialization. The paper, having a lamb fattening professional cooperatives in Hainan sub-prefecture of Qinghai Province as the example, introduces the general conditions of the establishment and development of cooperatives and points out the advantages and disadvantages of husbandry in Qinghai Province. The paper analyzes the competitive advantages of Hongyuan Lamb Fattening Cooperatives through five forces mode of Michael Port, putting forward countermeasures and upgrading the competitiveness of Hongyuan Lamb Fattening Competitive.展开更多
Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capa...Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capability to deviate the allocation of interests from the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiations are likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay-off vector are given.展开更多
文摘On September 22,the inaugural meeting of the China Federation of International Mining CapacityCooperationEnterprises('Federation')was held in Tianjin.Vice Minister of Land and Resources Cao Weixing attended the meeting and delivered a speech.Heads of the departments and units directly under the National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC)and the Ministry of
基金Supported by Major Policy Research Project of Chinese Association for Science and Technology (2009ZCYJ20-A)
文摘The empirical analyses on agricultural industrialization pattern and local animal husbandry in northwestern areas show that the industrialization development of husbandry in northwestern areas faces international and national competitive pressures. The survival ability and competitive ability are the key points of husbandry industrialization. The paper, having a lamb fattening professional cooperatives in Hainan sub-prefecture of Qinghai Province as the example, introduces the general conditions of the establishment and development of cooperatives and points out the advantages and disadvantages of husbandry in Qinghai Province. The paper analyzes the competitive advantages of Hongyuan Lamb Fattening Cooperatives through five forces mode of Michael Port, putting forward countermeasures and upgrading the competitiveness of Hongyuan Lamb Fattening Competitive.
文摘Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capability to deviate the allocation of interests from the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiations are likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay-off vector are given.
