In a credence goods market,a consumer(he)is unaware of his true need,w hich can be either intense or minor.A n expert(she)designs a menu that either charges a u n iform price to both services,termed pooling pricing,or...In a credence goods market,a consumer(he)is unaware of his true need,w hich can be either intense or minor.A n expert(she)designs a menu that either charges a u n iform price to both services,termed pooling pricing,or varies charges according to service types,termed differential pricing.Learning the menu offered by the expert and anticipating her behavior in serving consumers,a consumer weighs the expected u tility of service provision against the cost incurred in transportation to decide w hether to visit the expert,termed entry decision.Upon arrival of a consumer,the expert discerns his true need and recommends a service along w ith the associated charge.Under the lia b ility assumption,the expert provides a service to satisfy the consumer's need.However,the consumer is unable to discern the nature of the service actually provided.This can induce the expert w ho adopts differential pricing to recommend intense service to a consumer w ith m inor need,termed overcharging.We investigate the effects of consumers'entry decision on the expert's optim al pricing strategy and the occurrence of overcharging,and study the robustness of the main results to practical features.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.72001115Natural Science Foundation of the Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions of China under Grant No.20KJB410006,Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of Ministry of Education of China under Grant No.20YJC630041Startup Foundation for Introducing Talent of NUIST under Grant No.2019r067.
文摘In a credence goods market,a consumer(he)is unaware of his true need,w hich can be either intense or minor.A n expert(she)designs a menu that either charges a u n iform price to both services,termed pooling pricing,or varies charges according to service types,termed differential pricing.Learning the menu offered by the expert and anticipating her behavior in serving consumers,a consumer weighs the expected u tility of service provision against the cost incurred in transportation to decide w hether to visit the expert,termed entry decision.Upon arrival of a consumer,the expert discerns his true need and recommends a service along w ith the associated charge.Under the lia b ility assumption,the expert provides a service to satisfy the consumer's need.However,the consumer is unable to discern the nature of the service actually provided.This can induce the expert w ho adopts differential pricing to recommend intense service to a consumer w ith m inor need,termed overcharging.We investigate the effects of consumers'entry decision on the expert's optim al pricing strategy and the occurrence of overcharging,and study the robustness of the main results to practical features.
