Environmental impact assessment(EIA)system has been established in China since 1973.In present EIA cases,there are four participants in general:governments,enterprises,EIA organizations and the public.The public has h...Environmental impact assessment(EIA)system has been established in China since 1973.In present EIA cases,there are four participants in general:governments,enterprises,EIA organizations and the public.The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties.The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA.However public participation is mostly deputized by governments,which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA.In this paper,EIA refers to the different attitudes of the par-ticipants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model.According to disfigurements in EIA,three sides(governments,enterprises,and EIA organizations)dynamic iterative game theory of many phases is established referring to iterative game theory,dynamic game theory of incomplete information,and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments,EIA organizations and enterprises.The results show that in a short period,economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit.Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs.EIA organizations’income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit.In a long run,social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit,so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA,helpful to increase private benefit.EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured.At present,the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA.The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides,bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.展开更多
随着我国电力需求侧管理(demand side management,DSM)试点工作的不断推进,如何进一步提高电网企业和电力用户的参与度是当前亟待解决的问题。分析了DSM中政府、电网企业、电力用户的博弈行为及利益关系,同时针对演化博弈均衡解求解困...随着我国电力需求侧管理(demand side management,DSM)试点工作的不断推进,如何进一步提高电网企业和电力用户的参与度是当前亟待解决的问题。分析了DSM中政府、电网企业、电力用户的博弈行为及利益关系,同时针对演化博弈均衡解求解困难的问题,提出了一种基于系统动力学的建模求解方法;在此基础上,建立了DSM演化博弈系统动力学模型,并设置了基本激励、动态激励控制和外部效益联动3种情景,对各情景下主体参与度的演化情况及博弈稳定策略进行了仿真分析。算例验证了所提方法的科学有效性,各主体间的策略行为存在反馈关系,采取动态激励措施可有效抑制博弈的波动性,外部效益联动机制有助于提高各方参与度。展开更多
文摘Environmental impact assessment(EIA)system has been established in China since 1973.In present EIA cases,there are four participants in general:governments,enterprises,EIA organizations and the public.The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties.The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA.However public participation is mostly deputized by governments,which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA.In this paper,EIA refers to the different attitudes of the par-ticipants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model.According to disfigurements in EIA,three sides(governments,enterprises,and EIA organizations)dynamic iterative game theory of many phases is established referring to iterative game theory,dynamic game theory of incomplete information,and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments,EIA organizations and enterprises.The results show that in a short period,economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit.Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs.EIA organizations’income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit.In a long run,social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit,so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA,helpful to increase private benefit.EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured.At present,the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA.The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides,bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.
文摘随着我国电力需求侧管理(demand side management,DSM)试点工作的不断推进,如何进一步提高电网企业和电力用户的参与度是当前亟待解决的问题。分析了DSM中政府、电网企业、电力用户的博弈行为及利益关系,同时针对演化博弈均衡解求解困难的问题,提出了一种基于系统动力学的建模求解方法;在此基础上,建立了DSM演化博弈系统动力学模型,并设置了基本激励、动态激励控制和外部效益联动3种情景,对各情景下主体参与度的演化情况及博弈稳定策略进行了仿真分析。算例验证了所提方法的科学有效性,各主体间的策略行为存在反馈关系,采取动态激励措施可有效抑制博弈的波动性,外部效益联动机制有助于提高各方参与度。
