Pricing decision of green supply chain under the game competition of duopolistic retailers

In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and two cases of collusion,are constructed.The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis.The results indicate that the manufacturer's marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers.However,due to the manufacturer's green cost,the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer's profitability.The retailers'Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level.However,there is an opposite result in collusion.Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer's green sensitivity is higher than a threshold.When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products,retailers prefer collusion,and then choose the Stackelberg behavior.Manufacturers'profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.

Managing economic and social profit of cooperative models in three-echelon reverse supply chain for waste electrical and electronic equipment

In addition to maximizing economic benefits, reverse supply chains should further seek to maximize social benefits by increasing the quantity of waste electrical and electronic equipment （WEEE）. The paper investigates cooperative models with different parties in a three-echelon reverse supply chain for WEEE consisting of a single collector, a single remanufacturer, and two retailers based on complete information. In acldition, the optimal decisions of four cooperative models and the effect of the market demand of remanufactured WEEE products and the market share of two retailers on the optimal decisions are discussed. The results indicate that optimal total channel profit and recycle quantity in a reverse supply chain are maximized in a centralized model. The optimal total channel profit and recycle quantity increase with an increase in the market demand of remanufactured WEEE products. The three-echelon reverse supply chain consisting of duopolistic retailers maximizes total channel profit and recycle quantity in a reverse supply chain fbr WEEE.