This paper investigates imitation dynamics with continuously distributed delay.In realistic technological,economic,and social environments,individuals are involved in strategic interactions simultaneously while the in...This paper investigates imitation dynamics with continuously distributed delay.In realistic technological,economic,and social environments,individuals are involved in strategic interactions simultaneously while the influences of their decision-making may not be observable instantaneously.It shows that there exists a time delay effect.Different distributions of delay are further considered to efficiently lucubrate the stability of interior equilibrium in the imitation dynamics with continuous distributions of delay in the two-strategy game contexts.Precisely,when the delay follows the uniform distributions and Gamma distributions,the authors present that interior equilibrium can be asymptotically stable.Furthermore,when the probability density of the delay is general density,the authors also determine a sufficient condition for stability derived from the expected delay.Last but not least,the interested but uncomplicated Snowdrift game is utilized to demonstrate our theoretical results.展开更多
The political environment of the South China Sea Region(SCSR)has gradually stabilized,such that regional cooperation in the preservation of marine resources seems realistic.Blue carbon international cooperation is an ...The political environment of the South China Sea Region(SCSR)has gradually stabilized,such that regional cooperation in the preservation of marine resources seems realistic.Blue carbon international cooperation is an important solution to the problem of global warming,which has a large number of economic and political attributes.As a region that has incredibly abundant blue carbon resources,further cooperation among SCSR governments would present the opportunity to establish meaningful economic and environmental protections that would promote peaceful blue carbon development of this region.To examine the feasibility of such an undertaking,we leverage the imitator's dynamic game as a research method and introduce Weber's law to examine the subjective psychological factors(i.e.,biases)of participants in qualifying the economic stability of blue carbon cooperation in the SCSR.The results suggest that the economic stability of blue carbon cooperation correlates to Weber's coefficient and the income produced by the different strategies.Based on these findings,we discussed policy recommendations to promote the sustainable economic development of SCSR.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.11271098Guizhou Provincial Science and Technology Fund under Grant No.[2019]1067the Fundamental Funds for Introduction of Talents of Guizhou University under Grant No.[2017]59。
文摘This paper investigates imitation dynamics with continuously distributed delay.In realistic technological,economic,and social environments,individuals are involved in strategic interactions simultaneously while the influences of their decision-making may not be observable instantaneously.It shows that there exists a time delay effect.Different distributions of delay are further considered to efficiently lucubrate the stability of interior equilibrium in the imitation dynamics with continuous distributions of delay in the two-strategy game contexts.Precisely,when the delay follows the uniform distributions and Gamma distributions,the authors present that interior equilibrium can be asymptotically stable.Furthermore,when the probability density of the delay is general density,the authors also determine a sufficient condition for stability derived from the expected delay.Last but not least,the interested but uncomplicated Snowdrift game is utilized to demonstrate our theoretical results.
文摘The political environment of the South China Sea Region(SCSR)has gradually stabilized,such that regional cooperation in the preservation of marine resources seems realistic.Blue carbon international cooperation is an important solution to the problem of global warming,which has a large number of economic and political attributes.As a region that has incredibly abundant blue carbon resources,further cooperation among SCSR governments would present the opportunity to establish meaningful economic and environmental protections that would promote peaceful blue carbon development of this region.To examine the feasibility of such an undertaking,we leverage the imitator's dynamic game as a research method and introduce Weber's law to examine the subjective psychological factors(i.e.,biases)of participants in qualifying the economic stability of blue carbon cooperation in the SCSR.The results suggest that the economic stability of blue carbon cooperation correlates to Weber's coefficient and the income produced by the different strategies.Based on these findings,we discussed policy recommendations to promote the sustainable economic development of SCSR.
