Game Theory Model and Equilibrium Analysis of Peasant's Production Decision

Unbalanced agricultural production decision becomes the great block that influences the effective distribution of social resources, national grain security, social stability and economic development. This paper took the game theory as an analyzed tool to describe the interactional processes among the peasants, and set up the game theory model of independent decision and joint decision by peasants. It was shown that the government＇s positive guide and the market environment macroscopically controlled by the government could effectively increased the peasants＇ income

A Game Theory Analysis of the OPEC’s Influence on World Oil Price

Most studies concerning OPEC＇s behavior assumptions about oil market structure are either very were based on traditional market microstructure. However, the rigorous or rather fuzzy. This paper demonstrates the rationality and necessity of OPEC＇s price band policy by using the game theory. We conclude that OPEC has the incentive to limit its price within a specific range if the game period is sufficiently long. This incentive comes either from preference for long-term interest or from future expectations. In such a way, OPEC tries its best to maximize its profit with the quota-price dual policy and plays a price stabilizing role in the future world oil market.

Power Control Algorithm of Cognitive Radio Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory

This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service （QoS） standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio （S/NR） and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium （NE） in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.

Modeling and Analysis of Single Machine Scheduling Based on Noncooperative Game Theory

Considering the independent optimization requirement for each demander of modernmanufacture, we explore the application of noncooperative game in production scheduling research,and model scheduling problem as competition of machine resources among a group of selfish jobs.Each job has its own performance objective. For the single machine, multi-jobs and non-preemptivescheduling problem, a noncooperative game model is established. Based on the model, many prob-lems about Nash equilibrium solution, such as the existence, quantity, properties of solution space,performance of solution and algorithm are discussed. The results are tested by numerical example.

Analysis of the 2007-2008 Writer’s Guild Strike with Game Theory

In 2007-2008, the writer’s guild of America went on strike in order to receive a better outcome from management. We built a game to analyze the situation. The Nash equilibrium of that game says that the writers should not strike and that management should maintain the status quo. The equilibrium is quite unattractive to the writers leading to a strike and forcing management to negotiate. We illustrate the results in order to gain insights into the process. We demonstrate finding the Nash equilibrium with both ordinal and then cardinal values. We demonstrate a method to find the cardinal values using the analytical hierarchy processes to measure the utility for the strategies. We show finding the prudential strategies and security levels as well as finding threat levels in this example. We show using the threat level in Nash arbitration leads to a better solution for the writers than using the security levels.

Geometric Study of the Weak Equilibrium in a Weighted Case for a Two-Dimensional Competition Game

In this work, an improvement of the results presented by [1] Abellanas et al. (Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3), 449-459) is discussed. Concretely, this paper investigates an abstract game of competition between two players that want to earn the maximum number of points from a finite set of points in the plane. It is assumed that the distribution of these points is not uniform, so an appropriate weight to each position is assigned. A definition of equilibrium which is weaker than the classical one is included in order to avoid the uniqueness of the equilibrium position typical of the Nash equilibrium in these kinds of games. The existence of this approximated equilibrium in the game is analyzed by means of computational geometry techniques.

Computation of PoA for Selfish Node Detection and Resource Allocation Using Game Theory

The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized and dynamic,few nodes in the network may not associate with other nodes.These uncooperative nodes also known as selfish nodes corrupt the performance of the cooperative nodes.Namely,the nodes cause congestion,high delay,security concerns,and resource depletion.This study presents an effective selfish node detection method to address these problems.The Price of Anarchy(PoA)and the Price of Stability(PoS)in Game Theory with the Presence of Nash Equilibrium(NE)are discussed for the Selfish Node Detection.This is a novel experiment to detect selfish nodes in a network using PoA.Moreover,the least response dynamic-based Capacitated Selfish Resource Allocation(CSRA)game is introduced to improve resource usage among the nodes.The suggested strategy is simulated using the Solar Winds simulator,and the simulation results show that,when compared to earlier methods,the new scheme offers promising performance in terms of delivery rate,delay,and throughput.

Higher Education in Taiwan： An Analysis of Trends Using the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium

Taiwan is currently facing the serious challenge of decreasing enrollment in higher education institutes （HEIs） due to the oversupply of these institutions and decreasing birthrates. This has necessitated that policymakers implement new policies to meet the demands of the market. This paper uses punctuated equilibrium theory （PET） to explain the circumstances that led to the overexpansion of Taiwan＇s higher education institutions over the past decades. This article also analyzes the social contexts and ramifications of social conflict regarding public expectations and policy changes in the ideology of the educational reform movement.

Fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy n-person non-cooperative game

The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan＇s binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.

A Predator-prey Particle Swarm Optimization Approach to Multiple UCAV Air Combat Modeled by Dynamic Game Theory

Dynamic game theory has received considerable attention as a promising technique for formulating control actions for agents in an extended complex enterprise that involves an adversary. At each decision making step, each side seeks the best scheme with the purpose of maximizing its own objective function. In this paper, a game theoretic approach based on predatorprey particle swarm optimization (PP-PSO) is presented, and the dynamic task assignment problem for multiple unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in military operation is decomposed and modeled as a two-player game at each decision stage. The optimal assignment scheme of each stage is regarded as a mixed Nash equilibrium, which can be solved by using the PP-PSO. The effectiveness of our proposed methodology is verified by a typical example of an air military operation that involves two opposing forces: the attacking force Red and the defense force Blue. © 2014 Chinese Association of Automation.

Network Security Transmission Based on Bimatrix Game Theory

Based on the bimatrix game theory, the network data transmission has been depicted in a game theory way： the actions of the attacker and defender （legitimate users） are depicted within a two-person, non-cooperative and bimatrix game model, this paper proves the existence of the Nash equilibrium theoretically, which is further illustrated by the experimental resuhs.

A game-theory approach against Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing

In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory,the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator.The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly,the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore,the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the noncooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.

Game Theory Application and Strategic Bidding in Electricity Supply Market

This paper introduced the application of game theory in electricity power market. Moreover, the electricity pool model and the merit order dispatch method was introduced. In pool mode, participants are trying to maximize their benefit via competition with each other. Hence the market can be regarded as a non-cooperative game, especially, the electrical supply competition. Players (generators) could use strategic bidding to occupy advantages in competition. The bidding strategies of generators in electricity pool model were researched via build a 3-generator competition model. Moreover, Nash Equilibrium idea was used to explore generator’s optimal bidding strategy. The results show when players are in Nash Equilibrium;thestrategy is their optimal bidding strategy.

A Game Theory Approach Using Excel

Understanding the behavior of companies in market conditions has been an important topic of studies for the economists and mathematicians. Many companies have treated their relationship of service providers as a game. Thus, the attitudes of the players can be endowed with rational thinking, which leads to the conclusion that the use of game theory as a tool to understand such behavior is of great importance. Based on the previous studies, this paper presents a study on the cooperative game theory, discussing the Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies, treating solutions using the minimax John Von Neumarm theorem and illustrating a mathematical modeling of a game theory problem. Furthermore, a solution of linear programming using Microsoft Excel is also proposed and presented. The methodology adopted to model the problem may help students to familiarize themselves to game theory.

Improving Behavior of Computer Game Bots Using Fictitious Play

In modern computer games, ＂bots＂ - intelligent realistic agents play a prominent role in the popularity of a game in the market. Typically, bots are modeled using finite-state machine and then programmed via simple conditional statements which are hard-coded in bots logic. Since these bots have become quite predictable to an experienced games＇ player, a player might lose interest in the game. We propose the use of a game theoretic based learning rule called fictitious play for improving behavior of these computer game bots which will make them less predictable and hence, more a enjoyable game.

Institutional Incentives, Game Equilibrium and Social Justice： Toward a Unified Theory of Pure Jurisprudence

This article seeks to make a constructive advance in jurisprudential theory by employing the unified analytical framework of modern social science. We first outline the main ideas of individual rational decision-making and game theory and of social choice and mechanism design, before offering a preliminary discussion of their application to legal issues. The core thesis is that the law in combination with other social norms provides institutional incentives to all actors in society. Legislators＇ social justice objectives can be reasonably enforced only as a result of behavioral equilibrium in the social game.

Relationship of the Interests between the Dairy Farmer and the Company in Ecological Agriculture——A Case of the Dairy Industry in Sichuan Province,China

Development status of dairy industry in Sichuan Province,China is analyzed,indicating that how to ensure the high-quality and ecological production of peasant households has become an important issue for the safety and healthy of the masses and the development of dairy industry.Game model is established and the solution for the model is obtained.Based on analyzing the relationship of the interests between the dairy farmer and the company in ecological agriculture,two mixed strategies of Nash equilibrium are obtained.One is that when the probability is equal to α*1,there are no differences between purchasing or not purchasing;if the probability of company purchase is equal to β*1,there are no differences between producing high-quality milk and poor-quality milk.The other is that if the probability of dairy farmer under normal transaction is equal to α*2,there are no differences for the company to select high-quality inspection or low-quality inspection;if the probability of high-quality inspection is equal to β*2,passing off inferior milk as high-grade one has no differences with normal transaction.Therefore,moral risk of the dairy farmer should be prevented by probability β*1 and high-quality inspection.Finally,countermeasures are put forward,such as reducing the risk of transaction,ensuring the basic interest of the dairy farmer engaged in ecological production,intensifying the supervision,correctly preventing the moral risk of dairy farmer,improving the laws and regulations,and coordinating interests between dairy farmer and company in industrial chain.

Analysis of Nash-Cournot equilibrium for electricity markets considering option contracts

Option contract is one of the most important instruments for power generators developing bidding strategies and hedging market risk. Based on the peculiarities of bid-based-pool （BBP） power markets, a joint two-stage Cournot equilibrium model for option and spot markets is developed, and analytical formulas for market equilibrium are derived using a backward induction method. The impacts of option contract on efficiency of electricity markets and the behaviors of strategic generators are analyzed. The results show that strategic generators will voluntarily participate in strategic option contracting, and the existence of option contract accelerates the degree of competitive intensity in electricity markets and mitigates the market power abuse of generators to a large extent. In order to retain high spot market price and stable revenues, generators are interested in holding extremely high volatility of spot market price.

A Scalar Compromise Equilibrium for N-Person Prescriptive Games

A scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form. When a decision criterion (notion of rationality) is either agreed upon by the players or prescribed by an external arbiter, the resulting decision process is modeled by a suitable scalar transformation (utility function). Each n-tuple of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is transformed into a nonnegative scalar value between 0 and 1. Any n-tuple yielding a largest scalar value determines an SE, which is always a pure strategy profile. SEs can be computed much faster than Nash equilibria, for example;and the decision criterion need not be based on the players’ selfishness. To illustrate the SE, we define a compromise equilibrium, establish its Pareto optimality, and present examples comparing it to other solution concepts.

Game Theory based Optimal Defensive Resources Allocation with Incomplete Information in Cyber-physical Power Systems against False Data Injection Attacks

Modern power grid is fast emerging as a complex cyber-physical power system(CPPS)integrating physical current-carrying components and processes with cyber-embedded computing,which faces increasing cy-berspace security threats and risks.In this paper,the state(i.e.,voltage)offsets resulting from false data injection(FDI)attacks and the bus safety characterization are applied to quantify the attack consequences.The state offsets are obtained by the state estimation method,and the bus safety characterization considers the power net-work topology as well as the vulnerability and connection relationship of buses.Considering the indeterminacy of attacker’s resource consumption and reward,a zero-sum game-theoretical model from the defender’s perspective with incomplete information is explored for the optimal allocation of limited defensive resources.The attacker aims to falsify measurements without triggering threshold alarms to break through the protection,leading to load shedding,over-voltage or under-voltage.The defender attempts to ensure the estimation results to be as close to the actual states as possible,and guarantee the system’s safety and efficient defensive resource utilization.The proposed solution is extensively evaluated through simu-lations using the IEEE 33-bus test network and real-time digital simulator(RTDS)based testbed experiments of the IEEE 14-bus network.The results demonstrate the effec-tiveness of the proposed game-theoretical approach for optimal defensive resource allocation in CPPS when lim-ited resources are available when under FDI attacks.Index Terms—Optimal strategy,game theory,Nash equilibrium,CPPS,FDI attack.