Analysis of stage-investing strategy in equity financing market

Stage-investing strategy is a primary measure to mitigate asymmetric information during equity investment. This paper attempts to investigate the problem faced by equity investors wishing to make optimal investment decision under stage-investing strategy. A serial investment-decision making model will be designed to help investors to take the best choice.

Research on the Risk Management Issues of VAM Agreements in Private Equity Financing

At present,the biggest obstacle that growing enterprises may encounter in their development process is insufficient funds.Private equity financing does not only solve the capital problem of enterprises,but also provide enterprises with professional management concepts and even help growing enterprises to go public in advance.However,high returns must be accompanied by high risks.For example,private equity financing has information asymmetry risks,principal-agent risks,etc.,and these risks make it impossible to maximize the advantages of private equity financing.Therefore,in order to reduce the risks brought by financing,investment and financing parties should choose to sign gambling contracts to reduce the risk.In recent years,the use of VAM agreements has become more in China.However,according to incomplete statistics,less than 30%of VAM agreements are successful,and this result is mainly due to the insufficient depth and breadth of research on VAM agreements.Therefore,this article will comprehensively analyze the problems that need to be paid attention to when signing a gambling agreement by introducing the case of Anda Technology,and the issue of targeted risk prevention will also be discussed in this paper.

ROE as a performance measure in performance-vested stock option contracts in China

In this paper, we hand-collect the performance measures adopted in performance-vested stock option plans in China. We find that return on equity （ROE） is a widely used performance measure. Different from most of the other performance measures, ROE is affected by the number of shares outstanding. When executive compensation contracts are explicitly tied to ROE performance, in order to avoid the reduction in reported ROE through the issuance of additional common shares （i.e., ROE dilution）, managers have an incentive to influence ROE performance through financing decisions. We find that managers are more likely to avoid ROE dilution related to debt-versus-equity choice when their performance-vested stock option plans are explicitly tied to ROE performance and when firms have a high level of access to bank loans. However, there is no such link for firms with a low level of access to bank loans. Our study shows that the association between executive compensation design and corporate financing decisions depends on the accessibility of bank loans, demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in China. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in executive compensation and corporate financing decisions. Our study contributes to both the executive compensation and corporate finance literature.