The Coalition Cooperative Game Method and Its Application in Multi-objective Optimization Design

This paper proposes a multi-objective optimization design method based on the coalition cooperative game theory where the three design goals have been seen as three game players. By calculating the affecting factors and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into different strategic spaces which belong to each player, then it constructs a payoff function based on the coalition mechanism. Each game player takes its own revenue function as a target and obtains the best strategy versus other players. The best strategies of all players consist of the strategy permutation of a round game and it obtains the final game solutions through multi-round games according to the convergence criterion. A multi-objective optimization example of the luff mechanism of compensative sheave block shows the effectiveness of the coalition cooperative game method.

How to promote cooperative innovation in environmentally friendly technology:a case of agricultural biotechnology in China

This study explored the factors influencing cooperative innovation in environmentally friendly agricultural biotechnology in China.First,we constructed an evolutionary game model comprising the factors of net income of cooperative innovation,net income of independent innovation,market constraints,and government subsidies.Using MATLAB simulation,we assigned different values to the aforementioned variables to explore the evolutionary trend of innovators’willingness to cooperate.Results showed that when the values of net income of cooperative innovation,net income of independent innovation,market constraints,and government subsidies exceeded the threshold,innovators’willingness to cooperate was significantly enhanced.Furthermore,the proportion of innovators who cooperated with others gradually increased to 100%;otherwise,it gradually decreased to 0%.Comparing the simulation curve with the real evolution curve of cooperative innovation in agricultural biotechnology in China,we found that the gradual decline in the willingness to cooperate could be due to insufficient subsidies for cooperative innovation,low income from cooperative innovation,weak profitability of innovators,and weak market constraints.

Evolutionary games and spatial periodicity

Spatial interactions are considered an important factor influencing a variety of evolutionary processes that take place in structured populations.It still remains an open problem to fully understand evolutionary game dynamics on networks except for certain limiting scenarios such as weak selection.Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection where strategy evolution of individuals becomes deterministic in a fashion of winners taking all.We show that the long term behavior of the evolutionary process eventually converges to a particular basin of attraction,which is either a periodic cycle or a single fixed state depending on specific initial conditions and model parameters.In particular,we find that symmetric starting configurations can induce an exceedingly long transient phase encompassing a large number of aesthetic spatial patterns including the prominent kaleidoscopic cooperation.Our finding holds for any population structure and a broad class of finite games beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Our work offers insights into understanding evolutionary dynamics of spatially extended systems ubiquitous in biology and ecology.

Integrating the environmental factor into the strategy updating rule to promote cooperation in evolutionary games

Many previous studies have shown that the environment plays an important role for social individuals. In this paper, we integrate the environmental factor, which is defined as the average payoff of all a player＇s neighbours, with the standard Fermi updating rule by introducing a tunable parameter, w. It is found that the level of cooperation increases remarkably, and that the cooperators can better resist the invasion of defection with an increase in w. This interesting phenomenon is then explained from a microscopic view. In addition, the universality of this mechanism is also proved with the help of the small-world network and the random regular graph. This work may be helpful in understanding cooperation behaviour in species from unicellular organisms up to human beings.

THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner＇s Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two con- trol strategies are proposed： compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a coop- erator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can＇t prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）. On the other hand, compensation for the coopera- tor can＇t prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit

The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.

Biham-Middleton-Levine model in consideration of cooperative willingness

In this paper, the Biham-Middleton-Levine （BML） model with consideration of cooperative willingness has been proposed to study the traffic flow in urban networks. An evolutionary game with a cooperative willingness profile is intro-duced to deal with conflicts between disturbing neighbors. Simulation results suggest that imitating cooperative willingness can ease the effect of premature seizure on traffic flow due to the introduction of evolutionary games. Phase diagrams with a strategy profile and cooperative willingness profile have been investigated in detail. Our findings also prove that by imitating the more successful, cooperative willingness instead of simply the more successful strategies, the evolution of cooperation is significantly promoted, hence improving the order of cooperation and relieving the pressure of traffic networks.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner＇s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.

Spatial snowdrift game in heterogeneous agent systems with co-evolutionary strategies and updating rules

We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each＇agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance VT as well as the initial composition of agents faO. Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including VT, faO, and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 〈 r 〈 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems.

Hysteresis behavior and nonequilibrium phase transition in a one-dimensional evolutionary game model

We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.

高阶结构对无标度网络上合作行为演化的影响

为研究高阶结构对无标度网络上合作行为演化的影响,构建基于囚徒困境博弈的网络博弈模型。在无标度网络上引入二阶高阶结构,定义含成对博弈的三角形面博弈,用高阶结构参数联系成对博弈收益与面博弈收益,并通过仿真实验分析高阶结构对合作行为演化的影响。结果表明,当高连接度个体优先合作并获得高收益时,会促使其他连接度个体也选择合作,博弈个体间一旦形成稳定的“全合作”三角形策略结构,就能显著提高每个合作者收益,进而促进合作行为的产生。

农户风险规避、羊群效应与农业绿色生产转型——基于“企业+合作社+农户”模式的演化博弈分析

基于3方演化博弈,构建政府补贴条件下“企业+合作社+农户”农业绿色生产转型博弈模型,引入农户风险规避、羊群效应,研究3方主体行为的演化规律和稳定策略,并利用Matlab软件进行数值仿真.结果表明:企业、合作社、农户均需要政府补贴的帮助,政府的补贴力度越大,系统收敛至理想状态的速度越快;企业、合作社、农户任何一方不进行绿色生产转型都会使得转型成本剧增;农户的风险规避程度越高,农业绿色生产转型就越难以实现;农户中存在的羊群效应有利于农业绿色生产方式在农户中传播.基于此提出“企业+合作社+农户”模式下农业绿色生产转型相关建议.

澜湄次区域减灾合作发展的随机演化博弈模型

长期以来,澜沧江—湄公河次区域一直深受灾害风险的威胁,给次区域的社会经济发展造成了很大阻碍,开展减灾合作是提升减灾能力的有效方式。该文为探析次区域内各国减灾合作机制和影响减灾合作关系的关键因素,建立随机演化博弈模型,并引入灾害抗逆力与国际关系来探讨各国博弈策略动态演化过程及影响因素。研究结果表明:一国灾害抗逆力的提升无论是在随机因素影响强或弱的条件下,均不确定其能否促进合作发展局面的形成,国际关系的亲近则对于合作发展局面有着正向的促进作用,在当前时代背景下,各国对减灾合作的积极性在不断提高,同时,我国当前的决策行为能够对合作局面产生促进作用。基于澜湄次区域内国家间合作演化规律的探讨,可进一步为各国提升防灾减灾救灾能力与优化减灾合作机制提供借鉴,助力经济社会发展。

考虑新机场投运的多式联运组织演化博弈——以北京大兴国际机场为例

为迎合市场需求,激发北京市新机场及周边企业运输潜力,发展多式联运并合理调动运输供给资源成为关键。通过建立航空运输企业、公路运输企业及多式联运经营人三方演化博弈模型,对各参与方组建多式联运组织的策略、选择演化路径及合作机制进行研究。各参与方在成本投入与可获得的额外收益之间权衡,决策是否选择组成联运组织。研究过程中设置合作意愿,对多式联运组织各参与方策略选择的演化路径进行仿真分析,并分别改变业务规模系数、运输收益系数及新市场损失系数,就各参与方行为对其策略选择的演化结果进行分析。结果表明:各参与主体初始意愿的变化对多式联运组织的建立和有效运营产生直接影响,即运输企业对合作策略的初始意愿是多式联运组织形成的关键;经营人企业的行为策略选择也将影响航空运输企业和公路运输企业的成本付出与新市场带来的额外收益获得,组织内部因素(例如合理收益分配)有助于促进多式联运组织有效形成;组织业务规模、市场发展状况变化等外部环境因素也对多式联运组织成员的意愿值有所影响,即不同运输企业行为会影响经营人企业的经营态度,也将作用于组织的演化方向及到达均衡状态的演化时间。

区块链赋能生产、供销、信用合作社信任构建——基于三方演化博弈的分析

融资风险和交易对手风险引发的信任问题始终制约着农民专业合作社、供销合作社和信用合作社(以下简称为“三社”)融合向纵深发展,而区块链技术为解决这一困境提供了契机。文章通过构建“三社”信任行为策略演化博弈模型,探究区块链如何降低上述两种风险解决信任问题,深入研究区块链对“三社”信任构建的影响因素。研究表明:一是区块链对市场需求预测的作用在较为不稳定的市场中价值体现最大;二是区块链减小风险损失的作用在农业风险发生概率较高的情况下价值体现最大。因此,区块链技术应当优先在市场环境恶劣和农业自然风险高的地区推广,并适当予以补贴。

快递进村倡议下“邮快合作”主体博弈关系研究

快递进村具有成本高和效率低的困难,邮政与民营快递企业在共建配送中心、开展共同配送业务等方面进行合作,是解决这一问题的重要手段。因此围绕共建共配的邮快合作模式,分析了邮政快递企业和民营快递企业之间的合作和博弈关系,并构建了演化博弈模型,选取某区的实际数据作为算例,探讨不同因素对合作稳定性的影响以及政府政策在邮快合作中所起的作用效果。结果表明:邮政占据主导地位对推进快递进村具有一定优势,政府推进邮快合作的政策补贴应考虑多种补贴形式。

政企社合作推进吉林省体育社会指导员发展的演化博弈分析

社会体育指导员队伍发展依托于多元主体协同参与,不同主体之间的博弈关系梳理是队伍高质量建设的关键。通过审视政企社合作推进社会体育指导员发展的现实问题,立足多元主体协同视角,运用演化博弈方法,系统性梳理相关利益主体间的博弈关系,探寻政企社合作未来发展趋势和策略。研究发现,政府是政企社合作中多主体协同治理的重要主导,企业与政府合作的资源质量是社会体育指导员发展的关键,政企社合作推进社会体育指导员发展的稳定策略,尤其对于吉林省需要把握不同主体的策略选择。依据演化博弈分析结果,提出政府、企业和社区协同参与社会体育指导员队伍建设发展的策略建议:政府设立制度保障,协调监管多元主体的行为策略;社区理性参与建设,形成多方位合作建设系统;企业建立长远规划,实现资源要素“精准扶持”。

基于区块链的负荷聚合商及居民用户多方共治交易模式

居民用户以负荷聚合商为中介参与需求响应,在交易中往往不具有话语权和选择权,由此产生信息不透明、第三方权力过大等信任问题;同时,居民用户因信息获取能力差以及负荷实时控制能力弱,难以在聚合响应中享受平等决策权、知情权和话语权。因此,基于区块链技术设计负荷聚合商及居民用户多方共治交易模式,针对包含3类柔性负荷的居民用户及聚合商的区块链节点,以自治共享为基本原则建立区块链节点模型和配置方法;基于负荷聚合商及居民用户节点间的聚合响应新模式,构建了基于聚合商非合作博弈、居民用户间演化博弈及聚合商与居民用户间主从博弈的激励机制,设计了激励相容的智能合约算法和区块数据结构,并提出响应标识因数和激励理性系数来评估所提交易模式的有效性;最后,经算例仿真验证表明,所提交易模式在保证各交易节点效用的基础上,可确保聚合服务高效可信,有利于唤醒海量需求侧沉睡资源。

全民健身公共服务多元协同供给的演化博弈分析与实施路径研究

落实全民健身公共服务多元协同供给,是“十四五”时期深入实施全民健身国家战略的迫切要求,是全面建设社会主义现代化国家的应然选择。借助公共产品理论、协同学理论和演化博弈理论,构建以政府、市场和社会组织三方为参与主体的全民健身公共服务多元协同供给演化博弈模型,分析三方主体的演化策略选择,并分别就三方主体的初始意愿、激励成本、补贴力度和处罚力度对演化策略的影响程度进行数值仿真。分析认为,通过提高初始意愿,控制激励成本,对市场和社会组织进行适度补贴并合理规制,能够有效实现全民健身公共服务多元协同供给。以供给全过程为逻辑理路,提出重构供给主体的权责关系、丰富供给内容的差序格局、健全供给系统的监督反馈机制等全民健身公共服务多元协同供给实施路径。

混合所有制企业高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈分析

基于有限理性视角,运用演化博弈理论,构建了国企高管团队和私企高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈模型,探讨了违约罚金、政府奖励、合作成本、合作收益对高管团队合作行为演化的影响,并对其演化过程进行了数值仿真和相关分析。研究表明:混合所有制企业高管团队合作双方的最终策略将会稳定于合作与不合作策略,不会稳定于一方合作,一方不合作策略。其中,在一定范围内,增大违约罚金,增加政府奖励,减小合作成本,增大合作收益系数将会促使国企高管和私企高管合作行为由不合作向合作进行转变。研究以期为中国国企混改顺利推进,形成国企混改高效制度安排提供一定参鉴意义。