We establish an exchange rate determination model for central banks' interventions in financial markets. The model shows that central banks can adjust exchange rate by several policy instruments and that different...We establish an exchange rate determination model for central banks' interventions in financial markets. The model shows that central banks can adjust exchange rate by several policy instruments and that different instruments may have different effects on exchange rate determination. It specifies potential policy instruments for central banks as well as their policy effects. Based on these effects, feasible matches of policy instruments in contingent intervention are put forth.展开更多
With balance of payments in China and the RMB exchange rate approaching the equilibrium level,political gaming of domestic interest groups rather than international political pressures plays a more important role in f...With balance of payments in China and the RMB exchange rate approaching the equilibrium level,political gaming of domestic interest groups rather than international political pressures plays a more important role in future bidirectional changes of the RMB exchange rate.From the perspective of political economics,this paper analyses the dynamics of exchange rate preferences of domestic interest groups and their role in the evolution of RMB exchange rate regimes.The findings show that interest groups and their exchange rate preferences do play a significant role in RMB exchange rate reforms,which implicates that it is necessary to take account of policy preferences and political gaming of interest groups in the determination and forecasts of the RMB exchange rate.展开更多
文摘We establish an exchange rate determination model for central banks' interventions in financial markets. The model shows that central banks can adjust exchange rate by several policy instruments and that different instruments may have different effects on exchange rate determination. It specifies potential policy instruments for central banks as well as their policy effects. Based on these effects, feasible matches of policy instruments in contingent intervention are put forth.
基金This work was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(15BGJ034).
文摘With balance of payments in China and the RMB exchange rate approaching the equilibrium level,political gaming of domestic interest groups rather than international political pressures plays a more important role in future bidirectional changes of the RMB exchange rate.From the perspective of political economics,this paper analyses the dynamics of exchange rate preferences of domestic interest groups and their role in the evolution of RMB exchange rate regimes.The findings show that interest groups and their exchange rate preferences do play a significant role in RMB exchange rate reforms,which implicates that it is necessary to take account of policy preferences and political gaming of interest groups in the determination and forecasts of the RMB exchange rate.
