Executive Compensation and Corporate Financial Performance： Empirical Evidences on Brazilian Industrial Companies

This survey investigated the relationship between executive compensation and the financial performance of companies. It is hypothesized that a company can utilize its pay system to direct executives＇ efforts toward its strategic business objectives, thus contributing to higher levels of corporate financial performance. The survey data consisted of a secondary and non-probabilistic sample of 44 Brazilian industrial companies. In order to operationalize the independent remuneration variable, the authors used average monthly salary, average variable salary, and three indices that were created for this survey： benefits, career, and development. These indices measure the access to benefits, mechanisms for stimulating and supporting careers, and mechanisms to encourage education and professional development that companies offer to their directors, vice presidents, and chief executive officers （CEOs）, who are referred to in this paper by the term ＂executive＂. The remuneration data are from fiscal year 2006. In order to operationalize the financial performance variable, two accounting indicators were used： sales growth and return on equity （ROE） for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. The size of the companies was used as a control variable. The results of a multiple regression analysis do not support the hypothesis that there is a positive and significant relationship between executive compensation and corporate financial performance.

Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Japan： The Role of Keiretsu Memberships and Bank-Appointed Monitors＊

This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay for performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay for performance sensitivity of Japanese executive compensation is positive and almost the same as in a market-oriented system like that of the United States of America （USA）. However, previous studies do not investigate how Japanese corporate governance mechanisms like financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors affect pay for performance sensitivity. This paper finds that the disciplinary mechanism of keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors did not function well in Japan in the 1990s.

Knowledge Graph of China's Executive Compensation Gap:Visual Analysis Based on CiteSpace

This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.

Mandatory IFRS adoption and executive compensation:Evidence from China

This study investigates how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards(IFRS) affects the contractual benefits of using accounting information to determine executive compensation in China. After controlling for firm and corporate governance characteristics, we find strong evidence supporting the positive role of mandatory IFRS adoption on the accounting-based performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Subsample analysis suggests that improvements in accounting-based performance sensitivity after IFRS adoption differ across regions with various levels of institutional quality and across firms that are affected to a different extent by the adoption. Additional analysis supports the argument that the positive effects of IFRS adoption on the use of accounting performance in executive compensation are driven by the reduction in accounting conservatism associated with IFRS adoption.

Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State-owned Enterprises

Since the commencement of industrial reform in Chinna, most CHinese state-owneu enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms ＇future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long-term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.

CEO Emotional Intelligence level and Compensation： Evidence From Tunisia

This article focuses on the impact of emotions on Tunisian chief executive officer （CEO） compensation. It examines specifically the role of executives＇ emotional intelligence （El） level and their emotional biases, namely optimism in explaining compensation plans. An empirical study was conducted in this respect, by using a questionnaire as a method of data collection, on a sample of 100 Tunisian companies＇ leaders. This research paper translates an original approach, since it highlights the behavioral aspects role in explaining the CEO＇s compensation policy level. To the best of the knowledge, this represents the first study in the Tunisian context that explored this area of research. Actually, the results show that Tunisian leaders may be subject to certain emotions thereby impacting their compensation characteristics. Indeed, they opt at first to contribute to the organizational performance by establishing a mutual trust within the organizational structure in order to achieve the objectives already set up. However, this could be done at the expense of their compensation plans

Profits and losses from changes in fair value,executive cash compensation and managerial power:Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value(CFV) and levels of executive compensation.In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value(PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value(LCFV). Furthermore,we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.

ROE as a performance measure in performance-vested stock option contracts in China

In this paper, we hand-collect the performance measures adopted in performance-vested stock option plans in China. We find that return on equity （ROE） is a widely used performance measure. Different from most of the other performance measures, ROE is affected by the number of shares outstanding. When executive compensation contracts are explicitly tied to ROE performance, in order to avoid the reduction in reported ROE through the issuance of additional common shares （i.e., ROE dilution）, managers have an incentive to influence ROE performance through financing decisions. We find that managers are more likely to avoid ROE dilution related to debt-versus-equity choice when their performance-vested stock option plans are explicitly tied to ROE performance and when firms have a high level of access to bank loans. However, there is no such link for firms with a low level of access to bank loans. Our study shows that the association between executive compensation design and corporate financing decisions depends on the accessibility of bank loans, demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in China. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in executive compensation and corporate financing decisions. Our study contributes to both the executive compensation and corporate finance literature.