This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 202...This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.展开更多
Since the commencement of industrial reform in Chinna, most CHinese state-owneu enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiv...Since the commencement of industrial reform in Chinna, most CHinese state-owneu enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms 'future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long-term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.展开更多
In this paper, we hand-collect the performance measures adopted in performance-vested stock option plans in China. We find that return on equity (ROE) is a widely used performance measure. Different from most of the...In this paper, we hand-collect the performance measures adopted in performance-vested stock option plans in China. We find that return on equity (ROE) is a widely used performance measure. Different from most of the other performance measures, ROE is affected by the number of shares outstanding. When executive compensation contracts are explicitly tied to ROE performance, in order to avoid the reduction in reported ROE through the issuance of additional common shares (i.e., ROE dilution), managers have an incentive to influence ROE performance through financing decisions. We find that managers are more likely to avoid ROE dilution related to debt-versus-equity choice when their performance-vested stock option plans are explicitly tied to ROE performance and when firms have a high level of access to bank loans. However, there is no such link for firms with a low level of access to bank loans. Our study shows that the association between executive compensation design and corporate financing decisions depends on the accessibility of bank loans, demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in China. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in executive compensation and corporate financing decisions. Our study contributes to both the executive compensation and corporate finance literature.展开更多
文摘This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.
文摘Since the commencement of industrial reform in Chinna, most CHinese state-owneu enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms 'future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long-term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.
基金Bo Zhang acknowledges the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (no. 71402185). Xiaoqiang Zhi acknowledges the financial support from the Research Project Special Support of National Accounting Leading Talents Program.
文摘In this paper, we hand-collect the performance measures adopted in performance-vested stock option plans in China. We find that return on equity (ROE) is a widely used performance measure. Different from most of the other performance measures, ROE is affected by the number of shares outstanding. When executive compensation contracts are explicitly tied to ROE performance, in order to avoid the reduction in reported ROE through the issuance of additional common shares (i.e., ROE dilution), managers have an incentive to influence ROE performance through financing decisions. We find that managers are more likely to avoid ROE dilution related to debt-versus-equity choice when their performance-vested stock option plans are explicitly tied to ROE performance and when firms have a high level of access to bank loans. However, there is no such link for firms with a low level of access to bank loans. Our study shows that the association between executive compensation design and corporate financing decisions depends on the accessibility of bank loans, demonstrating the importance of institutional factors in China. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in executive compensation and corporate financing decisions. Our study contributes to both the executive compensation and corporate finance literature.