Executive Stock Option, Mediation of Agency Costs and Allocation of Power in Levered Firms

The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.

Effect of Employees’ Pay-performance Sensitivity on Future Firm Performance: Evidence from State-owned Listed Enterprises in China over 2007-2015

Taking a balanced panel data consisting of 4365 firm-year observations drawn from the listed state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over 2007-2015 as the research sample,the paper examines the effect of the employees’pay-performance sensitivity(PPS)on the future firm performance from the two competing perspectives of“incentive effect”and“risk-aversion effect”,adopting the method of multiple regression analysis based on OLS and applying the SPSS23 as the data processing tool.Theoretical analysis and empirical results demonstrate that there is a positive link between the employees’PPS and the future firm performance.To improve the employees’PPS can stimulate the engagement of the employees,improve their working quality,enrich their workplace innovative behavior,and further lead to higher future firm performance.Meanwhile,the positive effect of the employees’PPS on the future firm performance is,on average,lower than that of the top executives’PPS on the future firm performance.Implications of the findings are provided in the end.

Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Japan： The Role of Keiretsu Memberships and Bank-Appointed Monitors＊

This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay for performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay for performance sensitivity of Japanese executive compensation is positive and almost the same as in a market-oriented system like that of the United States of America （USA）. However, previous studies do not investigate how Japanese corporate governance mechanisms like financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors affect pay for performance sensitivity. This paper finds that the disciplinary mechanism of keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors did not function well in Japan in the 1990s.

高管性别多样性、ESG表现与企业价值

为探究高管性别多样性与企业价值的关系以及ESG表现在两者之间的中介效应,基于2015—2021年中国沪深两市A股上市公司数据,采用实证分析方法对固定效应模型进行检验。研究发现,高管性别多样性与企业价值存在正向相关关系,ESG表现在两者之间发挥了部分中介效应,即高管性别多样性—ESG表现—企业价值这一链条关系得以证明。通过异质性进一步分析发现,高管性别多样性—ESG表现—企业价值链条关系存在产权异质性和行业竞争强度异质性,即对比非国有企业,国有企业高管性别多样性与ESG表现关系的显著性较强,但高管性别多样性—ESG表现—企业价值这一链条关系在这一分组中并未得到证明;全样本的研究结论在处于高市场竞争状态下的企业样本中得以证明,在低市场竞争强度下的企业样本中,未能得到证实。在此基础上,进行了内生性检验与稳健性检验,上述结论依旧成立。

Does top executives' US experience matter? Evidence from US-listed Chinese firms

Foreign firms face enormous obstacles in attracting investors and analysts when issuing securities in the United States.We use US-listed Chinese firms as our research sample and find that firms that hire top executives(i.e.,Chief Executive Officer[CEO]or Chief Financial Officer[CFO]) with work experience in the US or educational qualifications from the US attract more US institutional investors and analysts.Further,we find that CFOs' US experience dominates the results.Corroborating our results,we further find that firms with US-experienced CFOs are more likely to hold conference calls and voluntarily issue management forecasts,which suggests that CFOs with a US background are better at communicating with US investors and analysts and acting in alignment with US norms compared with Chinese CFOs.Collectively,our results suggest that hiring a CFO with a US background could facilitate cross-listed foreign firms to lower US investors' and analysts' information disadvantage.

An Analysis of Causes of Professional Embezzlement Committed by Executives of State-Owned Enterprise Based on the “Triangle Theory”

According to the fraud"triangle theory",the causes of professional embezzlements committed by executives of China’s state-owned enterprises are mainly from pressure,opportunities and excuses.Among them,pressure is a huge psychological burden and desire generated by the combined action of the self-interested value orientation of the economic man and the value-oriented market economy in the pursuit of wealth.Opportunity refers mainly to the weak restrain on the asset operation responsibility of the executives,the cultural atmosphere of advocating the status and authority in the enterprises,and the lack of necessary power balance and internal control,all of them are caused by the system defects of the company systems under the public ownership.Excuses mainly have such forms as"kickbacks","borrowed money"and unreasonable design of remuneration and incentive systems,etc.The effective way to prevent executives of state-owned enterprises from committing professional embezzlement is to select the personnel with excellent conduct and ability as executives,create the corporate culture of honesty and trustworthiness,perfect a variety of mechanisms and systems,urge the effective implementation of the system,and maintain the normal operation of the mechanism.

Comparison of Entrepreneurship Environment for Executives between State-owned and Private Enterprises in China

This research aims at exploring the differences in the effects of environment on entrepreneurship growth between state-owned enterprises and private businesses. Through executive investigation, reasons are provided for better performance of private businesses. Environmental factors, including economic, legal, technological, cultural and social factors, which influence entrepreneurship growth, are examined to determine differences between state-owned enterprise and private business executives. It is found that the methods of executive assignment to managerial posts determine executives＇ effort towards entrepreneurship.

多维关系网络中企业创新的同群效应

处于多维关系网络中的企业,进行技术创新时会观察同群企业的创新活动,而关系网络的联结状况则会强化这种关联效应。本文使用沪深两市A股上市公司样本,研究信息化网络和高管关联社会网络对企业创新同群效应强度的影响,并从信息传递、知识扩散的角度深化了对同群效应机制研究。研究发现,目标企业的创新数量和质量会受到同一地区、同一行业的同群企业创新的正向影响,背后的机制主要是企业在外部信息不确定性下的企业间信息传递,以及关联企业之间的知识溢出。此外,在信息化网络中,企业的互联网融入程度越高,其创新的同群效应越强;而在社会关联网络中,相比于无高管校友关联的同群企业,有高管校友关联的同群企业对目标企业创新有着更强的正向影响。

发明家高管、创新投入与企业绩效—— 基于双重差分模型的实证分析

基于2010—2020年科创板与创业板上市公司的发明家数据,使用双重差分法实证检验了发明家高管对企业绩效的影响及作用机制,结果表明:发明家高管对企业绩效有显著的正向促进作用,稳健性检验之后结论仍然成立;机制研究表明,发明家高管主要通过增大企业的创新投入来提升企业的绩效水平,超前行动正向调节发明家高管与创新投入之间的关系;异质性分析表明,非国有企业和成熟期企业的高管发明家背景更能促进企业绩效的提升。

技术专家型高管与上市企业绿色创新

本研究基于绿色专利数据和企业财务数据,构建2000—2020年A股上市企业的绿色创新数据库,人工识别86457个核心管理者的学历特征数据,通过计量模型探讨上市企业高管技术、学历背景对绿色创新绩效的影响与机制分析。研究结果发现,理、工、农、医学背景的高管从事研发的概率比文、商、法学背景的高管高出一倍。进一步控制核心高管研发背景、学历后,回归结果表明技术专家型高管对绿色创新及其效率依然有正向影响,具体影响渠道有二:研发资金投入和研发人员投入具有中介效应;所有制结构、企业规模和研发人员投入具有调节效应。异质性分析表明,大型企业为技术专家型高管提供了更好的平台,知识与研发结合后的复合型人才能在绿色创新中发挥更大的作用,但我国上市企业当前的绿色创新仍处于初期阶段。本文进一步采用了准自然实验的高管“换届”以及多种PSM方法对潜在的内生性问题进行检验,结果均保持一致。

用户投诉对企业绩效的影响研究——基于注意力基础观的视角

用户投诉是反映用户对企业产品或服务质量满意度的重要指标,对企业获取竞争优势与长久发展具有重要影响。为探讨用户投诉对企业绩效之间的影响机制,本文基于注意力基础观视角,运用2016—2021年223家中国上市企业投诉数据,实证分析用户投诉与企业绩效之间的关系及高管团队特征和政务环境的调节作用。研究结果表明,用户投诉与企业绩效显著负相关;女性高管比例会削弱用户投诉与企业绩效之间的负向关系;高管持股比例增强用户投诉与企业绩效之间的负向关系;高管受教育水平削弱用户投诉与企业绩效之间的负向关系;政务环境削弱用户投诉与企业绩效之间的负向关系。本文研究结果拓展了注意力基础观的实证检验,分析了企业注意力分配的前因,并定量分析了用户投诉对企业绩效的影响程度,同时讨论了用户投诉、高管团队、政务环境与企业绩效间的作用机制。为此,企业高管团队必须重视投诉管理和风险管理,优化注意力配置以提高用户满意度,进而创造更大的竞争优势并提高企业绩效。

Executive turnover in China's state-owned enterprises:Government-oriented or market-oriented?

Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.

高管外部薪酬攀比心理与企业违规行为

文章以2009-2020年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验高管外部薪酬攀比心理对企业违规行为的影响。研究发现,高管外部薪酬攀比心理能够显著加剧企业违规行为,即高管外部薪酬攀比心理越强,企业违规倾向越大、严重程度越高;企业信息透明度能够显著抑制高管外部薪酬攀比心理与企业违规行为之间的关系;情境性分析表明,高管外部薪酬攀比心理对企业违规行为的正向关系在低货币薪酬、高持股比例或低市场化水平的企业中更为明显。研究结论不仅丰富了高管外部薪酬攀比心理与企业违规行为的相关文献,同时为高管薪酬制定以及如何规范企业违规行为提供了参考思路。

企业异质性、高管过度自信与企业创新绩效

本文选用科技部数据库中全部A股上市公司作为研究样本,探讨高管过度自信对企业创新绩效的影响。研究结果表明,高管过度自信会促进企业加大创新项目的投入和产出;在企业研发支出保持不变的情况下,高管过度自信仍旧会给企业带来更多的创新产出,表明高管过度自信促进了企业创新绩效的提升。研究发现,这一促进作用受到企业异质性的影响,高管过度自信对于创新绩效的促进作用会因为企业规模与负债的不同而存在显著差异,验证了熊彼特效应和投资扭曲效应。进一步研究表明,相比非高新技术企业,高管过度自信与创新绩效的正相关关系在高新技术企业中更为显著。本文的研究对重新认识高管过度自信这一心理偏差对于企业财务决策的影响,以及对企业管理者的聘任决策有重要的理论和实践意义。

中美两国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素比较研究

选取中国深沪两市1999年到2003年4 430家上市公司和美国纽约交易所1999到2002年6 907家上市公司进行实证比较,在确定了中国上市公司高管薪酬的主要决定因素的基础上,与美国上市公司高管薪酬进行比较.结果表明,公司规模、公司绩效、股权特征是决定高管薪酬的主要因素;它们对于两国上市公司高管薪酬的影响是有区别的;探究了造成这种差异的原因并提出了对于中国上市公司高管薪酬政策设计的指导性建议和以后研究的方向.

上市公司高管相对薪酬差距与公司绩效相关性研究

对高管薪酬与公司绩效的已有研究主要集中在高管薪酬总额以及绝对薪酬差距方面。现采用相对薪酬差距指标,以沪深两市435家制造业上市公司的年报数据为基础,对高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的相关性进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,高管相对薪酬差距对公司绩效无正向显著性,并呈现出负向影响的趋势,结果符合行为理论提出的假说。

企业特征、高管薪酬结构与企业绩效

利用2005—2010年我国沪深两市A股非金融保险行业1654家上市公司的高管年度薪酬数据,结合企业特征,对不同类型企业的高管薪酬结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,细化锦标赛理论和行为理论在不同类型企业中可能形成的差异化实施效应。结果显示:我国不同类型的企业都比较适宜采用锦标赛理论制定高管薪酬激励政策,竞争性的高管薪酬结构对于提升企业绩效具有正面作用,均等化高管薪酬结构不利于企业的价值创造;相对于民营企业、小规模企业、低成长企业而言,我国国有企业、大规模企业、高成长企业更宜采用锦标赛理论设计企业高管薪酬结构。因此我国不宜对非金融保险行业国有企业的高管薪酬进行过度均等化的管制,否则会负面影响企业绩效提升和企业价值创造。

高管持股对创新可持续性的影响研究——兼论高管过度自信与产权性质的调节效应

企业创新活动一旦中断将会产生巨大的调整成本损失。因此,如何保持企业创新可持续性是企业创新研究的重要问题。结合委托代理理论,探索了企业高管持股对创新可持续性的影响,并进一步讨论了高管过度自信与产权性质的调节作用。使用2003-2014年中国A股制造业上市公司面板数据进行实证分析,结果表明:高管持股对企业创新可持续性具有显著正向影响,高管过度自信则弱化了两者间正向关系,而相对于非民营企业,民营企业高管持股对创新可持续性的正向作用更强。同时考虑两种情境效应的综合影响时,在民营企业中高管过度自信的负向调节作用更强。最后,考虑了遗漏变量带来的"选择偏差问题"和内生性问题,采用基于Kernel匹配得分法的反事实检验,为实证结果提供了稳健性证明。

上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

高管薪酬问题是公司治理理论的核心,如何科学、客观、准确地评价高管薪酬是理论界和实践界共同关注的焦点。通过计算2008年1 581家上市公司的高管薪酬指数,提出基于公司业绩的高管薪酬指数,并分行业、地区和所有制性质分析了上市公司高管薪酬指数的特点,本文认为对高管薪酬的评价不能简单地使用高管薪酬绝对值,而应充分考虑高管薪酬与企业业绩的匹配程度。

公司高管个人特征对企业绩效的影响——引入中介变量:投资效率

一直以来,高管人员作为企业重要的人力资源备受关注。通过文献研究发现,高管个人特征与企业绩效存在相关关系,但是我们认为高管个人特征对企业绩效的影响可能并非是简单的直接相关,更有可能受到一些中间变量的作用。因此,选取在沪深A股上市的983家上市公司面板数据为样本,以投资效率为中介变量,分别对高管个人特征与投资效率、投资效率与企业绩效之间的相关关系进行了探讨。实证分析结果表明,高管个人特征除了年龄以外,学历、专业背景对投资效率都是正向影响,进一步研究发现,投资效率与企业绩效也是正向影响,三者之间形成一个传导关系:高管个人特征→投资效率→企业绩效。