Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to ...Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.展开更多
Pervasive computing, which requires applications composed of independent and distributed components, is an important domain for dynamic ubiquitous heterogeneous environment. However, one of the critical challenges it ...Pervasive computing, which requires applications composed of independent and distributed components, is an important domain for dynamic ubiquitous heterogeneous environment. However, one of the critical challenges it faces is resource allocation. To overcome the difficulty, enhanced universal service terminal （UST＋） is designed as a reflective middleware combined distributed components with particular features to achieve user goals. Moreover, a novel algorithm based on microeconomics is presented to resolve conflicting resource allocation and is implemented on top of the UST＋. Besides, an example outlines how this algorithm is used in pervasive computing, and the simulation results illustrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve high performance at low cost.展开更多
In this paper we reanalyze Said’s(2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. ...In this paper we reanalyze Said’s(2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said(2011). This implies that the well-known "revenue equivalence theorem"holds true for Said’s(2011) dynamic model setting.展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62173066)Open Project of Sichuan Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Terminal Co-built by Province and City(SCITLAB-1014)。
文摘Sealed-bid auctions are a vital transaction tool in the e-commerce field.Traditional centralized auction schemes typically result in severe threats to data integrity,information transparency,and traceability owing to their excessive reliance on third parties,and blockchain-based auction schemes generally suffer from high storage costs and are deficient in functional and architectural design.To solve these problems,this study presents a sealed-bid auction scheme that removes the third-party based on an Ethereum smart contract,ensuring data integrity,openness,and transparency in the execution process.The commitment mechanism and distributed storage system help to significantly reduce the user’s storage cost and protect the privacy of user bids.For the functional design,this study introduces a fulltext-retrieval and dispute-processing module for commodities,which reduces the defects existing in the functional module design of existing auction systems.Furthermore,a prototype auction system on the Ethereum test chain is built to validate the proposed scheme.Experiments show that compared with traditional storage methods,indirect storage based on a distributed storage system of texts and images can reduce the storage cost by at least 50%while ensuring data integrity.Finally,the gas cost at each stage of the auction scheme and the time required for the full-text retrieval of products are recorded to evaluate the scheme performance and analyze the test results.
基金supported by the Hi-Tech Research and Development Program of China (2009AA01Z262,2006DFA11050)the Beijing Munical Education Commission (KM200910016003)
文摘Pervasive computing, which requires applications composed of independent and distributed components, is an important domain for dynamic ubiquitous heterogeneous environment. However, one of the critical challenges it faces is resource allocation. To overcome the difficulty, enhanced universal service terminal （UST＋） is designed as a reflective middleware combined distributed components with particular features to achieve user goals. Moreover, a novel algorithm based on microeconomics is presented to resolve conflicting resource allocation and is implemented on top of the UST＋. Besides, an example outlines how this algorithm is used in pervasive computing, and the simulation results illustrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve high performance at low cost.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71171052)
文摘In this paper we reanalyze Said’s(2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said(2011). This implies that the well-known "revenue equivalence theorem"holds true for Said’s(2011) dynamic model setting.
