Purpose-The purpose of the paper is to investigate the impact of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local public education expenditure at the county level in China and to estimate the leakage of ca...Purpose-The purpose of the paper is to investigate the impact of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local public education expenditure at the county level in China and to estimate the leakage of categorical subsidies for rural compulsory education.Design/Approach/Methods-It is a quantitative study.The paper constructs a quantile regression model and adopt data collected in 2007 for 1,985 counties in China to examine the impact of relevant fiscal transfers.Findings-The results reveal that most intergovernmental fiscal transfers exert a substitution effect on the local education expenditure,whereas subsidies for rural compulsory education from the Central Government have a crowding-out effect on education investments from local financial resources.Although the subsidy program generally narrows the education expenditure disparity across counties,there are heterogeneous effects across different regions.Originality/Value-The paper estimates and compares the impact of fiscal transfers on both the level and disparity of local public education in different regions,and provides a possible explanation for the crowding-out effect of fiscal transfers in China.展开更多
Reasonable allocation of educational powers and expenditure responsibilities between central and local government is crucial to the development of education.The reason lies in the fact that local governments have rela...Reasonable allocation of educational powers and expenditure responsibilities between central and local government is crucial to the development of education.The reason lies in the fact that local governments have relatively insufficient incentives to invest in education by using local fiscal revenues,while the central government,which pursues the maximization of the interests of the whole society,could promote education and other public services with spatial spilloves.The fiscal transfer payment has made up for the shortage of local investment in education.This paper uses 2010 census(micro data)and macro fiscal data to verify the effects above.Based on the year of birth and place,this paper constructs the proportion of fiscal transfers for compulsory education in the total fiscal revenue(local fiscal revenue and fiscal transfers)to reflect its structural effect.It is found that every 10%increase in the proportion of fiscal transfers brings at least additional 0.2 year of schoolings for local residents,and the effect of special transfer payments accounts for a larger share,among the three types of transfer payment.In the mechanism test,we find that transfer payment can effectively increase local education expenditure and produce an obvious structural effect.Based on this,in order to further improve the long-term educational performance of individuals,we believe that it is necessary to improve the incentive effect of the transfer payment system on common power and the division of expenditure responsibilities in the field of education.展开更多
基金This work has been supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China in Education(Grant No.:BFA140039).
文摘Purpose-The purpose of the paper is to investigate the impact of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local public education expenditure at the county level in China and to estimate the leakage of categorical subsidies for rural compulsory education.Design/Approach/Methods-It is a quantitative study.The paper constructs a quantile regression model and adopt data collected in 2007 for 1,985 counties in China to examine the impact of relevant fiscal transfers.Findings-The results reveal that most intergovernmental fiscal transfers exert a substitution effect on the local education expenditure,whereas subsidies for rural compulsory education from the Central Government have a crowding-out effect on education investments from local financial resources.Although the subsidy program generally narrows the education expenditure disparity across counties,there are heterogeneous effects across different regions.Originality/Value-The paper estimates and compares the impact of fiscal transfers on both the level and disparity of local public education in different regions,and provides a possible explanation for the crowding-out effect of fiscal transfers in China.
基金“Research on the Scale Measurement,Formation Mechanism and Spillover Effect of Fiscal Subsidies in China”project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71973088)“Comprehensive Promotion of Ecological Innovation-based Public Finance and Taxation Policy System”project supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(19ZDA076)。
文摘Reasonable allocation of educational powers and expenditure responsibilities between central and local government is crucial to the development of education.The reason lies in the fact that local governments have relatively insufficient incentives to invest in education by using local fiscal revenues,while the central government,which pursues the maximization of the interests of the whole society,could promote education and other public services with spatial spilloves.The fiscal transfer payment has made up for the shortage of local investment in education.This paper uses 2010 census(micro data)and macro fiscal data to verify the effects above.Based on the year of birth and place,this paper constructs the proportion of fiscal transfers for compulsory education in the total fiscal revenue(local fiscal revenue and fiscal transfers)to reflect its structural effect.It is found that every 10%increase in the proportion of fiscal transfers brings at least additional 0.2 year of schoolings for local residents,and the effect of special transfer payments accounts for a larger share,among the three types of transfer payment.In the mechanism test,we find that transfer payment can effectively increase local education expenditure and produce an obvious structural effect.Based on this,in order to further improve the long-term educational performance of individuals,we believe that it is necessary to improve the incentive effect of the transfer payment system on common power and the division of expenditure responsibilities in the field of education.
