This paper studies the long run behavior in evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma games. All players are assumed to sit around a circle and to interact only with their neighbors. It is known that full-defection is the uniq...This paper studies the long run behavior in evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma games. All players are assumed to sit around a circle and to interact only with their neighbors. It is known that full-defection is the unique long run equilibrium as the probability of players＇ experimentation （or mutation） tends to zero in the best response dynamics. Here, it is shown that full-cooperation could emerge in the long run if one also cares for his neighbors in the best- response dynamics.展开更多
文摘This paper studies the long run behavior in evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma games. All players are assumed to sit around a circle and to interact only with their neighbors. It is known that full-defection is the unique long run equilibrium as the probability of players＇ experimentation （or mutation） tends to zero in the best response dynamics. Here, it is shown that full-cooperation could emerge in the long run if one also cares for his neighbors in the best- response dynamics.
