Game analysis on Huaihe River anti-pollution administration mechanism and policy research

Based on the literature review of environmental anti-pollution researches, this paper analyzes the administra- tive mechanism of Huaihe River anti-pollution with game theory. Based on the quantitative analysis on three correspond- ing game models with four players including local residents, enterprises, local governments and competent authorities at higher levels, this paper demonstrates four main shortcomings of current administrative mechanism of Huaihe River anti-pollution system, including low emission cost, low connivance cost, overemphasis on heavy fine of the enterprises, neglect of the punishment on the local departments and intersected administrative mechanism. This paper sets up anti- pollution administrative mechanism, combining economic method with noneconomic method, government control with market mechanism, and introducing public participation. At last, this paper proposes policies, such as implementing emissions trading system, reforming public participation system, and reforming government’s environmental protection mechanism to promote law enforcement.

Game Analysis of Rational FRS on Market Admittance

The dynamic signaling game-model is employed to study countermeasures of Q, U and C for supply-demand on financial market. As the game result, the mixed equilibrium of Q and U exists naturally without FRS. It is concluded that FRS on market admittance is objective demand of financial market, also the rational management behavior of government FRSI. And in addition to the empirical criteria, the FRS agreements between FRSI and financial-institutions should be considered as one of advanced FRS techniques. These must cover:① the regulation conformed status investigation with sufficient frequency,② corresponding punitive measures with sufficient strength. Thus the information can be delivered FRSI have ensured only qualified and regulation-conformed financial-institutions could be allowed to enter. That could safeguard the steadiness of the financial market.

Model Building for Community Participating in Rural Tourism and Game Analysis of Core Stakeholders

Community residents play an important role in the development of rural tourism. Taking the interest demands of stakeholders and non-cooperative game process as main line,the conflict of interest between community residents and tourists and between community residents themselves as guidance,it built an interest relation model for community participating in rural tourism. Besides,it elaborated non-cooperative relation and their interest pattern for stakeholders of rural tourism,and discussed behavior interaction process and results of core stakeholders of rural tourism. Finally,it came up with pertinent recommendations for harmonious and healthy development of rural tourism.

Game analysis on the regulation of listed companies＇ accounting information-gaming between Internal Audit Department and Audit Office

Through the establishment of game model, this article formulates the intuitive and experiential understanding of regulation on listed companies＇ accounting information by using game analysis method, and from an economic point of view, it analyzes how various parameters affect Internal Audit Department＇s nonfeasance probability and Auditing Office＇s supervision probability. Hope that this article can provide a reference for regulation on accounting information.

The exploration of the innovation mode of school enterprise cooperation in game analysis

school enterprise cooperation as a new mode of teaching. In the teaching practice has its advantages and disadvantages, how to obtain the maximum value in the pros and cons,It is the problems that enterprises and schools, both sides need to work together to solve. This article will carries on the domestic and foreign cooperation game research production analysis on the advantages and disadvantages in school enterprise cooperation and the analysis of its innovation. Emphasizing that between school and enterprises signed employment agreement, both parties together to develop personnel training plan, and the teachers, technology and other aspects to carry on the cooperation, using ＂agreement order type＂ talent culture.

AUCTIONING METHOD FOR AIRSPACE CONGESTING RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.

Stakeholder Contradictions and Win-win Strategies for Tourism along the Ancient Tea Horse Road in the South of Yunnan based on Game Analysis

With the emergence of the concept of cultural routes, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to the sustainable development of tourism along cultural routes. The needs for community participation and the ongoing provision of benefits of stakeholders are characteristics of cultural routes. Therefore, the importance of cooperative relations and systematic development among stakeholders in tourism activities along cultural routes has become a subject of interest. This paper selects local government, tourism enterprises and local community residents, all of which play a key role in the Ancient Tea Horse Road cultural route in the south of Yunnan, as the main stakeholders. We use game theory to construct a model to trace interactions between local government and tourism enterprises, between tourism enterprises and community residents, and between local government and community residents. The paper then analyzes the different interests of the three parties and key factors that influence them in the game process. This provided a certain scientific basis for the win-win decisions regarding tourism development made by the three parties. Our results show that the final decision choices of the three parties depend on the initial payoff matrix of the game, and the influence of key parameters. When making decisions about tourism, the government should respect the wishes of local residents, strengthen protections of local traditions, manage the unreasonable behavior of tourism enterprises as they develop tourism, and develop appropriate penalties for violations of regulations. When tourism enterprises carry out tourism development, they should let community residents take the initiative and fully participate in tourism activities, and be sure that income from tourism is fed back to local residents, to ensure that tourism is mutually beneficial. The study shows that conflicts among the three parties originated mainly from differences in interests, but that the three parties also shared common interests. With a goal of coordinating interests, we can establish relevant mechanisms, follow the principle of interest realization, attach importance to supervision and management, strengthen community participation and decision-making, and realize win-win results for the three parties.

Game Theory Analysis on Seasonal Coupons from Business Perspective

Issuing coupons is a common marketing tool for business to increase demand and create profits. Mooncake coupons are among the most popular coupons in China. However, such popularity has sparked heated debate nationwide. In this regard,the paper studies the phenomenon through game theory model that deals with the relationship between mooncake makers,as for their efforts in balancing the number of coupons issued and the amount of mooncakes actually produced,and scalpers,as for the repurchase discount they enjoy, to finally bring a win-win situation. For mooncake makers to print more coupons than their actual production capacities while keeping the risks under control,a prior agreement should be made with the scalpers to set certain rules,among which the variable k is particularly important.

GAMES ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE PRICING UNDER CONSIDERING MORAL HAZARD

This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.

Study on Game Model of Information Disclosure and Supervision

In recent years, the infringements of information disclosure are conspicuous in listed companies in China, which has seriously impeded the healthy development of the capital market. In this paper, the results of regulations of the infringements by means of the game theory and our findings suggest that we should witness less cases of violations when we intensify own efforts to check up and punish those violations, and lower the return of the infringement. At the same time, we would increase the effect of supervising violated behavior when we strengthen the deterrence.

Study on Development Process and Mechanism of Ecological Compensation in Beijing and Hebei Province

The problem of water resources has become a bottleneck for the sustainable development of Beijing and Hebei Province (the two regions together are called "Jingji Region" for short).It is imperative to establish an effective and equitable water resources ecological compensation (eco-compensation) mechanism.The three stages of water resources eco-compensation are expatiated here namely the eco-compensation missing stage,ecocompensation start stage and the eco-compensation development stage.Through the establishment of eco-compensation game model based on the game theory,the reasons of the formation for the three stages were analyzed,as well as the conversion conditions from non-cooperative game to cooperative game among the related stakeholders including the central government,the water recipient government and the water source government.Furthermore,this study pointed out that the water resources eco-compensation in Jingji Region was not established based on the institution,but formed and developed in coping with the challenges of water crisis.However,institution construction is quite essential in game process for the water recipient government and the water source government.Finally recommendations in four areas including legalization of eco-compensation mechanism,setting up compensation standards,leading industrial upgrading and developing related incentives and constraints were concluded.

A Critical Model Construction of Knowledge Sharing Mechanism in Virtual Organization Based on Game Theoretic Perspective

Virtual organization uses information technology to achieve a closer integration and better management of business relationships between internal and external parties. There are many emerging issues in virtual organization and one of them is knowl- edge sharing. Knowledge sharing that is the core of knowledge management plays a key role in virtual organization. However, game theoretic exploration about knowledge sharing mechanism based on virtual organization is seldom published, In this study, knowledge sharing mechanism in virtual organization enterprise is explored using game theories from two aspects based on the features of knowledge sharing in virtual organization enterprise. Fi- nally, the critical model of knowledge sharing mechanism in virtual organization also is presented based on the perspective of game analysis.