Objective: To study the problematic use of video games among secondary school students in the city of Parakou in 2023. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study conducted in the commune of Parakou from December 2022 ...Objective: To study the problematic use of video games among secondary school students in the city of Parakou in 2023. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study conducted in the commune of Parakou from December 2022 to July 2023. The study population consisted of students regularly enrolled in public and private secondary schools in the city of Parakou for the 2022-2023 academic year. A two-stage non-proportional stratified sampling technique combined with simple random sampling was adopted. The Problem Video Game Playing (PVP) scale was used to assess problem gambling in the study population, while anxiety and depression were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results: A total of 1030 students were included. The mean age of the pupils surveyed was 15.06 ± 2.68 years, with extremes of 10 and 28 years. The [13 - 18] age group was the most represented, with a proportion of 59.6% (614) in the general population. Females predominated, at 52.8% (544), with a sex ratio of 0.89. The prevalence of problematic video game use was 24.9%, measured using the Video Game Playing scale. Associated factors were male gender (p = 0.005), pocket money under 10,000 cfa (p = 0.001) and between 20,000 - 90,000 cfa (p = 0.030), addictive family behavior (p < 0.001), monogamous family (p = 0.023), good relationship with father (p = 0.020), organization of video game competitions (p = 0.001) and definite anxiety (p Conclusion: Substance-free addiction is struggling to attract the attention it deserves, as it did in its infancy everywhere else. This study complements existing data and serves as a reminder of the need to focus on this group of addictions, whose problematic use of video games remains the most frequent due to its accessibility and social tolerance. Preventive action combined with curative measures remains the most effective means of combating the problem at national level.展开更多
A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for q...A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems are proved in noncompact generalized convex spaces. Then, ar applications of the quasi-equilibrium existence theorem, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact generalized convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literatures.展开更多
In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values,...In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values, having some fairness properties, expressed in most cases by groups of axioms. In an earlier work, we solved what we called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, in which the main result was offering an explicit formula providing the set of all games with an a priori given Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector. However, in this set there is an infinite set of games for which the Semivalues are not coalitional rational, perhaps not efficient, so that these are not fair practical solutions of the above fundamental problem. Among the Semivalues, coalitional rational solutions for the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value have been given in two more recent works. In the present paper, based upon a general potential basis, relative to Semivalues, for a given game and a given Semivalue, we solve the connected problem: in the Inverse Set, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is also coalitional rational. Several examples will illustrate the corresponding numerical technique.展开更多
In any group,the project’s members want to create the highest value for the common goal,and how to choose project’s members could be a game.This study investigated the cooperating with education institutions.Analysi...In any group,the project’s members want to create the highest value for the common goal,and how to choose project’s members could be a game.This study investigated the cooperating with education institutions.Analysis of the players’strategic choices and relative outcomes was conducted.The researchers would organize a simple tree model and sort to payoff matrix.The results revealed that the strategy of each player is different finally.There were two strategies for selecting a member-'Choosing Good Friendship player'and'Choosing Good Ability player'.Furthermore,this study also analyzed the influencing factors and stable matching possibility among the factors.展开更多
By applying a maximal element theorem on product FC-space due to author, some new equilibrium existence theorems for generalized games with fuzzy constraint correspondences are proved in FC-spaces. By using these equi...By applying a maximal element theorem on product FC-space due to author, some new equilibrium existence theorems for generalized games with fuzzy constraint correspondences are proved in FC-spaces. By using these equilibrium existence theorems, some new existence theorems of solutions for the system of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems are established in noncompact product FC-spaces. These results improve and generalize some recent results in literature to product FC-spaces without any convexity structure.展开更多
A new system of vector quasi-equilibrium problems is introduced and its existence of solution is proved. As applications, some existence results of weak Pareto equilibrium for both constrained multicriteria games and ...A new system of vector quasi-equilibrium problems is introduced and its existence of solution is proved. As applications, some existence results of weak Pareto equilibrium for both constrained multicriteria games and multicriteria games without constrained correspondences are also shown.展开更多
Some classes of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems ( in short, GVQEP) are introduced and studied in locally G-convex spaces which includes most of generalized vector equilibrium problems; generalized vector...Some classes of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems ( in short, GVQEP) are introduced and studied in locally G-convex spaces which includes most of generalized vector equilibrium problems; generalized vector variational inequality problems, quasi-equilibrium problems and quasi-variational inequality problems as special cases. First, an equilibrium existence theorem for one person games is proved in locally G-convex spaces.. As applications, some new existence theorems of solutions for the GVQEP are established in noncompact locally G-convex spaces. These results and argument methods are new and completely different from that in recent literature.展开更多
The delivery of the natural gas obtained by drilling, fracking and sending the product to consumers is done usually in two phases: in the first phase, the gas is collected from all wells spread on a large area, and be...The delivery of the natural gas obtained by drilling, fracking and sending the product to consumers is done usually in two phases: in the first phase, the gas is collected from all wells spread on a large area, and belonging to several companies, and is sent to a depot owned by the city;then, in the second phase, another company is taking the gas on a network of ducts belonging to the city, along the streets to the neighborhoods and the individual consumers. The first phase is managed by the gas producing companies on the ducts owned by each company, possibly also on some public ducts. In this paper, we discuss only this first phase, to show why the benefits of these companies depend on the cooperation of the producers, and further, how a fair allocation of the total gas obtained, to the drilling companies, is computed. Following the model of flow games, we generate a cooperative transferable utilities game, as shown in the first section, and in this game any efficient value gives an allocation of benefits to the owners of ducts in the total network. However, it may well happen that the chosen value is not coalitional rational, in the game, that is, it does not belong to the Core of the game. By using the results obtained in an earlier work of the author, sketched in the second section, we show in the last section how the same allocation may be associated to a new game, which has the corresponding value a coalitional rational value. An example of a three person flow game shows the game generation, as well as the procedure to be used for obtaining the new game in which the same value, a Shapley Value, will give a coalitional rational allocation.展开更多
In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the S...In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.展开更多
We present a direct algorithm for solving the vertical generalized linear complementarity problem, first considered by Cottle and Dantzig, when the associated matrix is a vertical block P-matrix. The algorithm converg...We present a direct algorithm for solving the vertical generalized linear complementarity problem, first considered by Cottle and Dantzig, when the associated matrix is a vertical block P-matrix. The algorithm converges to a unique solution in a finite number of steps, without an assumption of nondegeneracy on the given problem. The algorithm is simple, efficient, and easy to implement.展开更多
文摘Objective: To study the problematic use of video games among secondary school students in the city of Parakou in 2023. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study conducted in the commune of Parakou from December 2022 to July 2023. The study population consisted of students regularly enrolled in public and private secondary schools in the city of Parakou for the 2022-2023 academic year. A two-stage non-proportional stratified sampling technique combined with simple random sampling was adopted. The Problem Video Game Playing (PVP) scale was used to assess problem gambling in the study population, while anxiety and depression were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results: A total of 1030 students were included. The mean age of the pupils surveyed was 15.06 ± 2.68 years, with extremes of 10 and 28 years. The [13 - 18] age group was the most represented, with a proportion of 59.6% (614) in the general population. Females predominated, at 52.8% (544), with a sex ratio of 0.89. The prevalence of problematic video game use was 24.9%, measured using the Video Game Playing scale. Associated factors were male gender (p = 0.005), pocket money under 10,000 cfa (p = 0.001) and between 20,000 - 90,000 cfa (p = 0.030), addictive family behavior (p < 0.001), monogamous family (p = 0.023), good relationship with father (p = 0.020), organization of video game competitions (p = 0.001) and definite anxiety (p Conclusion: Substance-free addiction is struggling to attract the attention it deserves, as it did in its infancy everywhere else. This study complements existing data and serves as a reminder of the need to focus on this group of addictions, whose problematic use of video games remains the most frequent due to its accessibility and social tolerance. Preventive action combined with curative measures remains the most effective means of combating the problem at national level.
文摘A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems are proved in noncompact generalized convex spaces. Then, ar applications of the quasi-equilibrium existence theorem, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact generalized convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literatures.
文摘In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values, having some fairness properties, expressed in most cases by groups of axioms. In an earlier work, we solved what we called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, in which the main result was offering an explicit formula providing the set of all games with an a priori given Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector. However, in this set there is an infinite set of games for which the Semivalues are not coalitional rational, perhaps not efficient, so that these are not fair practical solutions of the above fundamental problem. Among the Semivalues, coalitional rational solutions for the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value have been given in two more recent works. In the present paper, based upon a general potential basis, relative to Semivalues, for a given game and a given Semivalue, we solve the connected problem: in the Inverse Set, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is also coalitional rational. Several examples will illustrate the corresponding numerical technique.
文摘In any group,the project’s members want to create the highest value for the common goal,and how to choose project’s members could be a game.This study investigated the cooperating with education institutions.Analysis of the players’strategic choices and relative outcomes was conducted.The researchers would organize a simple tree model and sort to payoff matrix.The results revealed that the strategy of each player is different finally.There were two strategies for selecting a member-'Choosing Good Friendship player'and'Choosing Good Ability player'.Furthermore,this study also analyzed the influencing factors and stable matching possibility among the factors.
基金This project was supported by the NSF of Sichuan Education of China(2003A081)and SZD0406
文摘By applying a maximal element theorem on product FC-space due to author, some new equilibrium existence theorems for generalized games with fuzzy constraint correspondences are proved in FC-spaces. By using these equilibrium existence theorems, some new existence theorems of solutions for the system of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems are established in noncompact product FC-spaces. These results improve and generalize some recent results in literature to product FC-spaces without any convexity structure.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos.10171118 and 70432001) the Applied Basic Research Foundation of Chongqing(No.030801) the Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing(No.8409) and the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China
文摘A new system of vector quasi-equilibrium problems is introduced and its existence of solution is proved. As applications, some existence results of weak Pareto equilibrium for both constrained multicriteria games and multicriteria games without constrained correspondences are also shown.
文摘Some classes of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems ( in short, GVQEP) are introduced and studied in locally G-convex spaces which includes most of generalized vector equilibrium problems; generalized vector variational inequality problems, quasi-equilibrium problems and quasi-variational inequality problems as special cases. First, an equilibrium existence theorem for one person games is proved in locally G-convex spaces.. As applications, some new existence theorems of solutions for the GVQEP are established in noncompact locally G-convex spaces. These results and argument methods are new and completely different from that in recent literature.
文摘The delivery of the natural gas obtained by drilling, fracking and sending the product to consumers is done usually in two phases: in the first phase, the gas is collected from all wells spread on a large area, and belonging to several companies, and is sent to a depot owned by the city;then, in the second phase, another company is taking the gas on a network of ducts belonging to the city, along the streets to the neighborhoods and the individual consumers. The first phase is managed by the gas producing companies on the ducts owned by each company, possibly also on some public ducts. In this paper, we discuss only this first phase, to show why the benefits of these companies depend on the cooperation of the producers, and further, how a fair allocation of the total gas obtained, to the drilling companies, is computed. Following the model of flow games, we generate a cooperative transferable utilities game, as shown in the first section, and in this game any efficient value gives an allocation of benefits to the owners of ducts in the total network. However, it may well happen that the chosen value is not coalitional rational, in the game, that is, it does not belong to the Core of the game. By using the results obtained in an earlier work of the author, sketched in the second section, we show in the last section how the same allocation may be associated to a new game, which has the corresponding value a coalitional rational value. An example of a three person flow game shows the game generation, as well as the procedure to be used for obtaining the new game in which the same value, a Shapley Value, will give a coalitional rational allocation.
文摘In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.
文摘We present a direct algorithm for solving the vertical generalized linear complementarity problem, first considered by Cottle and Dantzig, when the associated matrix is a vertical block P-matrix. The algorithm converges to a unique solution in a finite number of steps, without an assumption of nondegeneracy on the given problem. The algorithm is simple, efficient, and easy to implement.