Intergenerational Justice： Rights versus Fairness

Among various views on intergenerational justice, the most widely accepted theory invokes the rights of future generations. However, the rights theory seems to suffer from the non-identity problem addressed by Derek Parfit. Some rights theorists attempt to circumvent the problem by examining causal links between actions taken by preceding generations and their effects on succeeding ones, Others try to do so by replacing future individual rights with such collective rights. This paper argues that both individualist and collectivist versions of the rights theory fail to supply grounds for intergenerational concern. The paper then offers an alternative theory that refines the idea of duty of fair play developed by John Rawls and applies it to the context of intergenerational relationships. To begin with, I identify several characteristics of posterity and explicate the adverse implications these characteristics have for other major theories of intertemporal concern than the rights theory. Next, different versions of the rights theory are closely examined from the perspective of the non-identity problem. Then, I offer an alternative argument for caring about future people, which is founded on the idea of intergenerational fair play. This paper concludes by noting that the fairness theory, unlike its rivals, does not face the non-identity problem or any other problems stemming from the features of posterity previously identified.

On the Protection of the Rights of Future Generations in the Context of Human Germline Genome Editing

Human germline genome editing has inherent risks in the use of the technologies, as well as unknown genetic and social risks. The application of such technologies by the present generations will adversely affect human dignity, right to life and health, right to biological information integrity, genetic autonomy and other specific rights of future generations. Legal protection should be provided for the rights of future generations affected by human germline genome editing, which is supported by the theories of intergenerational equity,the intergenerational social contract and an intergenerational community with a shared future for human beings. In spite of the continuously improved regulation of germline genome editing in China, the attention paid to the rights of future generations remains insufficient.Learning from international legislation, in combination with the current research and applications of germline genome editing, China can strengthen the protection of the rights of future generations in the context of human germline gene editing from three aspects: clarifying the principles and contents regarding the rights protection of future generations, strengthening the oversight of germline genome editing,and promoting the implementation of laws and regulations such as the Biosecurity Law.

Evolution and Reconstruction of Meaning of Right to Peace under New Situation

It is difficult to interpret traditional connotation of the right to peace properly, when facing the increasing changes of international and domestic security situation. As 'the third generation of human rights', for lack of the key element of the right to peace with the intensive nature of the international collective human rights, the right to peace does not highlight the function of protecting peace. It is imperative to build the right to peace system of a Multi-layer and dual meaning, which includes the domestic and international human rights, the collective and individual rights and 'peace' and 'safety'.

Individual Human Rights and Obligations Towards Communities

Tensions and oppositions between the individual and community have accompanied the discourse on human rights from the beginning. I want to first recall how in the UDHR （1948） and in the major human rights treaties, the rights and obligations of individuals are regulated towards communities. I then want to investigate whether the talk of ＂collective human rights＂, understood as ＂third- generation＂ rights, are of equal value to be set with individual human rights. Against communitarian arguments for the primacy of community-related duties one can stress an expansion of a liberal concept of human rights by the inclusion of justice demands and social human rights. To show that special community needs can be protected and promoted through individual human rights and national col- lective rights, I used the example of the protection of minorities. Finally, I will explain why human rights are not a comprehensive theory of the good and illustrate with this the limits, and also the original strength of human rights. We should not overestimate human rights, but also we should be aware that a sober understanding of human rights is philosophically reasonable, legally possible and politically of great importance.