Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

Convenience on Three Wheels China-made motor tricycles are transforming the way goods and people are transported in Uganda

In most cities,towns and villages in Uganda,Chinamade motor tricycles have become a game-changer for commuters and entrepreneurs alike.

Changes in the Supply of Public Intermediate Goods,Fixed Wage,and the Relative Price in the Harris-Todaro Model

Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public intermediate goods provided by the government,the increase in the fixed wage rate in the urban sector,and the changes in the relative international prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods on labor employment,unemployment,and the economic welfare in the context of a small open economy.It also proposes relevant policies to reduce the unemployment rate while improving national welfare.

Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Punishment in optional public goods games

In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

The Supply-Demand Analysis and Mechanism Innovation of Chinese Rural Public Goods

The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers' demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers' demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers' demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

Global Development Initiative:An International Public Goods to Promote Common Development

The world today is facing turbulence and change,and global development is at a crossroads.At this critical juncture,President Xi Jinping put forth the Global Development Initiative(GDI)with the theme“implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda for more robust,greener and healthier global development”at the 76th General Assembly of the United Nations,which sheds light on the direction of global development.The GDI,proposed by China,has galvanized support from the international community as an international public goods to promote common development.Following the historical trends of human development,the GDI breaks through the limitations of the hegemonic stability theory and the free-riding curse to expand and innovate the theoretical perception of international public goods with the right approach to principles and interests.With a people-oriented approach and the basic principles of green and innovative development,the GDI both addresses urgent challenges and attaches importance to enhancing development capabilities and creating supporting conditions to offer a holistic solution to global challenges.Through the implementation of multiple pathways under international cooperation,the GDI will build a consensus on global development,increase the momentum of global development,and play an important role in creating a community with a shared future for mankind.

Toward inclusive list-making for trade liberalization in environmental goods to reduce carbon emissions

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)is contemplating expanding its list of environmental goods(EG)for trade liberalization to fight climate change.In support of doing so,this study proposes that a long list that retains controversies is better for carbon emission reduction than a short common list.This study examines four mechanisms of longer lists:enlarging market scales,enriching product mixes,enhancing product sophistication,and enriching trade patterns.Using China’s emerging EG trade during the 2001-2015 period as a case study,this study compares four EG lists with different EG.The results show that:(1)a longer list reduces carbon emissions from both imports and exports,making domestic regions with different advantages have better chances of improving carbon efficiencies.(2)Product sophistication reduces the emission gap between trading partners,regardless of the length of EG lists.(3)China’s EG exports contribute to carbon reduction in leading regions,while EG imports provide laggard regions with better chances of reducing carbon emissions.These findings provide three implications for future list-making:it is important to(1)seek a long and inclusive list rather than a short common list,(2)shift the focus from environmental end-use to the technological contents of products,and(3)balance the demand of laggard regions to import and the capacity of leading regions to export.

Combining Stated Preference and Revealed Preference Methods for the Valuation of Non-market Goods

In this paper,we introduce the combining stated preference and revealed preference methods which is the state-ofthe-art method for the valuation of non-market goods.Revealed preference methods and stated preference (SP) methods have both been applied by economists in valuing non-market goods;however both methods have inherent weaknesses.In order to exploit the strengths of the various approaches while minimizing their weaknesses,combining the two methods has become an important methodological option.Up to now,a growing number of literatures of studying combing the two types of data have evolved,and researchers developed three types of models to estimate combining revealed preference and stated preference data in academic fields:discrete choice model,continuous choice model and mixed choice model.Combining stated and revealed preference methods have been developed fast especially in the transport study field in which ideas could also be leant for environmental economic studies.

The Theoretical Foundation and its Mode Transformation of Rural Public Goods Supply in the Perspective of Organizational Competition

Theoretical expositions of public goods supply by the liberalism,new institutionalism and the school of public choice are conducted in the perspective of organizational competition.And the theoretical foundation of rural public goods is put forward.Then,the changes of the supply mode of rural public goods are discussed before and after the tax reform,that is,the "Community Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods before the tax reform and the "Organization Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods after the tax reform.Finally,the diversification of rural public goods supply in China in future is forecasted.

Factors Analysis of Affecting Loading and Reinforcing Scheme of Large Goods in Railway

Large goods transported in railway are kinds of special goods and they are very important in national construction. In order to transport safely, loading and reinforcing schemes must be made first. How to design a reasonable scheme will be affected by many factors. This paper presents the characteristic of the large goods, summarizes the process of designing a loading and reinforcing scheme of large good, then probes the factors of affecting the loading and reinforcing scheme and gives a detail analysis. It’s considered that those out-of-gauge and overweight degree of goods, center-of- gravity height of a loaded wagon, position of center-of-gravity of goods, type of wagon for using, reinforcement material and reinforcement method, transport expense and transport organization could affect a scheme in the aspects of safety, economy, rapidity and convenience. This conclusion will instruct and help to make a good scheme.

Applying Network Flow Optimization Techniques to Improve Relief Goods Transport Strategies under Emergency Situation

Given the seriously damaged emergency situation occurring after a large-scale natural disaster, a critical and important problem that needs to be solved urgently is how to distribute the necessary relief goods, such as drinking water, food, and medicine, to the damaged area and how to transport them corresponding to the actual supply and demand situation as quickly as possible. The existing infrastructure, such as traffic roads, bridges, buildings, and other facilities, may suffer from severe damage. Assuming uncertainty related with each road segment’s availability, we formulate a transshipment network flow optimization problem under various types of uncertain situations. In order to express the uncertainty regarding the availability of each road segment, we apply the Monte Carlo simulation technique to generate random networks following certain probability distribution conditions. Then, we solve the model to obtain an optimal transport strategy for the relief goods. Thus, we try to implement a necessary and desirable response strategy for managing emergency cases caused by, for example, various natural disasters. Our modeling approach was then applied to the actual road network in Sumatra Island in Indonesia in 2009, when a disastrous earthquake occurred to develop effective and efficient public policies for emergency situations.

SIMULATION OF A COLD ROLLING PLANT'S GOODS DELIVERY FORECASTING SYSTEM

The goods delivery process of one cold rolling plant was analyzed and the result shows it is necessary to reengineer and optimize this process. The goods delivery forecasting system was proposed after choosing suitable sampling methods. It is necessary to verify the efficiency of this optimization before the real system adjustment, which is costly and dangerous to some distance. A Simulation method, which employs object oriented paradigm to construct simulation system and stochastic approach to calculate process parameters, was put forward. The simulation result shows the feasibility of this method.

Fitness of others'evaluation effect promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.

Incentive Mechanism Design for Public Goods Provision:Price Cap Regulation and Optimal Regulation

This paper studies the mechanism design that induces firms to provide public goods under two regulatory means： price cap regulation and optimal regulation, respectively. We first outline two models of monopoly regulation with unobservable marginal costs and effort, which can be regard as an optimal problem with dual restrictions. By solving this problem, we get the two optimal regulatory mechanisms to induce the provision of public goods. Further, by comparative statics, the conclusion is drawn that the welfare loss as sociated with price cap regulation, with respective to optimal regulation, increases more with increase of the expense of public goods.

从Goods(物品)到Good(好处)——客户价值曲线如何“别开生面”

格兰仕是一家令人尊敬的企业，至今仍是。格兰仕在世界同行业的地位和“杀伤力”，远高于海尔、联想、TCL这些著名的企业。“假如世界上没有我这家企业，人们会不会觉得明显少了什么？”对这个问题，格兰仕给出的答案比所有中国企业都明确，都理直气壮：假如没有格兰仕，这个行业极可能仍被国外的家电巨头所把持，微波炉极可能现在还是一种让多数中国家庭可望难及的奢侈品。当价格低得让不少消费者觉得难为情的微波炉售出时，格兰仕的确兑现了其“感动消费者”的承诺。

Strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game

The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work proposes a strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm;and an aspiration-driven multiplayer evolutionary game model is established based on the requirement. Then the average abundance function and strategy dominance condition of the model are constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via simulation,and the influences of the multiplication factor r, aspiration levelα, threshold m and other parameters on the strategy dominance conditions were simulated for both linear and threshold public goods games(PGGs) to determine the strategy dominance characteristics;Finally, deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.