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Improving Federated Learning through Abnormal Client Detection and Incentive
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作者 Hongle Guo Yingchi Mao +3 位作者 Xiaoming He Benteng Zhang Tianfu Pang Ping Ping 《Computer Modeling in Engineering & Sciences》 SCIE EI 2024年第4期383-403,共21页
Data sharing and privacy protection are made possible by federated learning,which allows for continuous model parameter sharing between several clients and a central server.Multiple reliable and high-quality clients m... Data sharing and privacy protection are made possible by federated learning,which allows for continuous model parameter sharing between several clients and a central server.Multiple reliable and high-quality clients must participate in practical applications for the federated learning global model to be accurate,but because the clients are independent,the central server cannot fully control their behavior.The central server has no way of knowing the correctness of the model parameters provided by each client in this round,so clients may purposefully or unwittingly submit anomalous data,leading to abnormal behavior,such as becoming malicious attackers or defective clients.To reduce their negative consequences,it is crucial to quickly detect these abnormalities and incentivize them.In this paper,we propose a Federated Learning framework for Detecting and Incentivizing Abnormal Clients(FL-DIAC)to accomplish efficient and security federated learning.We build a detector that introduces an auto-encoder for anomaly detection and use it to perform anomaly identification and prevent the involvement of abnormal clients,in particular for the anomaly client detection problem.Among them,before the model parameters are input to the detector,we propose a Fourier transform-based anomaly data detectionmethod for dimensionality reduction in order to reduce the computational complexity.Additionally,we create a credit scorebased incentive structure to encourage clients to participate in training in order tomake clients actively participate.Three training models(CNN,MLP,and ResNet-18)and three datasets(MNIST,Fashion MNIST,and CIFAR-10)have been used in experiments.According to theoretical analysis and experimental findings,the FL-DIAC is superior to other federated learning schemes of the same type in terms of effectiveness. 展开更多
关键词 Federated learning abnormal clients incentIVE credit score abnormal score DETECTION
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An Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning:A Continuous Zero-Determinant Strategy Approach
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作者 Changbing Tang Baosen Yang +3 位作者 Xiaodong Xie Guanrong Chen Mohammed A.A.Al-qaness Yang Liu 《IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica》 SCIE EI CSCD 2024年第1期88-102,共15页
As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems rema... As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems remain, including privacy breaches, imbalances in payment, and inequitable distribution.These shortcomings let devices reluctantly contribute relevant data to, or even refuse to participate in FL. Therefore, in the application of FL, an important but also challenging issue is to motivate as many participants as possible to provide high-quality data to FL. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for FL based on the continuous zero-determinant(CZD) strategies from the perspective of game theory. We first model the interaction between the server and the devices during the FL process as a continuous iterative game. We then apply the CZD strategies for two players and then multiple players to optimize the social welfare of FL, for which we prove that the server can keep social welfare at a high and stable level. Subsequently, we design an incentive mechanism based on the CZD strategies to attract devices to contribute all of their high-accuracy data to FL.Finally, we perform simulations to demonstrate that our proposed CZD-based incentive mechanism can indeed generate high and stable social welfare in FL. 展开更多
关键词 Federated learning(FL) game theory incentive mechanism machine learning zero-determinant strategy
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Stackelberg Game-Based Optimal Dispatch for PEDF Park and Power Grid Interaction under Multiple Incentive Mechanisms
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作者 Weidong Chen Yun Zhao +3 位作者 Xiaorui Wu Ziwen Cai Min Guo Yuxin Lu 《Energy Engineering》 EI 2024年第10期3075-3093,共19页
The integration of photovoltaic,energy storage,direct current,and flexible load(PEDF)technologies in building power systems is an importantmeans to address the energy crisis and promote the development of green buildi... The integration of photovoltaic,energy storage,direct current,and flexible load(PEDF)technologies in building power systems is an importantmeans to address the energy crisis and promote the development of green buildings.The friendly interaction between the PEDF systems and the power grid can promote the utilization of renewable energy and enhance the stability of the power grid.For this purpose,this work introduces a framework of multiple incentive mechanisms for a PEDF park,a building energy system that implements PEDF technologies.The incentive mechanisms proposed in this paper include both economic and noneconomic aspects,which is the most significant innovation of this paper.By modeling the relationship between a PEDF park and the power grid into a Stackelberg game,we demonstrate the effectiveness of these incentive measures in promoting the friendly interaction between the two entities.In this game model,the power grid determines on the prices of electricity trading and incentive subsidy,aiming to maximize its revenue while reducing the peak load of the PEDF park.On the other hand,the PEDF park make its dispatch plan according to the prices established by the grid,in order to reduce electricity consumption expense,improve electricity utility,and enhance the penetration rate of renewable energy.The results show that the proposed incentive mechanisms for the PEDF park can help to optimize energy consumption and promote sustainable energy practices. 展开更多
关键词 Demand response(DR) incentIVES PHOTOVOLTAIC energy storage direct current and flexible load(PEDF) REPUTATION Stackelberg game
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Carbon Abatement Cost-Sharing Strategy for Electric Power Sector Based on Incentive and Subsidy Mechanisms
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作者 Hui Wang Wen Wang Wenhui Zhao 《Energy Engineering》 EI 2024年第10期2907-2935,共29页
The green and low carbon transition and development of the electricity industry is the most crucial task in realizing the“dual-carbon target”,and it is urgent to explore the incentive and subsidy mechanism to promot... The green and low carbon transition and development of the electricity industry is the most crucial task in realizing the“dual-carbon target”,and it is urgent to explore the incentive and subsidy mechanism to promote green electricity consumption and the cost-sharing strategy of carbon reduction,to alleviate the pressure of carbon abatement cost of each subject of the electricity supply chain.Against this background,this paper takes into account the low-carbon subsidies provided by the government and the incentive subsidies for users,and studies the optimal decision-making of each subject in the electricity supply chain,so that each of them can obtain the optimal profit and achieve carbon emission reduction at the same time.Firstly,taking into account the direct power purchase mode of large users and the electricity-selling companies emerging after the reform of the power sales side,we have established a cooperative mechanism for sharing the cost of carbon emission reduction in the electricity supply chain and clarified the relationship between the supply and demand of electricity among the main parties.Subsequently,considering government low-carbon subsidies and user incentive subsidies,the optimal decisionmaking model is established under two scenarios of decentralized and centralized cooperative games in the supply chain,respectively,with the objective of maximizing profits and carbon reduction rates.Solving for the optimal proportion of carbon abatement costs shared by each participant in the electricity supply chain in achieving game equilibrium.Finally,we analyze the role of the government’s low-carbon subsidies,users’incentive subsidies,and other factors on the profit and carbon reduction effect of the electricity industry through the example analysis and further analyze the impact of carbon abatement cost-sharing measures to provide recommendations for the electricity industry to realize low-carbon abatement and make decisions. 展开更多
关键词 Electricity supply chain incentive subsidy mechanisms carbon abatement cost-sharing green electricity consumption
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Flexible Load Participation in Peaking Shaving and Valley Filling Based on Dynamic Price Incentives
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作者 Lifeng Wang Jing Yu Wenlu Ji 《Energy Engineering》 EI 2024年第2期523-540,共18页
Considering the widening of the peak-valley difference in the power grid and the difficulty of the existing fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism in meeting the energy demand of heterogeneous users at various ... Considering the widening of the peak-valley difference in the power grid and the difficulty of the existing fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism in meeting the energy demand of heterogeneous users at various moments or motivating users,the design of a reasonable dynamic pricing mechanism to actively engage users in demand response becomes imperative for power grid companies.For this purpose,a power grid-flexible load bilevel model is constructed based on dynamic pricing,where the leader is the dispatching center and the lower-level flexible load acts as the follower.Initially,an upper-level day-ahead dispatching model for the power grid is established,considering the lowest power grid dispatching cost as the objective function and incorporating the power grid-side constraints.Then,the lower level comprehensively considers the load characteristics of industrial load,energy storage,and data centers,and then establishes a lower-level flexible load operation model with the lowest user power-consuming cost as the objective function.Finally,the proposed method is validated using the IEEE-118 system,and the findings indicate that the dynamic pricing mechanism for peaking shaving and valley filling can effectively guide users to respond actively,thereby reducing the peak-valley difference and decreasing users’purchasing costs. 展开更多
关键词 Demand response fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism dynamic price incentives mechanism bi-level model flexible load
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Research on the Improvement of Incentive Mechanism for Pharmaceutical Sales Personnel - Taking Company A as an Example
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作者 Jia Fan Tian Lijuan 《Asian Journal of Social Pharmacy》 2024年第3期272-278,共7页
Objective To analyze the improvement of the incentive mechanism of sales personnel in pharmaceutical company A,and to promote the smooth operation and further development of the company in a long term.Methods Compensa... Objective To analyze the improvement of the incentive mechanism of sales personnel in pharmaceutical company A,and to promote the smooth operation and further development of the company in a long term.Methods Compensation incentive,performance appraisal,welfare benefit,training incentive,promotion motivation and enterprise cultural inspiration were explored through questionnaires,telephone interviews and in-person interviews.Results and Conclusion This company’s incentive mechanism has problems in two aspects:Material incentives and spiritual incentives.As to the company’s characteristics and strategic development,the optimization countermeasures of incentive mechanism are proposed from the following three aspects:constructing a reasonable incentive system,establishing an efficient spiritual incentive mechanism,and implementing the dynamic incentive and differentiated incentive simultaneously. 展开更多
关键词 pharmaceutical company sales personnel incentive mechanism STRATEGY
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Incentive-compatible and budget balanced AGV mechanism for peer-to-peer energy trading in smart grids 被引量:1
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作者 Yujia Chen Wei Pei +1 位作者 Hao Xiao Tengfei Ma 《Global Energy Interconnection》 EI CAS CSCD 2023年第1期26-35,共10页
Peer-to-peer(P2P)energy trading refers to a type of decentralized transaction,where the energy from distributed energy resources is directly traded between peers.A key challenge in peer-to-peer energy trading is desig... Peer-to-peer(P2P)energy trading refers to a type of decentralized transaction,where the energy from distributed energy resources is directly traded between peers.A key challenge in peer-to-peer energy trading is designing a safe,efficient,and transparent trading model and operating mechanism.In this study,we consider a P2P trading environment based on blockchain technology,where prosumers can submit bids or offers without knowing the reports of others.We propose an Arrow-d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet(AGV)-based mechanism to encourage prosumers to submit their real reserve price and determine the P2P transaction price.We demonstrate that the AGV mechanism can achieve Bayesian incentive compatibility and budget balance.Kernel density estimation(KDE)is used to derive the prior distribution from the historical bid/offer information of the agents.Case studies are carried out to analyze and evaluate the proposed mechanism.Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism in guiding agents to report the true reserve price while maximizing social welfare.Moreover,we discuss the advantages of budget balance for decentralized trading by comparing the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)and AGV mechanisms. 展开更多
关键词 P2P energy trading AGV mechanism Budget balance incentive compatibility
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A dynamic incentive and reputation mechanism for energy-efficient federated learning in 6G
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作者 Ye Zhu Zhiqiang Liu +1 位作者 Peng Wang Chenglie Du 《Digital Communications and Networks》 SCIE CSCD 2023年第4期817-826,共10页
As 5G becomes commercial,researchers have turned attention toward the Sixth-Generation(6G)network with the vision of connecting intelligence in a green energy-efficient manner.Federated learning triggers an upsurge of... As 5G becomes commercial,researchers have turned attention toward the Sixth-Generation(6G)network with the vision of connecting intelligence in a green energy-efficient manner.Federated learning triggers an upsurge of green intelligent services such as resources orchestration of communication infrastructures while preserving privacy and increasing communication efficiency.However,designing effective incentives in federated learning is challenging due to the dynamic available clients and the correlation between clients'contributions during the learning process.In this paper,we propose a dynamic incentive and reputation mechanism to improve energy efficiency and training performance of federated learning.The proposed incentive based on the Stackelberg game can timely adjust optimal energy consumption with changes in available clients during federated learning.Meanwhile,clients’contributions in reputation management are formulated based on the cooperative game to capture the correlation between tasks,which satisfies availability,fairness,and additivity.The simulation results show that the proposed scheme can significantly motivate high-performance clients to participate in federated learning and improve the accuracy and energy efficiency of the federated learning model. 展开更多
关键词 Federated learning incentive mechanism Reputation management Cooperative game Stackelberg game Green communication
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An Incentive Mechanism Model for Crowdsensing with Distributed Storage in Smart Cities
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作者 Jiaxing Wang Lanlan Rui +2 位作者 Yang Yang Zhipeng Gao Xuesong Qiu 《Computers, Materials & Continua》 SCIE EI 2023年第8期2355-2384,共30页
Crowdsensing,as a data collection method that uses the mobile sensing ability of many users to help the public collect and extract useful information,has received extensive attention in data collection.Since crowdsens... Crowdsensing,as a data collection method that uses the mobile sensing ability of many users to help the public collect and extract useful information,has received extensive attention in data collection.Since crowdsensing relies on user equipment to consume resources to obtain information,and the quality and distribution of user equipment are uneven,crowdsensing has problems such as low participation enthusiasm of participants and low quality of collected data,which affects the widespread use of crowdsensing.This paper proposes to apply the blockchain to crowdsensing and solve the above challenges by utilizing the characteristics of the blockchain,such as immutability and openness.An architecture for constructing a crowdsensing incentive mechanism under distributed incentives is proposed.A multi-attribute auction algorithm and a k-nearest neighbor-based sensing data quality determination algorithm are proposed to support the architecture.Participating users upload data,determine data quality according to the algorithm,update user reputation,and realize the selection of perceived data.The process of screening data and updating reputation value is realized by smart contracts,which ensures that the information cannot be tampered with,thereby encouraging more users to participate.Results of the simulation show that using two algorithms can well reflect data quality and screen out malicious data.With the help of blockchain performance,the architecture and algorithm can achieve decentralized storage and tamper-proof information,which helps to motivate more users to participate in perception tasks and improve data quality. 展开更多
关键词 Crowdsensing incentive mechanism blockchain smart contract
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Do Research Incentives Promote Researchers’Mental Health?
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作者 Liujian Gu Tao Wang +2 位作者 Chuanyi Wang M.James CCrabbe Xiao-Guang Yue 《International Journal of Mental Health Promotion》 2023年第8期903-914,共12页
Background:Researchers have a higher risk of anxiety and depression than the general population,so it is important to promote researchers’mental health.Method:Based on the data from 3210 global researchers surveyed b... Background:Researchers have a higher risk of anxiety and depression than the general population,so it is important to promote researchers’mental health.Method:Based on the data from 3210 global researchers surveyed by the journal Nature in 2021,confirmatory factor analysis,OLS regression and other regressions were used to explore the research incentive dimensions and their effects on researchers’mental health.Results:(1)Material incentive factors,work-family life balance factors,good organizational environment and spiritual motivation had significant positive effects on researchers’mental health.(2)The spiritual motivation could better promote researchers’mental health than the other factors.(3)Heterogeneity analysis showed that material incentive factors and spiritual motivation created more significant stimulating effects on the mental health of humanities and social sciences researchers.Work-family life balance factors were more effective in promoting the mental health of the mid-career group and the overtime group.Conclusion:Application of the four research incentives resulted in lower likelihood of anxiety or depression among researchers,and special attention should be paid to the role of the spiritual motivation.In order to promote researchers’mental health,different incentives should be applied to different researcher groups to better improve researchers’mental health. 展开更多
关键词 Researchers mental health research incentive
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Improving Interventions on Cardiovascular Disease and Diet: A Policy Incentive Analysis
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作者 Sandra Hurst 《Health》 2023年第6期569-621,共53页
Various Cardiovascular Diseases (CVDs) can be catastrophic and can lead to irreversible outcomes. Despite improved interventions for CVD prevention awareness, there continues to be discussion and research on diet-rela... Various Cardiovascular Diseases (CVDs) can be catastrophic and can lead to irreversible outcomes. Despite improved interventions for CVD prevention awareness, there continues to be discussion and research on diet-related CVD and mortality without addressing the problem. Instead of prioritizing public guidelines and policies, policymakers should understand CVD and address population barriers to adhering to a healthy diet that decreases CVD risk. Therefore, this project aims to analyze federal healthy food incentive policies to promote healthy diet behaviors that reduce CVD risk. The method used was existing data for a comparative policy analysis that included a policy proposal process: phases of progression, measures, and a policy model with data collection and requirements. This analysis compared a current federal food incentive program versus the proposed program. Results of the final analysis derived from the literature review and collected data stated consuming foods from the Mediterranean and other low-fat and low-salt diets reduced CVD risks that also reduced other risks secondary to CVD, such as obesity, diabetes, and Cerebrovascular Accident (CVA). Comparatively, combined healthy food incentives and disincentives were more effective for improving healthy behaviors than, in some cases, even after incentives were removed. Therefore, this policy analysis supports the indication for incentive policy change. However, the lack of federal stakeholders’ response to key policy changes upon proposal submission may require other methods of proposal dissemination. Nonetheless, focusing analysis on various Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) programs instead of one, multi-state program, which may have improved analysis outcomes, was the lesson learned. 展开更多
关键词 CVD Risk Prevention Diets Dietary Guidelines American Stroke/Heart Association (ASA/AHA) CVA Federal Healthy Food incentives
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Incentivization and the moral problem of involuntary consent in medical research
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作者 Victor Chidi Wolemonwu 《History & Philosophy of Medicine》 2023年第1期30-34,共5页
The legal and moral permissibility of clinical research entails that researchers must secure the voluntary,informed consent of prospective research participants before enrolling them in studies.In seeking the consent ... The legal and moral permissibility of clinical research entails that researchers must secure the voluntary,informed consent of prospective research participants before enrolling them in studies.In seeking the consent of potential participants,researchers are also allowed to incentivise the recruitment process because many studies would fail to meet enrollment goals without a financial incentive for participation.Some philosophers and bioethicists contend that the use of incentives to secure consent from research subjects is problematic because it constitutes undue inducement and a coercive offer.Some proponents of this view are Ruth Macklin(1981,1989)and Joan McGregor(2005).Macklin claims that it is ethically inappropriate to pay research subjects.The payment is likely to coerce the research subject,thereby violating the ethical requirement on the voluntariness of research participation.Also,such offers can prompt subjects to lie,deceive or conceal information that,if known,would disqualify them as participants.For McGregor,incentives could be undue and coercive because they make offerees better off relative to their baseline as well as constrain them to accept the offer of incentives as the only eligible choice or option.I argue that coercive offers are distinct from undue inducement.Coercive offers are essentially morally objectionable because by making people accept an offer through threats for the sake of some interests or ends,the offeror vitiates the offeree’s capacity to make informed,voluntary,and rational decisions and choices.I further claim that the quantity of an incentive does not render an inducement undue.I contend that the only condition under which incentives are regarded as an undue inducement and as such vitiates an agent’s voluntary consent is if they are offered through deceptive or manipulative means. 展开更多
关键词 VOLUNTARINESS informed consent incentIVES coercive offers undue inducement human rights
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On Incentive and Coordination Mechanism of Service Outsourcing Based on Principal-Agent Theory and Blockchain Technology
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作者 Chenglong Yan Xiao Wang +1 位作者 Xiaonan Zhang Ruzhi Xu 《Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Technology》 2023年第1期1-9,共9页
To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing,this paper builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-... To address the issue of information asymmetry between the two parties and moral hazard among service providers in the process of service outsourcing,this paper builds the Stackelberg game model based on the principal-agent framework,examines the dynamic game situation before the contract being signed,and develops four information models.The analysis reveals a Pareto improvement in the game’s Nash equilibrium when comparing the four models from the standpoint of the supply chain.In the complete information scenario,the service level of the service provider,the customer company’s incentive effectiveness,and the supply chain system’s ultimate profit are all maximized.Furthermore,a coordinating mechanism for disposable profit is built in this study.The paper then suggests a blockchain-based architecture for the service outsourcing process supervision and a distributed incentive mechanism under the coordination mechanism in response to the inadequacy of the principal-agent theory to address the information asymmetry problem and the moral hazard problem.The experiment’s end findings demonstrate that both parties can benefit from the coordination mechanism,and the application of blockchain technology can resolve these issues and effectively encourage service providers. 展开更多
关键词 service outsourcing coordination mechanism distributed incentive mechanism blockchain
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Research on the Incentive System of Human Resource Management in Universities
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作者 Dan Li 《Journal of Contemporary Educational Research》 2023年第4期61-66,共6页
Based on the actual situation of the establishment of the incentive system for human resource management in universities,the constituent elements and relevant principles of the incentive system for human resources in ... Based on the actual situation of the establishment of the incentive system for human resource management in universities,the constituent elements and relevant principles of the incentive system for human resources in universities are expounded on,the current situation of the actual needs of the faculty and staff in universities is studied and analyzed,and practical plans for establishing the concept and implementing the incentive system in universities are proposed,with relevant incentive mechanisms for human resource management focusing on differentiated needs developed for reference. 展开更多
关键词 Human resources incentive system Problem solving University manpower
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Research on Incentive Policies for Chinese Innovative Drug R&D - Taking Innovative Anti-tumor Drugs as an Example
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作者 Wang Yuejun Yang Yue Huang Zhe 《Asian Journal of Social Pharmacy》 2023年第4期303-314,共12页
Objective To provide reference for improving Chinese innovative drug research and development incentive policies.Methods Based on investigating the incentive policies for innovative drug research and development in cl... Objective To provide reference for improving Chinese innovative drug research and development incentive policies.Methods Based on investigating the incentive policies for innovative drug research and development in clinical research,evaluation and approval in China,anti-tumor drugs were taken as the research object to discuss relevant policies from the perspective of clinical trials and registration approval based on data statistics and current situation analysis.Results and Conclusion Driven by a series of incentive policies for innovative drug R&D,great achievements have been made on anti-tumor drugs.However,there are problems such as concentration of drug targets,homogenization of clinical trials,and gaps in some drugs with large clinical needs.To improve incentive policies for innovative drug R&D,China should adhere to the orientation of clinical value,focusing on basic research and translational research,improving evaluation and approval capabilities,and establishing a sound ecosystem for innovative drugs. 展开更多
关键词 innovative drug innovative anti-tumor drug incentive policy policy analysis
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Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model
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作者 熊强 仲伟俊 梅姝娥 《Journal of Southeast University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2014年第1期113-117,共5页
In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote clien... In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent. 展开更多
关键词 principal agent information security outsourcing incentive mechanism
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Optimization of Chinese power enterprises R&D staff incentive mechanism
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作者 SUN Jin-ting LI Ying +1 位作者 TIAN Si-jie ZHANG Lin-yue 《Ecological Economy》 2017年第1期59-68,共10页
With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterp... With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterprises need to optimize the incentive mechanism of R&D staff,to arouse the R&D staff's enthusiasm and creativity,to adapt to the new market competition and further improve market value.Whilst the incentive mechanism optimizing processing needs to consider not only the changing market environment but also the personal and working characteristics of R&D staff.This paper summarizes the characteristics of the current Chinese power enterprises' R&D staff:staff's theory quality is high,but insensitive to the market;they are confronted with heavy workload and diversified job choices;managers can observe their behavior choices or not;besides,the process of R&D is complex and the market reactions of R&D achievements are uncertain.Based on the premise of the above features,two incentive models are established in this paper from the point of view of enterprise managers.One is for the situation when staff's behavior choices can be observed;the other is for the situation when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed.Through solving the model,we analyze the optimization path of electric power enterprises R&D staff incentive mechanism under these conditions:(1) when staff's behavior choices can be observed,managers can pay more to the R&D staff who develop products with higher output value,in order to encourage them to work harder.(2) when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed,managers should take reasonable strategies according to the different situations:a.when R&D staff incentive totally depend on the market value of the R&D achievements,managers should allocate workload rationally according to their different technical levels;b.when the market reactions of R&D results become more precarious,managers need to reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;c.when R&D staff become more risk averse,managers should reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;on the contrary,managers should improve the incentive intensity and reduce the fixed salary level. 展开更多
关键词 electric power enterprises R&D staff incentive model incentive mechanism optimization
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The Incentive Mechanism Research of Knowledge Workers
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作者 YanhuiZhang 《International Journal of Technology Management》 2013年第7期87-89,共3页
"Knowledge workers" is the carrier of enterprise knowledge and technology and is undoubtedly the most important resource and core competence. How to effectively motivate such people create greater wealth for the ent... "Knowledge workers" is the carrier of enterprise knowledge and technology and is undoubtedly the most important resource and core competence. How to effectively motivate such people create greater wealth for the enterprise has become the key problem of the era of knowledge economy. Based on the concept and characteristics of knowledge workers, this paper uses classical analysis framework of incentive theory; through quantitative and qualitative analysis, it points out the existing problems and puts forward solutions on the basis of full analysis of the present incentive situation. 展开更多
关键词 Knowledge workers incentive theory incentive mechanism
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RTRC:A Reputation-Based Incentive Game Model for Trustworthy Crowdsourcing Service 被引量:5
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作者 Xindi Ma Jianfeng Ma +2 位作者 Hui Li Qi Jiang Sheng Gao 《China Communications》 SCIE CSCD 2016年第12期199-215,共17页
The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds ma... The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit. 展开更多
关键词 crowdsourcing system evolutionary game theory evolutionarily stable strategy incentive mechanism
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A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider 被引量:3
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作者 Li Lei Xin Zhanhong 《China Communications》 SCIE CSCD 2008年第1期79-83,共5页
Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe servic... Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe service provider is classical multi-task principalagentrelationship. The multi-task incentive for theservice provider is considered in the design of theprincipal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessaryto add the multi-task incentive to the serviceproviders through the analysis of the risk costs andthe agency costs of this problem. 展开更多
关键词 SERVICE PROVIDER PRINCIPAL-AGENT analysis ASYMMETRIC information incentIVE mechanism
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