Design of Principal-agent Incentive Mechanism between Government and NPO

Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Research shows that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.The output coefficient is positively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Reducing absolute risk aversion,increasing output coefficient and increasing government incentives can effectively motivate NPO to actively participate in social rescue activities.

E-Supply Chain Incentive and Coordination Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

This paper took the buyer-biased electronic market as an example, where multiple suppliers selling short-life-cycle products are bidding for an order from a powerful buyer with stochastic customer demand. It used a single period newsvendor model to analyze the decision of supplied and buyers to do or not do business online. The results suggest that lack of Incentive is the key factor of B2B electronic markets failure. At the same time, it designed a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the E-supply chain in order to prevent failure of E-market.

Contract theory based incentive mechanism design for buffer resource in wireless caching networks

Evidences indicate that,due to the limited caching capacity or inaccurate estimation on users’preferences,the requested files may not be fully cached in the network edge.The transmissions of the un-cached files will also lead to duplicated transmissions on backhaul channels.Buffer-aided relay has been proposed to improve the transmission performance of the un-cached files.Because of the limited buffer capacity and the information asymmetric environment,how to allocate the limited buffer capacity and how to incentivize users in participating buffer-aided relay have become critical issues.In this work,an incentive scheme based on the contract theory is proposed.Specifically,the backlog violation probability,i.e.,the buffer overflow probability,is provided based on the martingale theory.Next,based on the backlog violation probability,the utility functions of the relay node and users are constructed.With the purpose to maximize the utility of the relay node,the optimal contract problem is formulated.Then,the feasibility of the contract is also demonstrated,and the optimal solution can be obtained by the interior point method.Finally,numerical results are presented to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed contract theory scheme.

Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication

Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists＇ expertise and information in evaluating projects.

Design of Creative Incentive Contract of Cultural and Creative Industry Chain from Dual Perspective

The duality of cultural and creative industry can maintain the independence of creative birth and management as well as taking into account of the artistic and marketability of creativity.Income distribution contracts that link the design process to the commercial value of creative ideas can solve the problem of quantitative incentives for creative subjects.At the same time,it can encourage creative subjects to complete commercial and artistic design activities.The principal-agent relationship between the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain is utilized to stimulate the creation of creative ideas in line with market conditions,so as to solve the problem of duality reconciliation of cultural and creative industries.Through the design of the cultural creative industry chain dual task creative incentive contract,in the process of encouraging creative design subjects to complete the design of the work to give consideration to the coordination of duality.By analyzing the influences of design capability,risk,cost coefficient and binary correlation on the optimal investment level and the optimal risk sharing level of creative subjects in two types of design activities,the input transfer caused by the variation of the above conditions is further discussed.

Traffic Impact on Incentive Contracting Project Time Performance during Highway Construction

The volume of highway traffic in the United States continues to increase. In the face of this there is a concomitant need to improve and repair transportation infrastructure. Construction frequently requires a reduction in capacity during construction activity; consequently road users as well as adjacent businesses must endure the delays and inconveniences associated with transportation construction. Recognizing the problems that construction can produce, state highway agencies （SHAs） have continually sought ways to minimize the negative impact from their construction operations. Incentive contracting has played an important role in this effort to improve project performance. The Florida Department of Transportation （FDOT） is one of the leading SHAs using such innovative contracting methods as Incentive/Disincentive （I/D）, A＋B （cost plus time bidding） combined with I/D, No Excuse Bonus, and Liquidated Savings. This paper analyzes the traffic impact on incentive project time performance using highway construction projects recently completed in Florida. Project data obtained from FDOT were evaluated using time performance indices. A survey of traffic impact on project work types was performed in Florida in order to evaluate the relationship between construction project types and road traffic influence during construction. Based on the survey results, the 38 most frequently used work types in Florida during the study period were categorized into three traffic impact levels： （1） high traffic impact, （2） medium traffic impact, and （3） low traffic impact. Statistical analysis was performed. The results show that there are significant differences on project time performance between low and high impact levels as well as low and medium impact levels.

A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider

Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe service provider is classical multi-task principalagentrelationship. The multi-task incentive for theservice provider is considered in the design of theprincipal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessaryto add the multi-task incentive to the serviceproviders through the analysis of the risk costs andthe agency costs of this problem.

Study on Principal-agent Mechanism in Chinese Private Enterprises

Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the current situation and the developing trends of Chinese private enterprises. It points out the obstacles confronted by Chinese private enterprise in setting up the principal-agent mechanism and proposes the corresponding solutions to these problems.

Effective Incentive and Discipline Mechanisms for Top manage-ment in SOEs

Key to energize State-Owned-Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) is to set up effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. First of all, the paper analyses the problems existing in the current incentive and discipline mechanism system in SOEs, including low transparency income and considerable covert income, insider control,corporate governance nominalization and so on; next,the paper explores the causes behind these problems,such as incomplete corporate governance and imperfect market mechanism; finally, the paper proposes a series of solutions from the aspects of incentive mechanism and discipline mechanism.

An Incentive Mechanism Model for Crowdsensing with Distributed Storage in Smart Cities

Crowdsensing,as a data collection method that uses the mobile sensing ability of many users to help the public collect and extract useful information,has received extensive attention in data collection.Since crowdsensing relies on user equipment to consume resources to obtain information,and the quality and distribution of user equipment are uneven,crowdsensing has problems such as low participation enthusiasm of participants and low quality of collected data,which affects the widespread use of crowdsensing.This paper proposes to apply the blockchain to crowdsensing and solve the above challenges by utilizing the characteristics of the blockchain,such as immutability and openness.An architecture for constructing a crowdsensing incentive mechanism under distributed incentives is proposed.A multi-attribute auction algorithm and a k-nearest neighbor-based sensing data quality determination algorithm are proposed to support the architecture.Participating users upload data,determine data quality according to the algorithm,update user reputation,and realize the selection of perceived data.The process of screening data and updating reputation value is realized by smart contracts,which ensures that the information cannot be tampered with,thereby encouraging more users to participate.Results of the simulation show that using two algorithms can well reflect data quality and screen out malicious data.With the help of blockchain performance,the architecture and algorithm can achieve decentralized storage and tamper-proof information,which helps to motivate more users to participate in perception tasks and improve data quality.

Strategic Contracting for Software Upgrade Outsourcing in Industry 4.0

The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmust be tailored to meet the dynamic needs of enterprises. However, internal research and development can beprohibitively expensive, driving many enterprises to outsource software development and upgrades to externalservice providers. This paper presents a software upgrade outsourcing model for enterprises and service providersthat accounts for the impact of market fluctuations on software adaptability. To mitigate the risk of adverseselection due to asymmetric information about the service provider’s cost and asymmetric information aboutthe enterprise’s revenues, we propose pay-per-time and revenue-sharing contracts in two distinct informationasymmetry scenarios. These two contracts specify the time and transfer payments for software upgrades. Througha comparative analysis of the optimal solutions under the two contracts and centralized decision-making withfull-information, we examine the characteristics of the solutions under two information asymmetry scenarios andanalyze the incentive effects of the two contracts on the various stakeholders. Overall, our study offers valuableinsights for firms seeking to optimize their outsourcing strategies and maximize their returns on investment insoftware upgrades.

Design and pricing of maintenance service contract based on Nash non-cooperative game approach

Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are conducted.The results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.

数据要素三权分离的市场化配置机制及其激励契约研究

数据要素市场化配置对我国数字经济发展至关重要,对数据要素的产权管理是解决目前供需缺口的主要方向。基于数据在不同流通场景下衍生出的数据权利,本文通过建立双重多任务委托代理模型进行效用分析,首次提出构建数据持有权、控制权和使用权三权分离的市场化配置机制来解决数据配置问题。研究表明,该机制能够有效管控数据市场的垄断行为,满足多边利益最大化和数据市场发展诉求。研究发现,一个有效的数据要素三权分离的市场化配置机制有以下特征:(1)企业仅保留剩余控制权,并合理调配数据利用与数据脱敏两项任务的激励强度,使其增减相互制约,激励数据交易所对两项任务的努力水平进行按需分配,形成灵活的收益分配机制;(2)政府掌握剩余索取权,针对各类成本支付较高的情况,提高社会效益分成比例,对成本和风险进行补偿;(3)当数据脱敏努力水平与政府激励相关度不高,或政府加大监管力度时,政府能够通过调整税收比例或提供部分转移支付,提高社会效益分成比例。

Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing

In inventory financing,asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks,often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem,a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory.By comparison,it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions,and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions.The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.

Use of Innovative Contracting Methods by Dots - Project Managers Speak

Alternative contracting techniques have been frequently used in highway construction in the United State and have played an important role in the effort to improve construction project performance. However, it is still unknown whether which project factors have significant influence on project performance. It is essential to learn from the experiences and opinions of construction project managers who had executed innovative or alternative contracts in order to improve and refine the usage of alternative contracting methods. Innovative contracting methods have been used by state Departments of Transportation for many years, so there is now sufficient data to measure the effectiveness of these innovations. Working under a grant from the Florida Department of Transportation （FDOT）, the research team used the experiences and opinions of construction field engineers who had executed innovative contracts on FDOT projects to measure the effectiveness of these systems. To that end, interviews were conducted with FDOT and consultant personnel from across Florida. All interviewed were project managers who had overseen at least one project using an innovative contracting method. Discussions brought enthusiastic responses from those interviewed, both for and against certain innovations. This paper will focus on the experiences and opinions of those experienced construction field engineers dealing with well-known innovations, as well as newer innovations such as ＂Detour Rental＂ and ＂Damage Recovery＂.

国有企业职业经理人制度改革研究

我国的改革是对社会主义制度的自我完善,其中,国有企业改革需要将加强党的领导与市场化发展统一起来。因此,国有企业职业经理人制度改革,必须坚持中国特色社会主义市场化改革的方向,采取分类分层改革的方式,以市场化选聘、契约化管理、差异化薪酬、市场化退出为重点环节,因企制宜、循序渐进地推进。改革开放以来,我国国有企业职业经理人制度改革经历了改革准备、初步酝酿、试水调整、推广深化四个阶段,探索形成了四化管理、自愿转身、灵活市场化、部分市场化等典型模式,取得了显著成效,但还存在市场化选聘未能达到预期效果、契约化管理存在难点、差异化薪酬设计不合理、市场化退出机制不完善、监管及配套机制不健全等问题。应坚持党管干部、党管人才的原则,重塑企业文化,增强市场观念,充分发挥市场机制作用,弘扬企业家精神,完善治理体系,逐步建设具有中国特色的现代职业经理人制度体系。

提升监管科技协同创新产出水平的契约激励策略

创新主体的创新努力是提升监管科技协同创新产出水平的关键。已有监管科技的研究主要集中在应用场景上,缺乏深入到监管科技协同创新问题,且监管科技创新产出包括合规科技和狭义监管科技,其有关主体的角色交叉现象导致监管科技协同创新与一般情形的协同创新有很大不同。基于此,根据监管科技创新的供求关系,将创新主体划分为创新研发方和成果应用方,从创新主体追求自身收益最大化的行为逻辑出发,构建协同创新效益模型、开展协同创新激励因子分析,并以双方在协同创新中的努力水平比值作为考察变量,优选提升监管科技协同创新产出水平的激励契约。结果表明:提高创新研发方在协同创新中的地位和收益分配比例能鞭策不够努力的创新主体缩小与努力水平高的创新主体努力水平差距,提高协同创新总体产出水平;将创新研发方的研发人员工资投入等内部管控信号和金融机构的合规成本、监管机构的监管成本变化等市场反馈信号写入成果应用方的委托代理合同,能减少信息不对称、降低契约风险,激励创新研发方按照成果应用方的期望提高创新努力水平,以增加协同创新产出。

基于区块链的知识密集型服务业数据共享动态激励机制的构建

过高的初始投资和维护成本以及知识密集型服务组织间天然竞争关系限制区块链广泛应用及数据共享平台发展。通过对知识密集型服务业数据共享策略进行演化博弈分析,构建一种基于区块链智能合约的知识密集型服务组织的数据共享动态激励机制。针对产业数据共享现状,于博弈模型中引入区块链投资维护成本、数据竞争成本及激励成本/收益3个影响因素,通过复制动态方程分析组织间数据共享演化稳定策略。设计数据共享激励规则,并利用智能合约技术实现动态调整激励成本/收益,鼓励服务组织积极参与数据共享。结果表明:当服务组织接受符合数据共享策略条件的激励收益后,数据共享参与者比例最终达到饱和,且激励收益越大,趋近饱和状态的速度越快;针对不同数据共享策略的激励成本不仅有效增加知识密集型服务组织参与数据共享的意愿,且为知识密集型服务业数据共享平台带来额外收入。

基于心理契约的教师激励机制研究

高校教师是高校生存和发展的力量之源,制定合理、高效的激励机制对高校教师进行有效地激励是高校创新发展的重要任务。在心理契约的基础上,从交易维度、关系维度和发展维度三个方面构建了高校教师激励机制的系统动力学模型,并进行了仿真分析。结果表明,心理契约的交易维度、关系维度和发展维度均对教师的激励有明显的作用,交易维度的激励效果更为显著。另外,针对不同的教师群体从心理契约角度设计的差异化的激励机制能最大限度地发挥激励的作用。

不对称信息下的提成制销售激励合同设计

代理商销售模式下,不对称信息对制造商产品定价与销售合同设计的影响越来越不容忽视。本文基于委托代理模型,分别构建了两种信息情况下提成制激励合同模型,对比分析了信息不对称下产品定价与代理商提成的关系,以及信息不对称对代理商收益、制造商利润的影响。研究发现,制造商最优定价与高需求实现概率和努力成本密切相关,当高需求市场实现概率较小且努力成本较高时,制造商将放弃对代理商的激励,并设定较低产品价格。当制造商激励代理商努力时,不对称信息有利于提高代理商期望收益,但会降低制造商期望利润,不影响价格高低。此外,不对称信息会缩小制造商可接受的努力成本区间,当代理商努力成本较大时,制造商会因薪酬支出过高而放弃对代理商的激励,而不对称信息使得代理商薪酬进一步提高,使得制造商更倾向于不激励代理商努力,相应定价也随之降低。