Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the ...Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Research shows that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.The output coefficient is positively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Reducing absolute risk aversion,increasing output coefficient and increasing government incentives can effectively motivate NPO to actively participate in social rescue activities.展开更多
In the context of adulteration by suppliers,downstream firms need to choose between incentives and regulation to ensure product quality.Studies have shown that the adulteration behavior of suppliers increases with the...In the context of adulteration by suppliers,downstream firms need to choose between incentives and regulation to ensure product quality.Studies have shown that the adulteration behavior of suppliers increases with the degree of dispersion of suppliers,that is,the number of suppliers increases.Therefore,based on the assumption that the number of suppliers impacts quality uncertainty,this paper further introduces the number of suppliers into the incentive model to investigate the relationship between supply chain dispersion,that is,the number of suppliers,social integrity,and incentive strength.The study finds that the optimal number of suppliers depends on social integrity,regulatory cost,and incentive strength.There is a positive correlation between social integrity and the number of suppliers,while regulatory costs and incentive strength have a negative correlation with the number of suppliers.That means,the higher the social integrity,the lower the regulatory cost;and the lower the incentive intensity,the more optimal suppliers can be selected.展开更多
文摘Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Research shows that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.The output coefficient is positively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Reducing absolute risk aversion,increasing output coefficient and increasing government incentives can effectively motivate NPO to actively participate in social rescue activities.
文摘In the context of adulteration by suppliers,downstream firms need to choose between incentives and regulation to ensure product quality.Studies have shown that the adulteration behavior of suppliers increases with the degree of dispersion of suppliers,that is,the number of suppliers increases.Therefore,based on the assumption that the number of suppliers impacts quality uncertainty,this paper further introduces the number of suppliers into the incentive model to investigate the relationship between supply chain dispersion,that is,the number of suppliers,social integrity,and incentive strength.The study finds that the optimal number of suppliers depends on social integrity,regulatory cost,and incentive strength.There is a positive correlation between social integrity and the number of suppliers,while regulatory costs and incentive strength have a negative correlation with the number of suppliers.That means,the higher the social integrity,the lower the regulatory cost;and the lower the incentive intensity,the more optimal suppliers can be selected.
