Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication

Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists＇ expertise and information in evaluating projects.

Design of Creative Incentive Contract of Cultural and Creative Industry Chain from Dual Perspective

The duality of cultural and creative industry can maintain the independence of creative birth and management as well as taking into account of the artistic and marketability of creativity.Income distribution contracts that link the design process to the commercial value of creative ideas can solve the problem of quantitative incentives for creative subjects.At the same time,it can encourage creative subjects to complete commercial and artistic design activities.The principal-agent relationship between the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain is utilized to stimulate the creation of creative ideas in line with market conditions,so as to solve the problem of duality reconciliation of cultural and creative industries.Through the design of the cultural creative industry chain dual task creative incentive contract,in the process of encouraging creative design subjects to complete the design of the work to give consideration to the coordination of duality.By analyzing the influences of design capability,risk,cost coefficient and binary correlation on the optimal investment level and the optimal risk sharing level of creative subjects in two types of design activities,the input transfer caused by the variation of the above conditions is further discussed.

Research on Corporate Governance-based Problem of Financial Accounting Information

This article makes a detailed analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and financial accounting information under the framework of corporate governance, with the help of the principles of information economics and institutional economics. By taking into considerations of the agency issues arising form the separation of the managers from the owners under the modem corporate environment in order to solve agency conflict and to realize right restricting and benefit grouping. The mechanism of financial accounting information produced internally from the mechanism of corporate governance. Based on this understanding, this article discusses how financial accounting information works in both internal and external corporate governance mechanism. And explores the application mechanism of financial accounting information associating with stock price and introduces the function of corporate governance to guarantee the quality of accounting information respectively, respectively paying particular emphasis on the two goals of financial accounting-the decision useful and the accountability approach.