Decentralized Optimal Control and Stabilization of Interconnected Systems With Asymmetric Information

The paper addresses the decentralized optimal control and stabilization problems for interconnected systems subject to asymmetric information.Compared with previous work,a closed-loop optimal solution to the control problem and sufficient and necessary conditions for the stabilization problem of the interconnected systems are given for the first time.The main challenge lies in three aspects:Firstly,the asymmetric information results in coupling between control and estimation and failure of the separation principle.Secondly,two extra unknown variables are generated by asymmetric information(different information filtration)when solving forward-backward stochastic difference equations.Thirdly,the existence of additive noise makes the study of mean-square boundedness an obstacle.The adopted technique is proving and assuming the linear form of controllers and establishing the equivalence between the two systems with and without additive noise.A dual-motor parallel drive system is presented to demonstrate the validity of the proposed algorithm.

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND NONLINEAR DEMAND

The challenge for supply chain management is to create appropriate supply chain contracts so as to optimize the system performance. To examine the role of asymmetric information in a two-echelon supply chain system and derive supply chain contracts to deal with existing asymmetric information, a two level supply chain model including one Supplier and one retailer under the demand of price elasticity is developed. By using the principalagent principle and the optimal control theory, three types of supply chain contract, i. e. , a wholesale pricing contract, a two-parameter linear and a two-parameter nonlinear contracts are obtained. In these contracts, the Supplier has asymmetric information about the retailer cost structure. Simulation results show that the two-parameter contracts are more effective strategies to achieve supply chain coordination.

Farmers' seed choice behaviors under asymmetrical information: Evidence from maize farming in China

the financial support of the National Social Science Foundation of China （14ZDA038）;the National Natural Science Foundation of China （71222302;71373255;71573133）;the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences （2012RC102）

Credit Rationing in Medium-small Enterprises Credit Market under Asymmetric Information

Credit rationing has been an objective phenomenon in medium-small enterprises credit market of China. By analyzing the present situation of medium-small enterprises credit market of China, this study gives a new credit rationing model fitting medium-small enterprises credit market of China well. It has been showed in the empirical study that different factor has each different influence on medium-small enterprises credit market; further more, only the change of chastisement factor can make the medium-small enterprises credit market achieve whole success, but other factors can merely get integrant success even though under the most ideal condition.

Quantity discount contracts for supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and disruptions

The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information, two all-unit quantity discount contract models, fixed expected-profit percentage discount(FEPD) and fixed wholesale-pricing percentage discount(FWPD) under asymmetric information are proposed in a regular scenario. When the retailer's cost distribution fluctuates due to disruptions, the optimal emergency strategies of supply chains are obtained under asymmetric information. Using numerical methods, the impact of cost disruptions on decisions about the regular wholesale price, discount wholesale price, order quantity and expected profits of the retailer, the supplier as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the FEPD policy is more robust and adaptable than the FWPD policy in disruption circumstances.

Cooperative Mechanism of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

The cooperative mechanism is one main issue in the decentralized supply chain system, especially in an asymmetric information structure. We analyze the non-cooperative game behavior of a 2-echelon distribution supply chain, compare the results with the system optimal solution, and give the supplier dominated cooperative mechanisms. We also analyze the validity of our contract under the asymmetric retailers' holding cost information and give some useful conclusions.

Optimization of Supplier Switching with Asymmetric Information

The buyer-supplier relationship plays a great role in most economic systems. The buying firm usually tries to find a new supplier who provides products with satisfying quality and lower price. A broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer-supplier relationships, but limited research is on the circumstances under which a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. In this paper, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) which induces the entrant supplier to report his true cost is considered, and the participation constraint (PC) which ensures the entrant supplier to get at least reservation profit is taken into account. Then the supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm's total procurement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier, the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost, and the buying firm's switching cost is considered as a function of the switching quantity. With the theoretical analysis of IC, PC and the proposed model, the optimal supplier switching strategy can be obtained. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the switching strategy.

Quantity Discount Scheme in Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

Quantity discount scheme plays an important role in supply chain management. The different quantity discount schemes under symmetric （full） information and asymmetric information, are analyzed by using principal-agent and optimal control theory. As a result, the research reveals that the optimal quantity discount solution under symmetric information is a special case of that under asymmetric information. At the same price, the critical value of quantity discount under asymmetric information is much lower than that under asymmetric information. Therefore, this leads to less cost for retailers and smaller profit for their supplier.

Research on the Problem of Market Allocation Under the Condition of Asymmetric Information

In contemporary society, the problem of information asymmetry in talent markets has been becoming more prominent. On one hand, the company and candidates fight against each other based on the information available, so both of them could make fraud that will make the market level lower and lower. On the other hand, former scholars have studied from enterprises＇ perspective and put forward methods to solve it based on the aspect of improving the technology and standard mechanism, which could not solve the problem of information asymmetry thoroughly. Consequently, this research put up with the idea that the market can reduce information asymmetry through the establishing personnel information database and related platforms, which has a great practical significance on realizing the optimal allocation of the market and saving cost. At the same time, this study discussed the problems of information asymmetry fundamentally, which was of great importance to enrich the related theory research. Specific models were constructed through two perspectives from the enterprise and the candidates. And then two models would be eventually integrated into a large system. Finally, this research put all related information into a system, which was beneficial to the optimal allocation of human resources with constraints of the market environment.

Endogenous Explanation for Random Fluctuation of Stock Price and Its Application: Based on the View of Repeated Game with Asymmetric Information

In this paper, we characterize the players’ behavior in the stock market by the repeated game model with asymmetric information. We show that the discount price process of stock is a martingale driven by Brownian motion, and give an endogenous explanation for the random fluctuation of stock price: the randomizations in the market is due to the randomizations in the strategy of the informed player which hopes to avoid revealing his private information. On this basis, through studying the corresponding option pricing problem furtherly, we can give the expression of function φ.

Analysis on the Effect of Asymmetric Information on Product Supply Chain and Pricing

Along with the vigorous development of the markel economy, the transactions in the market are also increasingly frequent. In all kinds of market transactions, there are more or less inIbrmation asynunetry phenomena. Asynmaetric information makes supply chain unable to give a real reaction to the relationship between market supply and demand, and the personnel in the channels of supply chain are unable to make the optimal pricing, so that the overall profits are affected. Therefore, asymmetric information should be controlled within the normal range, for the purpose of ensuring the normal operation and healthy development of the market transactions.

Benign Interaction Between Rural Information Service and Farmers' Income

Based on the improvement of interactive relationship between rural information service system and farmers＇ income, accompanied by the serious restriction to its mutual promotion caused by such problems as asymmetric information, focusing on introduction of rural information service infrastructure while ignored the application of them, shortage of human resource on information and so on, this paper proposed corresponding measures respectively to promote the benign interaction development between rural information service and farmers＇ income.

Study on Pollution Cost Control Model under Asymmetric Information Based on Principal Agent

Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,considers pollution control quality level,pollution control quality inspection and pollution control cost model,and establishes pollution control cost model of management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise,including rational constraints of pollutant discharge enterprise.And it analyzes principal-agent relationship between the two under condition of asymmetric information,and un-observability of pollution control level is shown as hiding information of sewage enterprises.In essence,it is problem of adverse selection in principal-agent.Pollution control cost of management is objective function.The first order condition of pollution control cost of sewage enterprise is transformed into state space equation,and optimal control of problem is solved by using maximum principle.In particular,management authority,as principal,uses pollution control provisions to reward,punish and encourage pollutant discharge enterprises as agents.

SCM Implementation Decisions Under Asymmetric Information: An Agency Approach

The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.

Venture Capital Finance-Eliminating Double Sided Moral Hazards through Trade-off between Economic and Behavioural Economic Aspects-A Case Analysis

Venture capital finance has two aspects,the economic aspect and the behavioural economic aspect.The economic aspect includes issues such as conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist(VC),asymmetric information,moral hazard,and compensation issues for both the parties.The behavioural economic aspect is related to relational factors such as empathy and a feeling of fairness and trust shown by both the parties.Therefore,while deciding the financer,entrepreneur should consider both relational aspect and value add services of the financier and strike optimal trade-off.The ensuing case analysis has been carried out focusing on elimination of double-sided moral hazards through a proper trade-off between economy and behavioural economic theories(aspects).The performance of the venture can be enhanced by balancing both of these theories in practice.An equity distribution that represents economic reward is a source of motivation for both the parties to put optimal efforts towards the success of the venture.This was seen in the case analysis,when the parties perceived the initial equity distribution agreement as fair,the satisfaction level of all the parties increased,leading to the reduction in the possibility of double-sided moral hazard and ensuring the success of the venture.Moreover,the analysis shows that information sharing and two-way communication increases trust and improves decision quality.It further focusses on how feedback and proper work distribution results in efficiency of performance for each of the stakeholders,leading to reduced probability of double-sided moral hazards.

Asymmetric Information in Combating Terrorism: Is the Threat Just a Bluff?

This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.Asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.

Simple Contracts to Coordinate the Capacity Procurement Model with Asymmetric Demand Information

This paper studies the important problem of how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information.Under the model,the supplier has to secure necessary capacity before receiving a firm order from the manufacturer who possesses private demand information for her product.Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her forecast truthfully and the supplier to build enough capacity.In the literature,some elaborate contracts are designed to solve the problem.However,the authors prove that two simple conventional contracts(linear capacity reservation contract and payback agreement)can coordinate the supply chain and guarantee credible information sharing.Besides,the authors propose a new mechanism in which punishment is imposed in the payment function to bind the parties.To avoid punishment,the firms will choose the best decision for the entire supply chain.The contracts in this paper are all simple and easy to implement.The authors believe this work provides some insights to design coordination contracts in theory or in practice.

Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Market Regulation

This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.

Asymmetric Perceptions of Information, Transparency, and Learning Intentions: An Investigation and Analysis of Undergraduates’ Willingness to Study General Elective Courses in Eastern Chinese Colleges

To implement quality-oriented education in colleges and universities,the courses guide and significantly promote the holistic cultivation of students’personalities,while also rounding out the university curriculum.However,the learning effects are not expected.The authors develop a model on student learning intentions based on a questionnaire survey of 5,000 undergraduates in Eastern China,utilizing multiple regression analyses.Our results show that learning intention is closely related to course information transparency,teachers’opportunistic behaviors,the perceptions of students towards the course,and their trust in the classroom experience.Consequently,to decrease the degree of student asymmetric perceptions of information,course information transparency should be improved,and opportunistic teacher behaviors should be eliminated.This may result in enhancing students’learning intentions.